Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-3105.
May 28, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a motion for a new trial filed by plaintiff Regina Harris, on behalf of her minor child Arthur Harris. In addition, plaintiff seeks clarification on whether the Court's remand order was a type four or six remand, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). For the following reasons, the Court denies plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.
I. Legal Standard
Plaintiff's motion requests "a new trial" under Rule 59(a). The Court disposed of this matter by summary judgment, not by trial; therefore, it will construe plaintiff's motion as a motion to reconsider under Rule 59(e) or 60.
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not formally recognize a motion to reconsider in haec verba, the Fifth Circuit has held that a motion to reconsider a dispositive pretrial motion may be classified under either Rule 59 or Rule 60, depending upon the time of filing. See Pryor v. United States Postal Service, 769 F.2d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 1985); Lavespere v. Niagra Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1994) ( en banc). As plaintiff filed her motion for reconsideration more than ten days after judgment, the motion falls under Rule 60(b) as a motion for "relief from judgment." See Lavespere, 910 F.3d at 173. Under Rule 60(b) a court will grant relief from a final judgment or order only upon a showing of one of:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). Plaintiff does not state which subsection of Rule 60 provides relief from judgment in this case.
After reviewing the six bases, the Court finds that Rule 60(b)(6) is the most apposite. Under Rule 60(b)(6) a court may grant relief from a final judgment or order for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Id. 60(b)(6). This relief is extraordinary, and the movant bears the burden of demonstrating the exceptional circumstances that warrant relief. See Heirs of H.P. Guerra v. United States, 207 F.3d 763, 767 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613-14, 69 S.Ct. 384, 390 (1949)); Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173-74 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds, Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 27 F.3d 1069, 1075 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1994) ( en banc). To determine whether Rule 60(b) relief is appropriate, a district court considers the following factors: (1) that final judgments should not lightly be disturbed; (2) that the Rule 60(b) motion is not to be used as a substitute for appeal; (3) that the rule should be liberally construed in order to achieve substantial justice; (4) whether the motion was made within a reasonable time; (5) whether — if the judgment was a default or a dismissal in which there was no consideration of the merits — the interest in deciding cases on the merits outweighs, in the particular case, the interest in finality of judgments, and there is merit in the movant's claim or defense . . . (7) whether there are intervening equities that would make it inequitable to grant relief; and (8) any other factor that is relevant to the justice of the judgment under attack, bearing always in mind that the principle of finality of judgments serves a most useful purpose for society, the courts, and the litigants. . . . Crutcher v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 746 F.2d 1076, 1082 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Gould, 301 F.2d 353, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1962) (quoting 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 60.19, at 237-39)). The Court accordingly considers the plaintiff's arguments in the context of these factors.
II. Discussion
A. Whether partial summary judgment was properly granted
In the Court's January 3, 2002 order: 1) the Court found that the record was not adequately developed as to Arthur's asserted psychological and behavioral problems, because the ALJ erred by failing to obtain the medical records of Dr. Dowling, Arthur' treating psychiatrist, and accordingly remanded the case to the ALJ to develop the record and to reconsider whether Arthur was disabled in light of that new information; and 2) the Court found there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the ALJ's conclusion that Arthur was not disabled by virtue of asthma or speech and cognitive difficulties alone, and therefore approved the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that summary judgment be granted on those issues. (Rec. Doc. 17.) plaintiff now asserts that the Court's finding that the ALJ erred in failing to subpoena Dr. Dowling's records and remanding the case is inconsistent with its granting summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner on the asthma, and communication and cognitive issues. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should reevaluate all of his conclusions, rather than limiting his evaluation to Arthur's alleged psychological and behavioral problems, in light of the information contained in Dr. Dowling's medical records.
The Court first finds that plaintiff's argument that summary judgment on the asthma issue was improperly granted is meritless. plaintiff has not shown how Dr. Dowling's psychiatric treatment records, might alter the ALJ's determination that Arthur's asthma was severe but not disabling. See Kane v. Heckler, 731 F.2d 1216, 1220 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding that reversal is required when claimant can show that had ALJ done his duty in developing an adequate record, claimant "could and would have adduced evidence that might have altered the result."). Indeed, plaintiff does not assert that Dr. Dowling ever treated Arthur for asthma. Accordingly, the Court denies plaintiff's motion for reconsideration on the asthma issue.
The Court next turns to plaintiff's argument that summary judgment was improvidently granted on Arthur's cognitive and communication difficulties. Here, the ALJ found that Arthur had no significant limitations in cognitive development and no limitation in speech based on medical and school records. Plaintiff allegedly saw Dr. Dowling for behavioral problems, for which he was prescribed prozac. There is no evidence that Dr. Dowling evaluated plaintiff's speech or conducted an educational assessment. Thus, plaintiff has not shown how Dr. Dowling's psychiatric treatment records would alter the ALJ's conclusion that Arthur was not disabled based on these limitations alone.
The record reflects that Arthur had never seen a psychiatrist until February 25, 1997, around the time that Arthur's mother was informed that Arthur's disability status would be redetermined according to the new statute. Indeed, there was no assertion of behavioral problems until then.
The Court reiterates that it remands for the ALJ to reevaluate Arthur's eligibility for disability in light of Dr. Dowling's medical records and in combination with Arthur's other impairments to the extent that the ALJ found that they existed. See e.g. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926.
The ALJ is required to consider all relevant evidence in the record to determine medical equivalence. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926.
B. Clarification Regarding the Type of Remand Granted
Plaintiff also asks that the Court clarify which type of remand it granted in its order.
The Fifth Circuit explained that under 42 U.S.C. § 406 (g), in the context of an appeal of a denial of benefits by the Appeals Council, a district court may remand to the Appeals Council in only two circumstances:
[W]e [have] explained closely the language of § 405(g) and identified two kinds of remands under that statute: (1) remands pursuant to the fourth sentence, and (2) remands pursuant to the sixth sentence. The fourth sentence of § 405(g) authorizes a court to enter judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the case for rehearing . . . .
The sixth sentence of § 405(g) . . . describes an entirely different kind of remand. The district court does not affirm, modify, or reverse the Secretary's decision; it does not rule in any way as to the correctness of the administrative determination. Rather, the court remands because new evidence has come to light that was not available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding and that evidence might have changed the outcome of the prior proceedings. The statute provides that following a sentence six remand, the Secretary must return to the district court to file with the court any such additional or modified findings of fact and decision, and a transcript of the additional record and testimony upon which his action in modifying or affirming was based.Istre v. Apfel, 208 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2000), quoting Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 97-99, 111 S.Ct. 2157 (1991) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Court issued a substantive ruling affirming the Secretary's decision that Arthur was not disabled by virtue of asthma or speech and cognitive difficulties. The Court issued a substantive ruling by reversing the portion of the case in which the Secretary found that Arthur was not disabled based on psychological and behavioral problems. (Rec. Doc. 17, at 10-11.) In its opinion, the Court first noted that reversal for failure to subpoena records is required when claimant demonstrates that he "could and would have adduced evidence that might have altered the result," and then specifically found that "the claimant was prejudiced by that failure [to subpoena records] because medical evidence. . . . might have led the ALJ to a different decision." Id., citing Kane, 731 F.2d at 1220. Based on its substantive ruling that the Secretary's decision was not correct because there was an inadequate record, the Court remanded the proceeding and ordered the ALJ to develop the record on the issue of claimant's asserted psychological/behavioral disorder by subpoenaing his psychiatrist's records.
The Court's remand order in which the Court issued two substantive rulings, one partially reversing and one partially affirming the ALJ's decisions, falls into the category of a fourth sentence remand. See Istre, 208 F.3d at 520 (stating that a remand order that explicitly reversed the decision of the secretary placed the remand squarely within the dictates of sentence four); compare Huff v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1352, at *2 (10th Cir. 2000) (vacating the district court's remand as not satisfying the requirements of sentence four because the district court's order contained no substantive ruling on the merits of the Commissioner's decision, but merely remanded the action to the agency for further proceedings).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.