Opinion
NO. 2015-CA-000381-MR
08-12-2016
RANCIE WAYNE HANNAH APPELLANT v. ANGELA REBECCA HANNAH APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Gordon J. Dill Ashland, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Sharon E. Rowsey Ashland, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANIE MCKENZIE-WELLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CI-00381 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: DIXON, MAZE, AND STUMBO, JUDGES. MAZE, JUDGE: Rancie Hannah appeals from a February 6, 2015 order of the Greenup Circuit Court denying his motion to reduce child support. He alleges that the Greenup Circuit Court abused its discretion by maintaining his existing child support obligation of $4,192.00 per month and by awarding $5,000.00 in attorney fees to Angela Hannah's counsel. After our review of the record, we conclude that the Greenup Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in taking either of those actions. Hence, we affirm.
Background
The appellant, Rancie Hannah (hereinafter "Dr. Hannah"), and the appellee, Angela Hannah (hereinafter "Mrs. Hannah"), were married on September 28, 1991 and separated on or around April 27, 2009. Four children were born of the marriage, two of whom were minors at the time of the dissolution. Dr. Hannah is a practicing physician and Mrs. Hannah, who was not employed outside of the home, cared for the children.
On April 20, 2012, the trial court ordered Dr. Hannah to pay $4,192.00 per month in child support and $2,900.00 per month in spousal maintenance. Dr. Hannah appealed that ruling to this Court in 2012, alleging that because the adjusted parental gross income surpassed that provided for in the child support guideline table, the trial court abused its discretion in setting an excessive child support award. We remanded the case to the trial court for specific findings concerning the amount of child support awarded. See Hannah v. Hannah, 2012-CA-001578-MR, 2013 WL 6409318 (Ky. App. 2013).
On remand, the trial court conducted a hearing concerning the expenses for the two minor children on December 1, 2014. Testimony during this hearing included Mrs. Hannah's statement that the expense affidavit she entered in the original trial needed to be amended because the minor children's involvement in sports and academic teams resulted in increased costs that were not present at that time. Dr. Hannah also testified to an increase in expenses on behalf of the children.
On February 6, 2015, the trial court entered an order maintaining Dr. Hannah's child support obligation at $4,192.00 per month but discontinuing spousal maintenance based upon evidence that Mrs. Hannah had not used those payments to pursue further education or employment. In addition, the trial court awarded $5,000.00 in attorney fees to Mrs. Hannah's counsel. Dr. Hannah filed the present appeal from that order on March 9, 2015.
Standard of Review
On appeal, Dr. Hannah challenges the amount of the child support award. He asserts that the trial court's order entered on February 6, 2015, which maintained the child support at the amount of $4,192.00 per month, constituted an abuse of discretion because $2,096.00 per child is "excessive on its face." In addition, Dr. Hannah alleges that imposing the award of the attorney fees was an abuse of the court's discretion because the court did not hear or provide any evidence of how that amount was calculated. He further argues that the award was intended to be "punitive in nature" because he was unwilling to pay the money awarded to Mrs. Hannah in the original judgment while awaiting the outcome of his appeal.
We review child support awards according to the abuse of discretion standard. Holland v. Holland, 290 S.W.3d 671, 674 (Ky. App. 2009). The test implemented for abuse of discretion analyzes whether a trial court's decision was "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Downing v. Downing, 45 S.W.3d 449, 454 (Ky. App. 2001) (citing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)). Therefore, we will affirm the trial court's holding in this case unless there was a "flagrant miscarriage of justice." Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky. 1983). We also review an award of attorney fees according to the abuse of discretion standard. Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513, 520 (Ky. App. 2001).
Analysis
With respect to the issue of child support in this case, the trial court was authorized to deviate from the child support table under KRS 403.211(3)(e) as the "combined monthly adjusted parental gross income [was] in excess of the Kentucky Child Support Guidelines." When this occurs, a trial court has the authority to use its discretion in setting the child support award. Downing, 45 S.W.3d at 454. "A reviewing court should defer to the lower court's discretion in child support matters whenever possible. As long as the trial court's discretion comports with the guidelines, or any deviation is adequately justified in writing, [a reviewing court] will not disturb the trial court's ruling in this regard." Id.
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
Here, it is uncontested that the parties had a combined parental adjusted gross income that surpassed the child support guidelines. Dr. Hannah testified that his monthly gross income was approximately $20,000.00. Rather, Dr. Hannah alleges that the trial court abused its discretion because its deviation from the statutory guidelines, which only provide for up to a combined monthly gross income of $15,000, took the form of an impermissible extrapolation of the guidelines, resulting in an excessive child support award.
In Downing, a Domestic Relations Commissioner calculated child support under similar circumstances by looking to three factors: "(1) the reasonable needs of the children; (2) the standard of living enjoyed by the parents; and (3) a mathematical projection of the child support guidelines." Id. at 454. Of those factors, the Downing Court concluded that it was unreasonable for the Commissioner to rely primarily upon the mathematical projection of the child support guidelines for its calculation of the award and that the Commissioner's conclusion lacked support from specific findings as to how the reasonable needs of the children were met by that particular sum. Id. at 455-56. As a result, the Court held that "any decision to set child support above the guidelines must be based primarily on the child's needs, as set out in specific supporting findings." Id. at 456. The reasonable needs of the children are calculated based on the standard of living experienced by the children before and after the marriage was dissolved as well as "the financial circumstances of the parties, their station in life, their age and physical condition, and expenses in educating the children." Id.
We must disagree with Dr. Hannah's argument that the trial court abused its discretion by maintaining the previous child support award. The trial court's findings reflect that its calculation of the award took all of the Downing factors into account and afforded them proper weight. First, the trial court's mathematical projection concerning the child support award was valid, as there is no indication from the record that it was the lone or even primary basis for the final amount.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by maintaining the previous child support award. The trial court's specific findings reflect that the reasonable needs of the children formed the primary basis of the award and carried the most weight in its calculation. Mrs. Hannah submitted an expense affidavit detailing the extracurricular sports and academic activities in which the children were involved and the costs that would be incurred to meet the children's basic needs of food, shelter, and clothing within the lifestyle to which they were accustomed. Dr. Hannah was aware of, and did not dispute, that the expenses for the children increased due to their involvement in activities or due to their age. He even submitted an expense sheet of his own that indicated the expenses for the children had increased. These facts were properly accounted for and considered in the trial court's findings.
Finally, in determining the reasonable needs of the children pursuant to Downing, the trial court properly considered the standard of living to which the children had grown accustomed. The record reflects that the intact family's standard of living was high due to Dr. Hannah's profession and income. After the dissolution of the marriage, Dr. Hannah continued to earn the same amount. Mrs. Hannah, on the other hand, testified that she remained unemployed and had no sources of income other than spousal maintenance of $2,900.00 per month until its discontinuance on February 6, 2015.
Based upon the demonstrated disparity between the standard of living each parent was capable of sustaining individually, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in resolving this final Downing factor in favor of Mrs. Hannah. Mrs. Hannah alone did not possess the financial resources to keep the children in the lifestyle to which they were accustomed and engaged in the activities in which they were involved. In short, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to factor those expenses into the child support award based on the children's needs. Therefore, we conclude that the child support award was not excessive and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in maintaining Dr. Hannah's prior monthly child support obligation.
Turning to Dr. Hannah's argument that the trial court erred in imposing attorney fees, we note that, "with the exception of a specific contractual provision ... or a fee-shifting statute, each party assumes responsibility for his or her own attorneys' fees." Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Commonwealth, 179 S.W.3d 830, 842 (Ky. 2005). KRS 403.220 is such an exception. Our Supreme Court has summarized the statute as providing that a trial court can award attorney fees in a dissolution action "only if there exists a disparity in the relative financial resources of the parties in favor of the payor." Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 272 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d at 519)).
KRS 403.220 reads, in its entirety,
The court from time to time after considering the financial resources of both parties may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter and for attorney's fees, including sums for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding or after entry of judgment. The court may order that the amount be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in his name.
The policy and the purpose behind KRS 403.220's fee-shifting provision, as recognized by our Supreme Court, "is simply to ensure the fairness of domestic relations proceedings: 'to prevent one party in a divorce action from controlling the outcome solely because he or she is in a position of financial superiority[.]'" Rumpel v. Rumpel, 438 S.W.3d 354, 363 (Ky. 2014) (quoting Neidlinger at 521). Therefore, if the trial court finds that a disparity of income exists, it enjoys wide discretion to award costs and fees, and to "sanction or discourage" certain behavior. Rumpel at 363 (quoting Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, 521 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Ky. 1975) and Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 937 (Ky. 1990)).
The disparity in income in this case could hardly be greater. The record reflects that Dr. Hannah enjoyed a sizeable income while Mrs. Hannah had no source of income. Accordingly, Dr. Hannah does not contest that a disparity in income exists; nevertheless, he alleges that the $5,000.00 award in attorney fees to opposing counsel constituted an abuse of discretion because it was excessive for a single hearing and the trial court meant them to be "punitive in nature" given Dr. Hannah's arrearage. We must disagree.
The trial court's order made clear that it was awarding attorney fees not just for services rendered for one hearing but rather for the attorney's work throughout the case, including "collections proceedings" made necessary by Dr. Hannah's failure to abide by various orders. Therefore, it was neither unreasonable nor unfair to award $5,000.00 in attorney fees to Mrs. Hannah's counsel due to the work performed and the undeniable disparity in income between the parties.
Furthermore, Dr. Hannah provided no evidence of record demonstrating that the motives behind the award were nefarious or punitive in any way. Even if the imposition of fees could be viewed in this manner in light of the record, we would still grant the trial court's decision broad discretion if the trial court reasonably believed Dr. Hannah had engaged in conduct - including failure to abide by certain orders - which "waste[d] the court's and attorneys' time." Rumpel, 438 S.W.3d at 363 (quoting Gentry, 798 S.W.2d at 937)). In sum, the award of attorney fees did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Conclusion
We affirm both the trial court's decision to maintain the child support award and the award of attorney fees to Mrs. Hannah's counsel; and the trial court maintains jurisdiction to impose post-judgment interest pursuant to KRS 360.040.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Gordon J. Dill
Ashland, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Sharon E. Rowsey
Ashland, Kentucky