Opinion
NO. 03-14-00700-CR
04-06-2017
Alexandria Tammy Hampton, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 426TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 72513 , HONORABLE FANCY H. JEZEK, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant Alexandria Tammy Hampton of the offense of aggravated assault, dating violence, and assessed punishment at 60 years' imprisonment. The district court rendered judgment on the verdict. In fifteen points of error on appeal, Hampton asserts that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of various extraneous offenses. We will affirm the judgment of conviction.
BACKGROUND
The jury heard evidence that on May 4, 2013, Hampton stabbed her boyfriend, Antonio Jennings, with a knife. Jennings testified that the stabbing occurred at Hampton's apartment following an argument between the two in which Hampton had expressed anger over Jennings's ongoing relationship with Crystal Whiteside, the mother of Jennings's two daughters. According to Jennings, Hampton was upset because Jennings was planning to attend his daughter's birthday party, and Jennings's "baby mama was going to be there." Jennings explained that Hampton "got mad and went in her room, slammed the door," while Jennings remained in the kitchen, listening to music. Eventually, Jennings recalled, he walked into the bedroom and began to "get a little intimate" with Hampton. Jennings testified that after he had performed oral sex on Hampton, he told her that he "wanted to go all the way," but she declined. Jennings explained that he left the bedroom but returned shortly thereafter and attempted to initiate intercourse with Hampton one more time, by getting back into bed with her. At that point, Jennings testified, Hampton stabbed him repeatedly with a knife. Jennings explained, "I was stabbed several times. I got up, looked at her and said—my exact words [were], 'Bitch, did you just stab me?' She didn't say anything. She walked right out. I grabbed the rest of my things and tried to get out of the house." Jennings then left Hampton's apartment, managed to walk next door to where his sister lived, and collapsed. Jennings was subsequently transported to a hospital, where he was treated for multiple stab wounds to his left hand, left arm, chest, and back.
After Jennings had been transported to the hospital, police officers interviewed Hampton at her apartment. Officer Kellye McDermott of the Killeen Police Department testified that Hampton had "what appeared to be blood spatter on her clothing" and "blood on her hands." According to McDermott, Hampton admitted to stabbing Jennings but claimed that she had done so because Jennings had become violent during their argument and had "tried to force himself on her." McDermott explained that Hampton drew the officers' attention to several pieces of furniture in her apartment that were overturned and broken, which Hampton claimed was the result of Jennings's violent behavior. Hampton was transported to the hospital, where she again claimed that Jennings had sexually assaulted her. However, Hampton declined requests by the police to make a formal statement pertaining to the incident at the police station. Additionally, according to Detective Sharon Brank of the Killeen Police Department, who had investigated the incident, the items and furniture that had been found in Hampton's apartment appeared to Brank to be part of "a staged crime scene to make it look like there had been a fight when there was not."
Based on the above and other evidence, which we discuss in more detail below, the jury found Hampton guilty of the offense of aggravated assault as charged and assessed punishment as noted above. The district court rendered judgment on the verdict. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. We are to view the record "in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination, and the judgment will be reversed only if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or 'outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.'" We consider the ruling in light of what was before the district court at the time the ruling was made. "We will sustain the lower court's ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case."
State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)); Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Story, 445 S.W.3d at 732 (quoting Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 590); see Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh'g).
Billodeau v. State, 277 S.W.3d 34, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 590 (citing Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)); see Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
ANALYSIS
In fifteen points of error, Hampton challenges the admissibility of evidence pertaining to various extraneous offenses allegedly committed by Hampton. In points of error one through eight, Hampton asserts that this evidence was inadmissible pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b). In points of error nine through fifteen, Hampton further asserts that most of the evidence was also inadmissible pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 403.
The district court admitted evidence tending to show that Hampton had prior convictions. Hampton challenges the admissibility of this evidence only on Rule 404(b) grounds.
"Under the Texas Rules of Evidence, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 'to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.'" "But it may 'be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.'" "The exceptions listed under Rule 404(b) are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive." "Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion—it excludes only evidence that is offered solely for proving bad character and conduct in conformity with that bad character."
De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)).
Id.
Id. (citing Pondexter v. State, 942 S.W.2d 577, 583-84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d at 387; Banda v. State, 768 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)); see also Bass v. State, 270 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (explaining that extraneous-offense evidence is admissible to rebut defensive theories).
Dabney v. State, 492 S.W.3d 309, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343).
Similarly, Rule 403 allows for the exclusion of evidence only if its probative value is "substantially outweighed" by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. "Accordingly, 'the plain language of Rule 403 does not allow a trial court to exclude otherwise relevant evidence when that evidence is merely prejudicial. Indeed, all evidence against a defendant is, by its very nature, designed to be prejudicial.'" Rather, "[t]he rule envisions exclusion of evidence only when there is a 'clear disparity between the degree of prejudice of the offered evidence and its probative value.'" In determining whether such a disparity exists, "a trial court, when undertaking a Rule 403 analysis, must balance (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along with (2) the proponent's need for that evidence against (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted." "[T]hese factors may well blend together in practice."
Robisheaux v. State, 483 S.W.3d 205, 217-18 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet. ref'd) (quoting Pawlak v. State, 420 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (internal citation omitted)).
Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Joiner v. State, 825 S.W.2d 701, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641-42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Id. at 642.
Prior convictions
In her first point of error, Hampton asserts that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence pertaining to Hampton's prior convictions. On two occasions during Jennings's testimony, he briefly alluded to the fact that during their relationship, Hampton had been on "probation" at one point and "locked up" at another, although he did not provide any details as to the circumstances surrounding either event. On the first occasion, the State elicited the following testimony from Jennings:
During the guilt / innocence phase of trial, there was no evidence admitted as to the nature or number of Hampton's prior convictions. However, during the punishment phase of trial, Hampton stipulated that she had been convicted in Virginia of the offenses of petit larceny (twice), receiving stolen goods, and obtaining money by false pretenses. Hampton also stipulated that she had been convicted in federal district court of the offense of theft of government property.
Q. And at some point did you end up caring for the defendant's children?Hampton immediately objected on the basis of Rule 404(b). In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the State argued that the testimony was admissible as "contextual" evidence of the relationship between Hampton and Jennings:
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Okay. How did that come to be?
A. She went to a—to see her probation officer.
Judge, her status—it's contextual. I think it goes to the nature of their relationship. Her status is on probation. It's not an extraneous bad act that we plan to prove what offense and was she [] convicted of any offense. It's not being offered for that purpose. But it is contextual, the fact that it is an element of the offense that I prove their relationship. It's contextual as to that and him having custody of the two children of hers during that period of time.The district court overruled Hampton's objection and granted her a running objection to the evidence, although the State elicited no further testimony pertaining to Hampton's probation. However, Jennings alluded to Hampton's criminal history on one other occasion during his testimony, again when discussing his relationship with Hampton:
Q. During the sexual encounter two days prior [to the stabbing], was there any protection used during that event?
A. No. We never used protection.
Q: Okay. So no condoms were ever used in your relationship?
A. In the beginning, yes. Then after [a] while, no.
Q. Okay. So did that stop sometime in 2012?
A. No.
Q. When did the condom usage stop?
A. Oh—well, yes, 2012, yes. Yes, ma'am. Before she was locked up.
Q. Okay.
Assuming without deciding that this evidence was inadmissible, the erroneous admission of evidence constitutes non-constitutional error and "must be disregarded" unless the error affected the defendant's "substantial rights." "A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." "[S]ubstantial rights are not affected by the erroneous admission of evidence 'if the appellate court, after examining the record as a whole, has fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.'" "In assessing the likelihood that the jury's decision was adversely affected by the error, the appellate court should consider everything in the record, including any testimony or physical evidence admitted for the jury's consideration, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged error and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence in the case." We may also consider the jury instructions, the State's theory and any defensive theories, closing arguments, voir dire, whether the State emphasized the error, and whether there was "overwhelming evidence of guilt."
See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Barshaw v. State, 342 S.W.3d 91, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Tienda v. State, 479 S.W.3d 863, 880 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.).
Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)); King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355 (quoting Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).
Id. (citing Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
Id. at 355-57.
Here, Hampton concedes in her brief that there was "substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury," and we agree that there was. Jennings testified that Hampton had stabbed him repeatedly with a knife. The medical evidence presented at trial was consistent with Jennings's testimony, tending to show that he had suffered multiple stab wounds to his left hand, left arm, chest, and back. And the State's theory of the case—that Hampton had stabbed Jennings in a jealous rage following an argument over Jennings's ongoing relationship with Crystal Whiteside—was supported not only by Jennings's account of the events that had transpired, but also by the testimony of several other witnesses who were familiar with Hampton's animosity toward Whiteside. On the other hand, the defensive theory of the case—that Hampton had stabbed Jennings in self-defense—tended to be refuted by the physical evidence at the crime scene, which, according to the testimony of one of the investigating officers, looked as if it had been "staged" by Hampton to suggest that Jennings had been the aggressor. Additionally, the references to Hampton's prior convictions were brief and non-specific, with Jennings providing no details as to the nature of Hampton's prior convictions. The State did not emphasize this evidence during trial and, in fact, did not mention it at all during its closing arguments. On this record, we have "fair assurance that the error," if any, in admitting the evidence "did not influence the jury or had but a slight effect."
See Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355; Hankins v. State, 180 S.W.3d 177, 182-83 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. ref'd) (concluding that erroneous admission of evidence of prior conviction was harmless where evidence supporting charged offense was strong, no details of prior conviction were elicited, and the State made only "two brief references" to prior conviction); see also Roberts v. State, No. 14-14-00874-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 6404, at *4-6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that error, if any, in admitting evidence of prior conviction was harmless where "State presented a strong case for conviction," "[t]here was only a brief mention of the prior conviction during the guilt phase of trial," and "the parties did not mention or emphasize the prior conviction during closing arguments").
We overrule Hampton's first point of error.
Offenses committed against Whiteside
Crystal Whiteside and other witnesses testified that Hampton had committed several offenses against Whiteside before and after the stabbing. Specifically, the jury heard evidence tending to show that Hampton had: (1) vandalized Whiteside's vehicle by "slash[ing] her tires and put[ting] sugar in her tank"; (2) attempted to enter Whiteside's vehicle while it was locked; (3) threatened to "pay somebody a bag of weed to do something to" Whiteside; (4) threatened to "beat [Whiteside's] ass" prior to the stabbing; and (5) repeatedly drove by Whiteside's residence "every other day" for over a week after Jennings had been released from the hospital. In her third, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth points of error, Hampton asserts that this evidence was not admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b). In her tenth, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth points of error, Hampton asserts that this evidence was not admissible pursuant to Rule 403.
We cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in overruling either objection. With regard to Rule 404(b), one of the expressly permitted purposes for admitting extraneous-offense evidence is to prove motive. In this case, motive was a heavily contested issue at trial. The State's theory of the case was that Hampton was angry at Jennings over his ongoing relationship with Whiteside and that Hampton had stabbed Jennings in a fit of jealous rage following their argument. Hampton's theory was that Hampton had stabbed Jennings in self-defense during a sexual assault. Thus, it would not be outside the zone of reasonable disagreement for the district court to conclude that evidence tending to show that Hampton had committed other offenses against Whiteside had some relevance apart from character conformity purposes, namely, to rebut Hampton's theory of self-defense by making it more probable that Hampton's motive for the stabbing was her anger over Jennings's ongoing relationship with Whiteside, and to admit the evidence on that ground.
See Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ("Rebuttal of a defensive theory . . . is also one of the permissible purposes for which relevant evidence may be admitted under Rule 404(b)."); Lolmaugh v. State, 514 S.W.2d 758, 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) ("When the appellant made an issue of self-defense, motive became an issue."); see also Hegar v. State, 11 S.W.3d 290, 297 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (observing that extraneous offenses need not occur prior to commission of offense in order to be admissible).
Nor would it be outside the zone of reasonable disagreement for the district court to conclude that there was not a "clear disparity between the degree of prejudice of the offered evidence and its probative value." Because Hampton had admitted to stabbing Jennings, the primary issue in the case was why she had done so. The district court could have reasonably concluded that the difference between a conviction and an acquittal in this case would thus turn on how the jury answered that particular question. Thus, the district court would not have abused its discretion in concluding that the probative value of evidence tending to establish a motive for the stabbing—and the State's need for that evidence—was high, particularly in light of the fact that the only two witnesses to the stabbing were the victim and the assailant. The district court also would not have abused its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the evidence was not "substantially outweighed" by its degree of prejudice. The district court could have reasonably determined that the alleged extraneous offenses were not of such an inflammatory nature so as to suggest a jury decision on an improper or emotional basis. Moreover, the district court also could have reasonably determined that the evidence did not have a strong tendency to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues in the case. On the contrary, because the main issue in the case was why Hampton had stabbed Jennings, the district court would not have abused its discretion in finding that evidence pertaining to Hampton's actions toward Whiteside before and after the stabbing had a strong tendency to illuminate the reasons for why the stabbing had occurred. Finally, although Hampton is correct that a significant portion of the trial was devoted to discussing these extraneous offenses, the district court could have reasonably concluded that the time spent was necessary in light of the fact that the critical inquiry in the case was whether Hampton had acted in self-defense as she had claimed.
See Hammer, 296 S.W.3d at 568.
We overrule Hampton's third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, tenth, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth points of error.
Offenses committed against Jennings's sister and brother
Jennings's sister, Cheleste, testified that her apartment had been burglarized while her brother was recovering at the hospital. Jennings's brother, Jerry, similarly testified that the tires on his vehicle had been "slashed" during that same time period. The State presented evidence tending to show that Hampton had admitted to committing both offenses. In her second and fourth points of error, Hampton asserts that this evidence was inadmissible pursuant to Rule 404(b). In her ninth and eleventh points of error, Hampton asserts that this evidence was inadmissible pursuant to Rule 403.
Again, the defensive theory of the case was that Hampton had stabbed Jennings in self-defense. As with the evidence pertaining to the offenses allegedly committed against Whiteside, it would not be outside the zone of reasonable disagreement for the district court to conclude that evidence tending to show that Hampton had committed offenses against Jennings's sister and brother while Jennings was in the hospital had at least some tendency to rebut Hampton's theory of self-defense and establish that Hampton was instead angry with Jennings at the time of the stabbing. Thus, the district court would not have abused its discretion in overruling Hampton's Rule 404(b) objection on that ground.
It also would not be outside the zone of reasonable disagreement for the district court to conclude that there was no "clear disparity" between the degree of prejudice of the offered evidence and its probative value. The district court could have reasonably determined that this evidence went to the issue of Hampton's motive in committing the offense, which, as we previously discussed, was the main issue in the case. Thus, the district court would not have abused its discretion in concluding that the State's need for the evidence was high. Moreover, the district court could have reasonably determined that the alleged offenses against Jennings's brother and sister, because they involved property crimes only, did not have a strong tendency to suggest decision on an improper or emotional basis. Finally, the district court could have reasonably determined that the State did not need an inordinate amount of time to develop this evidence, as the State presented evidence tending to show that Hampton had admitted to committing both offenses. Thus, it would not be outside the zone of reasonable disagreement for the district court to conclude that the probative value of the evidence was not "substantially outweighed" by the danger of unfair prejudice.
We overrule Hampton's second, fourth, ninth, and eleventh points of error.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
/s/_________
Bob Pemberton, Justice Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton, and Goodwin Affirmed Filed: April 6, 2017 Do Not Publish