Opinion
Case No. 2:09-cv-256.
February 17, 2011
OPINION
Plaintiff David Hardy, an inmate currently confined at the Mid-Michigan/Central Michigan Correctional Facility, filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Chaplain James Bolton, Warden Greg McQuiggin, and Corrections Officer Unknown Donaghe.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Defendants did not allow him to participate in Ramadan in violation of his First Amendment rights. Plaintiff is seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
Presently before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and/or Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Plaintiff has filed a response and the matter is ready for decision. Because both sides have asked that the Court consider evidentiary materials beyond the pleadings, the standards applicable to summary judgment apply. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005); Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005). The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." State Farm Fire Cas. Co. v. McGowan, 421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)); see also Tucker v. Union of Needletrades Indus. Textile Employees, 407 F.3d 784, 787 (6th Cir. 2005). The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 400 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir. 2005).
A prisoner's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, which Defendants have the burden to plead and prove. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919-21 (2007). A moving party without the burden of proof need show only that the opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial. See Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 787 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398 F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). A moving party with the burden of proof faces a "substantially higher hurdle." Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002); Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001). "Where the moving party has the burden — the plaintiff on a claim for relief or the defendant on an affirmative defense — his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party." Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting W. SCHWARZER, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 487-88 (1984)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit repeatedly has emphasized that the party with the burden of proof "must show the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it." Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561 (quoting 11 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.13[1], at 56-138 (3d ed. 2000); Cockrel, 270 F.2d at 1056 (same). Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion "is inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact." Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).
Defendants claim that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies. Pursuant to the applicable portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PRLA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner bringing an action with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must exhaust his available administrative remedies. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 733 (2001). A prisoner must first exhaust available administrative remedies, even if the prisoner may not be able to obtain the specific type of relief he seeks in the state administrative process. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 520; Booth, 532 U.S. at 741; Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 1999). In order to properly exhaust administrative remedies, prisoners must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the deadlines and other applicable procedural rules. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922-23 (2007); Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2386 (2006). "Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to `properly exhaust.'" Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 922-23.
MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 (effective July 9, 2007), sets forth the applicable grievance procedures for prisoners in MDOC custody at the time relevant to this complaint. Inmates must first attempt to resolve a problem orally within two business days of becoming aware of the grievable issue, unless prevented by circumstances beyond his or her control Id. at ¶ P. If oral resolution is unsuccessful, the inmate may proceed to Step I of the grievance process and submit a completed grievance form within five business days of the attempted oral resolution. Id. at ¶ P. The Policy Directive also provides the following directions for completing grievance forms: "The issues shall be stated briefly. Information provided shall be limited to thefacts involving the issue being grieved (i.e., who, what, when, where, why, how). Dates, times, places and names of all those involved in the issue being grieved are to be included." Id. at ¶ R (emphasis in original). The inmate submits the grievance to a designated grievance coordinator, who assigns it to a respondent. Id. at ¶ X.
If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does not receive a timely response, he may appeal to Step II by obtaining an appeal form within ten business days of the response, or if no response was received, within ten days after the response was due. Id. at ¶¶ T, DD. The respondent at Step II is designated by the policy, e.g., the regional health administrator for a medical care grievances. Id. at ¶ GG. If the inmate is still dissatisfied with the Step II response, or does not receive a timely Step II response, he may appeal to Step III. Id. at ¶ FF. The Step III form shall be sent within ten business days after receiving the Step II response, or if no Step II response was received, within ten business days after the date the Step II response was due. Id. at ¶ FF. The Grievance and Appeals Section is the respondent for Step III grievances on behalf of the MDOC director. Id. at ¶ GG. Time limitations shall be adhered to by the inmate and staff at all steps of the grievance process. Id. at ¶ X. "The total grievance process from the point of filing a Step I grievance to providing a Step III response shall be completed within 90 calendar days unless an extension has been approved. . . ." Id at ¶ HH.
Defendants assert that although Plaintiff filed step I grievances against both Bolton and Donaghe, he did not appeal the denial of either of these grievances to step II or III. Plaintiff concedes that this is the case, but asserts that the policy regarding grievances is confusing, and that he was unaware of the requirement that he appeal the grievances. The court notes that a plaintiff must pursue all levels of the administrative procedure before filing an action in federal court. See Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999) ("While we recognize that plaintiff made some attempt to go through the prison's grievance procedures, we must dismiss plaintiff's complaint because he filed his federal complaint before allowing the administrative process to be completed."). Plaintiff quotes paragraph B of the general information in MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130, which provides that "[c]omplaints filed by prisoners regarding grievable issues as defined in this policy serve to exhaust a prisoner's administrative remedies only when filed as a grievance through all three steps of the grievance process in compliance with this policy." Policy Directive 03.02.130, ¶ B. Plaintiff states that this is confusing because it does not clearly state that this applies to exhaustion of remedies with regard to federal lawsuits. The court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff's assertion. As noted above, the requirements for filing a grievance and appealing the denial of a grievance are clearly set forth in the policy directive. Plaintiff's assertion that it is unclear lacks merit.
Plaintiff also contends that the language of the policy directive, that prisoner "may" file a step II or III appeal indicates that such appeals are not mandatory. However, as noted above, Policy Directive 03.02.130, ¶ B clearly states that a prisoner must grieve through all three steps in order to exhaust his administrative remedies. Therefore, Plaintiff's contention lacks merit. The court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Because Defendants are correct that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the court need not address Defendants' arguments regarding the merits of Plaintiff's claims.
In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to sustain his burden of proof in response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket #17) be granted and that this case be dismissed in its entirety.
An Order and Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: February 17, 2011