Opinion
CIVIL NO: 3:16-CV-01514
07-16-2018
RONALD T. HANNIVIG, Plaintiff v. THE COUNTY OF LACKAWANNA, et al., Defendants
(Judge Mariani) () REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction.
The plaintiff Ronald T. Hannivig ("Mr. Hannivig") contends that the defendants violated his rights in connection with an August 6, 2015, Orphans' Court order adjudging him to be an incapacitated person, and his subsequent admission to Lackawanna Health and Rehabilitation Center. The defendants move to dismiss the complaint. For the reasons discussed below, we recommend that the Court grant their motions to dismiss.
Mr. Hannivig styles himself "Ronald T. Hannivig, an Internee Acting pro se" in his complaint. Doc. 1 at 1.
II. Background and Procedural History.
Mr. Hannivig began this action on July 22, 2016, by filing a complaint and an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Mr. Hannivig names the following as defendants: Lackawanna Acquisition I, LLC, d/b/a Lackawanna Health and Rehabilitation Center ("Lackawanna Health"); the County of Lackawanna Pennsylvania; Lackawanna Commissioners Patrick O'Malley, Laureen Cummings, and Jerry Notarianni; the Area Agency on Aging; Advocacy Alliance, Inc.; Serving Seniors, Inc.; Thomas Minora, MD; Matthew C. Haley, MD; Elizabeth Ciaravino, Ph.D.; and Antoinette M. Hamidian, Psy.D. CCC-SLP. His complaint seeks monetary relief under 18 U.S.C. § 242 ("and all other applicable sections"), as well as those addressed within Title 42, the Fourth Amendment, and "Federal RICO Statutes" for an array of accusations. Doc. 1 at 2. We start with a brief summary of Mr. Hannivig's allegations and of the state proceedings.
Mr. Hannivig also filed what he titled "Addendum [Three Additional Respondents]" on August 15, 2016. Doc. 13. Under the heading "MOTION to AMEND Complaint—[Enjoining Three (3) Additional Respondents]," Mr. Hannivig seeks to add Kim A. Giombetti, Esq., Nancy M. Barrasse, Esq., and Lawrence J. Moran, Esq. as additional defendants. Id. at 1-3. Mr. Hannivig alleges that they "clearly acted in concert when they willfully and with malice aforethought conspired to deprive" him of his rights. Id. at 2.
Judge Munley, in the Final Decree of the Orphans' Court, appointed Advocacy Alliance, Inc., as the "Permanent Plenary Guardian of Estate," and Serving Seniors, Inc., as the "Guardian of Person" for Mr. Hannivig. Doc. 9 at 26-27.
Mr. Hannivig alleges that on April 26, 2015, he called for an ambulance which took him to Moses-Taylor Hospital in Scranton, Pennsylvania. Doc. 1 at 2. Subsequently, because of a "disabling physical condition which had caused [him] to become totally incapacitated and in immediate real need of medical attention and assistance," Moses-Taylor Hospital transferred him to Lackawanna Health to undergo further treatment. Id. Mr. Hannivig categorizes Lackawanna Health's medical treatment and physical therapy as "physical torture," alleges that all named defendants "conspired to keep [him] interned" by restricting him to the building against his will and stealing his identification and belongings, and contends that all named defendants engaged in an ongoing criminal conspiracy. Id. at 2-3. Mr. Hannivig alleges that, after about 120 days in treatment, he was well enough to leave and should have been discharged or allowed to sign himself out against medical advice, and he would have left but for the defendants' conspiracy to intern him and "literally [hold him] a captive" by "implementing novel [criminal] methods and means." Id. at 3. He alleges the defendants had a financial incentive to keep him confined. Id. Mr. Hannivig asserts that "[s]enior staff" at Lackawanna Health aided and abetted "in what has been an evident and mutually beneficial conspiracy to rob [him] of [his] identification, strip [him] of [his] dignity and assets—moreover, have [him] interned for an indefinite period-of-time." Id.
In the meantime, on August 6, 2015, Judge Munley of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Orphans' Court Division concluded that Mr. Hannivig was an incapacitated person because of "bi-polar disorder with a history of alcohol abuse which has left him with conditions or disabilities which totally impair his capacity to receive and evaluate information effectively and to make and communicate decisions concerning management of his financial affairs or to meet essential requirements for his health and safety." Doc. 9 at 26. Judge Munley appointed Advocacy Alliance, Inc. as the guardian of the estate of Mr. Hannivig, and Serving Seniors, Inc. as the guardian of his person. Id. at 26-27.
In August, 2016, the defendants filed four separate motions to dismiss (1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (2) because the court lacks jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine insofar as Mr. Hannivig seeks review of the Orphans' Court finding that he is incapacitated; and (3) due to absolute judicial immunity. Docs. 9, 10, 14, 17.
Mr. Hannivig is an adjudicated incapacitated person and was provided with state-appointed guardians; however, Mr. Hannivig is proceeding in this action pro se. Due to his adjudicated status as an incapacitated person, this Court went to extraordinary lengths to appoint counsel and/or a guardian for Mr. Hannivig by granting extensions and staying this case through several orders since September 14, 2016, and requesting assistance from pro bono legal representatives. Docs. 24, 27, 36, 39, 43, 51. Upon exhausting the sources for obtaining pro bono representation and/or a guardian for Mr. Hannivig, the Court lifted its stay on June 27, 2018, despite a lack of counsel or guardian for Mr. Hannivig. Docs. 53, 54.
This Court is well aware of its obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 17. See Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2012).
III. Discussion.
A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine prevents this Court from reviewing the judgment of the Orphans' Court.
As argued by the defendants, "the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine applies here and should bar this Court from further consideration of this matter as it spawns from a state Orphans Court Case." Doc. 10 at 4. Because this argument concerns this Court's subject matter jurisdiction over the review of a prior state court ruling, we address it first.
"A finding that Rooker-Feldman bars a litigant's federal claims divests a District Court of subject matter jurisdiction over those claims." Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir. 2003). And "[f]ederal courts must determine that they have jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits." Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007). Rooker-Feldman applies to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). It "provides that federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to sit in direct review of state court decisions." Day v. Flordia, 563 F. App'x 878, 880 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. Rooker-Feldman applies when "(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff 'complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments;' (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments." Day, 563 F. App'x at 880 (citing Great W. Mining and Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010)).
Thus, to the extent that Mr. Hannivig seeks review of the final decree of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas Orphans' Court Division adjudging him an incapacitated person, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to review the Orphans' Court order; moreover, as he was advised by Judge Munley in the order itself, Mr. Hannivig has the "right to appeal this determination to the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and, further, [he] may petition [the Orphans' Court] at any time to modify or terminate this guardianship." Doc. 10 at 18. But Mr. Hannivig seeks damages for the actions of the defendants both before and after the Orphans' Court order, and his claims for such are not barred by Rooker-Feldman.
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Standards.
In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court may dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." When reviewing a motion to dismiss, "[w]e must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). In making that determination, we "consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the [plaintiff's] claims are based upon these documents." Id. at 230.
"A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)." I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d 762, 769-70 (M.D. Pa. 2012). "Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and of the grounds upon which it rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but more is required than labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). "A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Id.
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, and the court must draw all reasonable inferences from the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). But a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not "assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief."Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and "'however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a "short and plain" statement of a cause of action.
C. Mr. Hannivig fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under 18 U.S.C. § 242.
Apart from mentioning that he seeks relief under 18 U.S.C. § 242, Mr. Hannivig does not inform us of the basis for that relief, why this law applies, or what facts satisfy its requirements, except to couch some of his allegations in the language of "under the color and auspices of authority." Doc. 1 at 2-3. Mr. Hannivig alleges no facts supporting his claim, or alleging how any authorities acted under color of any law to deprive him of his rights. Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. § 242 does not allow for civil monetary damages as relief; instead, it only allows for fines, imprisonment, both, or death. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) ("shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for like, or both, or may be sentenced to death."); see also Colon-Montanez v. Pennsylvania Healthcare Service Staffs, 530 F. App'x 115, 118 (3d Cir. 2013) (concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 242 provides "no private right of action for use by a litigant such as Colon-Montanez"). Accordingly, Mr. Hannivig fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under 18 U.S.C. § 242 since he cannot bring a private cause of action under this statute.
D. Mr. Hannivig fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under the Fourth Amendment.
Mr. Hannivig alleges that, "as illegal searches and seizures is [sic] pertinent in this-instance-cause-at-hand: [sic] The 4th Amendment of our U.S. Constitution . . . becomes germane." Doc. 1 at 2. He presumably asserts as bearing upon this claim that, a few weeks prior to August 7, 2015, he "discovered that all of [his] identification, debit cards," U.S. Passport and $130.00 in cash "had vanished," that he was told by "[s]enior staff" at the facility that his belongings were in Scranton, and that no chain of custody document exists. Id. at 3. Regardless of the veracity of these claims, the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment only proscribes "government action; it is wholly inapplicable 'to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental officer.'" U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (citing Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980)); see also U.S. v. Mitchell, 625 F. App'x 113, 117 (3d Cir. 2015). Moreover, Mr. Hannivig fails to allege which of the named defendants allegedly took his property. Doc. 1 at 3. Thus, Mr. Hannivig fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under the Fourth Amendment.
E. Mr. Hannivig fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").
Mr. Hannivig contends that because "such despicable criminal acts and behavior patterns, ongoing policies and overt practices must be incorporated into this cause" RICO applies to this case. Doc. 1 at 2. For the remainder of his complaint, Mr. Hannivig lays out his claims that a vast criminal conspiracy exists which seeks to deprive him of his rights. Id. at 2-7. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 lays out the elements necessary to establish a RICO claim, requiring "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) (footnote omitted).
Establishing these elements requires "'continuity plus relationship' among the predicate acts," of which there must be at least two in order to satisfy the 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) definition of "a pattern of racketeering activity." Liberty Bell Bank v. Rogers, No. 16-1323, 2018 WL 834197, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 13, 2018) (citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14). 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) defines racketeering activity as any predicate act from a long list of state or federal offenses. Predicate acts "are related when they have 'the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics.'" Liberty Bell Bank, 2018 WL 834197, at *3 (citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14). "Continuity is a temporal concept . . . 'both a closed- and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition.'" Hughes v. Consol-Pa Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594, 609 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 241 (1989)).
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides for civil monetary remedies for "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of § 1962 of this chapter." But Mr. Hannivig fails to allege any operative facts to establish any of the four elements of § 1962, instead offering merely accusations and conclusions, furthering a narrative of a "mutually beneficial conspiracy to rob" him of his belongings and dignity, including County Commissioners, the "Kids for Cash" scandal, multiple physicians and state agencies, a "Sham Competency Hearing" complete with a "deliberately ineffective appointed Attorney-of-Record," and an allegedly complicit judge. Doc. 1 at 2-7. Because Mr. Hannivig fails to allege facts which satisfy the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 in his complaint, he fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
F. Leave to Amend.
"[I]f a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). Here, given the liberal requirement for leave to amend and because Mr. Hannivig has not yet amended his complaint, we recommend leave to amend.
IV. Recommendations.
Accordingly, we recommend that the Court grant the defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint. (Docs. 9, 10, 14, 17). We further recommend that Mr. Hannivig be granted leave to file an amended complaint.
Any amended complaint shall be complete in all respects. It shall contain all of the plaintiff's claims against all of the defendants. It shall be a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the complaints already filed. It shall not incorporate by reference any of the previous complaints. Any amended complaint shall be titled as an amended complaint and shall contain the docket number of this case.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 16th day of July, 2018.
S/Susan E . Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
Chief United States Magistrate Judge