Opinion
3D23-2091
07-31-2024
Arlene Hanna, Appellant, v. Diego Augusto Hemelberg, et al., Appellees.
Arlene Hanna, in proper person. Diego Hemelberg and Maria Hemelberg, in proper persons.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County Lower Tribunal No. 23-4496 SP, Christopher Green, Judge.
Arlene Hanna, in proper person.
Diego Hemelberg and Maria Hemelberg, in proper persons.
Before EMAS, SCALES and GORDO, JJ.
SCALES, J.
In this small claims action, appellant Arlene Hanna appeals a November 8, 2023 county court order denying her post-judgment motion to vacate ("Vacatur Motion"). Hanna's Vacatur Motion seeks to vacate the trial court's September 5, 2023 order that dismissed, with prejudice, Hanna's amended statement of claim ("Dismissal Order") against appellees Diego Augusto Hemelberg and Maria Amelia Linares Hemelberg. In the challenged order, the trial court does not reach the merits of Hanna's Vacatur Motion because the motion - captioned by Hanna as a Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 motion - fails to assert any cognizable ground for relief under rule 1.540. Because the trial court should have treated Hanna's Vacatur Motion as a timely motion for new trial pursuant to Florida Small Claims Rule 7.180, we reverse the challenged order and remand with instructions for the trial court to adjudicate the Vacatur Motion on the merits. We also refer to the Florida Bar's Small Claims Rules Committee the issue of whether rule 7.180 should be amended to expressly authorize motions for rehearing directed to final orders entered by county court judges in small claims matters.
Hanna is self-represented below and in this appeal.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
In May 2023, Hanna filed this small claims action against the Hemelbergs in the county court. Hanna's amended statement of claim seeks damages for the Hemelbergs' alleged breach of an agreement to sell used kitchen cabinets and countertops to Hanna.
The trial court set the matter for a non-jury trial. Prior to the trial date, the Hemelbergs moved to dismiss Hanna's amended statement of claim, arguing that exhibits to Hanna's pleading demonstrate that the parties do not have a valid and enforceable contract. See Fla. Sm. Cl. R. 7.135 ("At pretrial conference or at any subsequent hearing, if there is no triable issue, the court shall summarily enter an appropriate order or judgment."). Following a hearing on the Helmelbergs' motion to dismiss, the trial court entered the Dismissal Order that finds Hanna's breach of contract claim is barred by Florida's statute of frauds.
Nine days after the trial court entered the Dismissal Order, on September 14, 2023, Hanna filed her Vacatur Motion that, citing only to rule 1.540, argues the trial court misapplied Florida's statute of frauds. On November, 8, 2023, the trial court entered the challenged order denying the Vacatur Motion. In the challenged order, the trial court does not reach the merits of Hanna's Vacatur Motion, determining that the Vacatur Motion is not cognizable because the motion: (i) is premised on Hanna's argument that, in entering the Dismissal Order, the trial court committed legal error; (ii) is not premised on any ground enumerated in rule 1.540; and (iii) otherwise fails to cite any portion of rule 1.540 upon which the vacatur is sought. Hanna timely appealed the challenged order.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.530 and 1.540 and their Florida Small Claims Rules Counterparts
At the outset, we note that the trial court correctly construed Florida's well-established case law holding that: (i) rule 1.540 provides a very limited basis for a trial court to exercise jurisdiction to revisit a final judgment; (ii) a rule 1.540 motion is not a substitute for an appeal or a timely-filed rule 1.530 motion; and (iii) a trial court reversibly errs by granting a rule 1.540 motion on grounds other than those limited grounds expressly authorized in the rule. Nevertheless, pursuant to Florida Small Claims Rule 7.020, neither rule 1.530 nor rule 1.540 is generally applicable in Florida small claims proceedings. Instead, the relevant rules applicable here are their Florida Small Claims Rules counterparts: Florida Small Claims Rules 7.180 and 7.190.
See Anderson v. Estate of Quintero, 49 Fla.L.Weekly D273, 2024 WL 358018, at *3 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 31,2024) ("Rule 1.540(b) allows a trial court, in very narrow, strictly enumerated instances, to revisit findings and holdings contained in final orders and judgments.").
See A.W. Baylor Plastering, Inc. v. Mellon Stuart Co., 611 So.2d 108, 109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) ("Rule 1.540 was intended to provide relief from orders under a limited set of circumstances. It was neither intended to serve as a substitute for the new trial or rehearing mechanism prescribed by Rule 1.530, nor as a substitute for appellate review of judicial error.").
See Herskowitz v. Herskowitz, 513 So.2d 1318, 1319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) ("[T]he trial court . . . vacated the final judgment herein on the merits based on certain perceived errors of law and did not rely on any of the narrow grounds for vacating a final judgment under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540. This being so, the trial court plainly erred in vacating the . . . judgment under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540.").
Rule 7.020, titled "Applicability of Rules of Civil Procedure," provides in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Generally. Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.090(a), (b), and (c); 1.190(e); 1.210(b); 1.260; 1.410; and 1.560 are applicable in all actions covered by these rules. ....
(c) Additional Rules. In any particular action, the court may order that action to proceed under 1 or more additional Florida Rules of Civil Procedure on application of any party or the stipulation of all parties or on the court's own motion.Fla. Sm. Cl. R. 7.020(a),(c). Here, the record does not contain a trial court order adopting any additional Florida Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to this action.
Because Florida's Small Claims Rules "shall be construed to implement the simple, speedy, and inexpensive trial of actions at law in county courts," Fla. Sm. Cl. R. 7.010(a), when a small claims litigant erroneously files a motion pursuant to rule 1.530 or 1.540, the trial court is required the review the motion and treat it as if it were filed pursuant to rule 7.180 or 7.190. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Parks, 338 So.3d 1070, 1071 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (observing that a post-trial motion for rehearing directed at a final judgment "would have been treated like an authorized motion for new trial" under rule 7.180); Arafat v. U-Haul Ctr. Margate, 82 So.3d 903, 905 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (treating a rule 1.530 motion for rehearing directed at a final judgment as a rule 7.180 motion for new trial); Metellus v. Storm Restoration Servs., LLC, 363 So.3d 139, 139 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (citing Parks and Arafat with approval, and treating a rehearing motion directed at a default final judgment as a rule 7.180 motion for new trial). This exercise, though, is not always easy because rules 1.530 and 1.540 are similar, but not identical, to their small claims rules counterparts.
One significant difference of concern in this case is that rule 1.530 expressly authorizes a party to direct a motion for rehearing toward a final order entered by the trial court. Rule 1.530(a) provides:
(a) Jury and Non-Jury Actions. A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or a part of the issues. To
preserve for appeal a challenge to the failure of the trial court to make required findings of fact in the final judgment, a party must raise that issue in a motion for rehearing under this rule. On a motion for a rehearing of matters heard without a jury, including summary judgments, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, and enter a new judgment.
Whereas rule 7.180 (rule 1.530's counterpart) contains no similar provision addressing rehearing motions, but instead mirrors only the "time" and "grounds" provisions of rule 1.530(b) and (f). See Fla. Sm. Cl. R. 7.180(a),(c). Similarly, the two rules' titles differ. Rule 1.530 is titled: Motions for New Trial and Rehearing; Amendments of Judgments; Remittitur or Additur. While Rule 7.180's title omits any reference to "rehearing": Motions for New Trial; Time for; Contents. In sum, unlike rule 1.530, rule 7.180 does not expressly provide for a motion for rehearing. See Metellus, 363 So.3d at 139; Arafat, 82 So.3d at 905.
Curiously, though, rule 7.190 (rule 1.540's counterpart) does expressly contemplate motions for rehearing. Rule 7.190(b) is almost identical to rule 1.540(b), providing the same, very limited bases for a trial court to vacate a final judgment. Indeed, section (b)(2) of both rules provides that a trial court may relieve a party from a final order based upon "newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial or rehearing[.]" Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(2) (emphasis added); Fla. Sm. Cl. R. 7.190(b)(2) (emphasis added).
We note also that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(b)(2) - which is expressly made part of Florida's Small Claims Rules by rule 7.020(a) -provides that "[t]he court may not extend the time for making a motion for new trial, for rehearing, or to alter or amend a judgment[.]" (Emphasis added).
Presumably, if motions for rehearing were neither authorized nor contemplated in small claims actions, rule 7.190(b)(2) would not have expressly referenced discoveries occurring after the time period for filing motions seeking either "a new trial or rehearing[.]" Possibly for this reason -coupled with rule 7.010's requirement that small claims rules be construed to implement "the simple, speedy, and inexpensive" resolution of actions within the small claims jurisdictional limit - Florida's appellate courts have concluded, in small claims actions, that the county court should treat a postjudgment motion for rehearing as a rule 7.180 motion for new trial where the motion is filed within the time period for filing a motion for new trial, see Parks, 338 So.3d at 1071 n.1; Arafat, 82 So.3d at 905, and even where the rehearing motion is directed to a final order when no trial has occurred. See Metellus, 363 So.3d at 139.
Hence, because such timely-filed rehearing motions are considered authorized, the filing of such motions tolls the rendition date of the underlying final order until the trial court has adjudicated the rehearing motion. See Fla. Sm. Cl. R. 7.230 ("Review of orders and judgments of the courts governed by these rules shall be prosecuted in accordance with the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure."); Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)(1)(B) (providing that timely and authorized motions for rehearing toll rendition of a final order); Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)(2)(A) ("If any timely and authorized motion listed in subdivision (h)(1) of this rule has been filed in the lower tribunal directed to a final order, . . . the final order will not be deemed rendered as to any existing party until all of the motions are either withdrawn by written notice filed in the lower tribunal or resolved by the rendition of an order disposing of the last of such motions[.]").
It is against this backdrop that we now review Hanna's Vacatur Motion.
B. Treating Hanna's Vacatur Motion as a Timely-Filed Motion for New Trial under Rule 7.180.
As discussed, notwithstanding its erroneous caption, Hanna's Vacatur Motion makes no argument that the Dismissal Order should be vacated for any of the bases enumerated in rule 7.190(b) (the small claims counterpart to rule 1.540(b)). Instead, the Vacatur Motion alleges grounds that would be cognizable under a motion for rehearing (i.e., that the trial court committed legal error in entering the Dismissal Order because the court purportedly misapplied Florida's statute of frauds). Irrespective of how Hanna captioned her Vacatur Motion, the motion was essentially a motion for rehearing. Furthermore, because Hanna filed her Vacatur Motion within fifteen days of the Dismissal Order's entry, it was timely under rule 7.180(a). Thus, the trial court should have treated the Vacatur Motion as an authorized and timely-filed motion under rule 7.180, and then proceeded to adjudicate the motion on its merits. See Metellus, 363 So.3d at 140; Hanna-Mack v. Bank of Am., NA, 218 So.3d 971, 973-74 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) ("If a pro se motion is improperly titled, the court should focus on the substance of the motion, based on its content. Florida courts emphasize substance over form. Pro se litigants are also afforded leniency on certain procedural technicalities in drafting motions and requesting relief. This leniency promotes the courts' fundamental principle of allowing pro se litigants 'procedural latitude, a practice effected to ensure access to the courts for all citizens,' although pro se litigants are still subject to procedural rules." (quoting Kidwell v. Kidwell, 181 So.3d 1190, 1190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (citations omitted))).
Without expressing any opinion on either the Dismissal Order or Hanna's Vacatur Motion, we reverse the challenged order and remand for the trial court to adjudicate the Vacatur Motion. The rendition of the Dismissal Order is tolled until the trial court enters its order adjudicating the Vacatur Motion on the merits. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)(1)(B), (h)(2)(A).
C. Referral to the Florida Bar's Small Claims Rules Committee
As evidenced by this case, Arafat and Metellus, the small claims rules in regard to motions for rehearing are unclear, and may need to be amended either to (i) expressly clarify that a motion for rehearing directed to a final order is authorized under rule 7.180, or (ii) alternately, clarify in rule 7.180 that a motion for rehearing directed to a final order entered without a trial is not authorized and, if such a motion is not authorized, amend rule 7.190(b)(2) to delete the reference to "rehearing." We, therefore, refer the issue to the Florida Bar's Small Claims Rules Committee for their consideration.
Reversed and remanded with instructions; referral made to Florida Bar's Small Claims Rules Committee.