Opinion
C. A. 23-5363-SAL-PJG
02-28-2024
DeWayne K. Handy, Jr.; Sonya McIntyre-Handy, Plaintiffs, v. York County Sheriff Dept.; York County Court; (SCICAC) Attorney General, Defendants.
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiffs DeWayne K. Handy, Jr., and Sonya McIntyre-Handy, self-represented litigants, filed this civil action arising out of DeWayne's May 2023 arrest by state and York County authorities. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendants' motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 37.) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised the plaintiffs of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if they failed to respond adequately to the defendants' motion. (ECF No. 40.) The plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 48), and the defendants replied (ECF No. 49). Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court finds the defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted.
BACKGROUND
Initially, the court notes that the plaintiffs have filed numerous pleadings, proposed amended pleadings, and supplements to those documents in this case, mostly in contravention of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding pleadings and amending pleadings. Pursuant to the court's screening procedures for pro se cases, the court authorized the issuance and service of process in this case on December 19, 2023 and designated the then mostly recently filed pleading, the Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 29), as the operative pleading in this case. Thus, the Amended Complaint is the pleading for which the court authorized service and the pleading to which the defendants filed an Answer (ECF No. 38) and now move to dismiss (ECF No. 37).
The plaintiffs have again filed another motion to amend their complaint as well as supplemental materials. (ECF Nos. 52 & 57.) As explained below, the plaintiffs' motion to further amend their pleading is denied.
Also of note, the plaintiffs' numerous filings that are purportedly attempts at pleading are difficult to read and understand. The filings are full of incomplete sentences and run-on sentences that are mixed with indecipherable legalese. Many of the plaintiffs' allegations do not have any obvious connection to a purported legal claim against the defendants listed in this case. Thus, to the extent the plaintiffs raise allegations or claims that are not discussed herein, the plaintiffs' filings fail to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that requires the pleading contain a short and “plain” statement showing that the plaintiffs are entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
Therefore, the following allegations are taken as true for purposes of resolving the defendant's motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs indicate that they bring this civil action to vindicate the deprivation of rights under color of law, including violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments based on false arrest, false imprisonment, cruel and unusual punishment, and retaliatory arrest, among other things. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 29 at 1.) The plaintiffs bring this case against “York County Sheriff Dept.,” “York County Court,” and “(SCICAC) Attorney General.” The court and the defendants construe these defendants as the York County Sheriff's Office, the York County Court of General Sessions, and the South Carolina Attorney General's Office.
DeWayne Handy was arrested in May 2023 on charges related to solicitation of a minor on an online dating site, and was later indicted on those charges, which remain pending. The plaintiffs claim that the York County Sheriff's Office's use of an undercover agent on the dating site was unlawful-at times referring to the undercover agent's actions as “cyber fraud,” “against ICAC Mandate” (presumably referring to the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force), and violative of the United States Constitution. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 29 at 1.) The plaintiffs also claim that the questions asked by the undercover agent were an illegal search in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs further claim that the undercover agent or a detention center deputy violated Dewayne's rights by seizing his property without doing a proper inventory search, denied DeWayne a post-arrest phone call, and denied DeWayne the opportunity to contact an attorney. The plaintiffs also claim the undercover agent violated DeWayne's rights by claiming to be eighteen years old, using an adult photo, asking for a photo, and playing on DeWayne's compassion for humanity by stating the agent needed a phone.
Sonya McIntyre-Handy, DeWayne's mother, contacted a solicitor to report her son missing but was only made aware of DeWayne's arrest through a text sent to her by an inmate's wife. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 2.) Sonya believes that the charges against DeWayne are fraudulent. (Id. at 3.)
The plaintiffs seek damages for the violations of law and injunctive relief that reforms how the defendants investigate the illegal solicitation of minors online.
DISCUSSION
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court “may also consider documents attached to the complaint, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006)).
Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Erickson, 551 U.S. 89, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
The defendants construe the Amended Complaint as asserting causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth Amendment violations related to DeWayne's arrest and prosecution. The plaintiffs do not appear to refute this construction of their claims in their response to the defendants' motion. A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs fail to state a claim against them upon which relief can be granted because they are not “persons” amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983. The court agrees, and notably, the plaintiffs do not argue otherwise in their response to the defendants' motion. As more thoroughly explained in the defendants' motion, the three named defendants in this case are all agencies or arms of the State of South Carolina. See Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F.Supp. 947, 954-55 (D.S.C. 1988) (concluding that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are agents of the state and cannot be sued in their official capacities), aff'd, 878 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1989) (table); see also Parker v. Beaufort Cty. Det. Ctr., C/A No. 4:07-0287-MBS-TER, 2007 WL 1377639, at *2 (D.S.C. May 7, 2007) (explaining that South Carolina's circuit courts, as part of the unified state judicial system, are not amenable to suit under § 1983). Therefore, the defendants are not “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67-68, 71 (1989) (holding that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983, and finding Congress did not intend to override the State's sovereign immunity by enacting the statute); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-31 (1991); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 482-83 (4th Cir. 2005). Consequently, the plaintiffs fail to state a claim for damages upon which relief can be granted against the defendants pursuant to § 1983.
The defendants also argue that the plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege a constitutional violation. The court agrees. First, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs fail to even raise a claim on behalf of Sonya, who was not arrested and does not assert that any of her rights were violated. The plaintiffs do not address this point in their response to the defendants' motion. Therefore, the plaintiffs appear to concede that Sonya does not raise a claim in this case upon which relief can be granted.
As to DeWayne, the defendants argue that the only possible claims he could raise are for violations of the Fourth Amendment arising out of his arrest and prosecution, but that he fails to allege facts that plausibly show a Fourth Amendment violation. The court agrees.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government and requires warrants be issued only upon a finding of probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. To establish a § 1983 claim for false arrest or imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff must show the seizure of his person was unreasonable, i.e., he must show he was arrested without probable cause. See Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that claims for false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”); see also Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff must show he was arrested without probable cause).
On the other hand, “allegations that an arrest made pursuant to a warrant was not supported by probable cause, or claims seeking damages for the period after legal process issued-e.g., postindictment or arraignment-are considered a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.” Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 866 F.3d 546, 555 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To state a constitutional claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant caused a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause and the criminal proceedings ended without a conviction. See Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022); see also Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 188 (4th Cir. 2012)).
Here, the plaintiffs fail to allege facts that plausibly show DeWayne was arrested or prosecuted without probable cause. The plaintiffs do not clearly explain the facts surrounding DeWayne's arrest. Regardless, Plaintiff does not provide the arresting officer's purported basis for DeWayne's arrest, which prevents the court from analyzing whether the facts support (or do not support) probable cause. See Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2017) (stating the probable cause inquiry turns on the suspect's conduct as known to the officer at the time) (citing Graham v. Gagnon, 831 F.3d 176, 184 (4th Cir. 2016)). The plaintiffs' assertion that DeWayne believed he was talking to an adult rather than a minor does not on its own show that the officer lacked probable cause for his arrest. See United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 769 (4th Cir. 1998) (“While probable cause requires more than ‘bare suspicion,' it requires less than that evidence necessary to convict.”); see also Wadkins v. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Reasonable law enforcement officers are not required to ‘exhaust every potentially exculpatory lead or resolve every doubt about a suspect's guilt before probable cause is established.' ”) (quoting Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1991)). Additionally, as DeWayne has been indicted, he also fails to explain how the indictments are not supported by probable cause such that he could maintain claim of malicious prosecution. See Humbert, 866 F.3d at 556. Consequently, even assuming the plaintiffs asserted a cause of action for injunctive relief for which they have standing, they fail to plausibly allege a constitutional violation that could support a claim for relief.
C. The Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend
The plaintiffs filed a motion to amend and proposed second amended complaint (ECF No. 52-1) that adds twelve pages to the current Amended Complaint. The defendants argue that the motion should be denied as futile. The court agrees.
The twelve pages appear to add claims about DeWayne's conditions of confinement as told from Sonya's perspective. Regardless of the merits of the plaintiffs' new allegations, the proposed second amended complaint fails to name a defendant that is a “person” amenable to suit as the proposed amendment does not include any new defendants. The proposed amendment also again violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)'s requirement that the pleading provide a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Instead, the new twelve pages merely list Sonya's opinions about her son's prosecution. The court is again unable to determine what claims are raised, against whom they are raised, or what relief is sought. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it requires more than a plain accusation that the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff, devoid of factual support); Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 126 (4th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e do not require a complaint to contain detailed factual allegations. But we do require sufficient facts to allow the court to infer liability as to each defendant. This is baked into Rule 8's requirement that the complaint ‘show' the plaintiff is entitled to relief.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Because the proposed second amended complaint still fails to state a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiffs' motion to amend is futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (holding that a motion to amend may be denied for futility); U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court should freely give leave when justice so requires. Although such motions should be granted liberally, a district court may deny leave if amending the complaint would be futile-that is, if the proposed amended complaint fails to satisfy the requirements of the federal rules.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends the defendants' motion to dismiss be granted. (ECF No. 37.) It is also
In light of the court's recommendation, Plaintiff's motions attempting to amend her service documents should be terminated as moot. (ECF Nos. 45 & 53.)
ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion to amend is denied. (ECF No. 52.)
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).