Opinion
C. A. 8:23-cv-03321-HMH-JDA
08-04-2023
Dante Sherod Hampton, Petitioner, v. Warden Joseph, FCI Bennettsville, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge
Dante Sherod Hampton (“Petitioner”) is a prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and is currently incarcerated in South Carolina at the Bennettsville Federal Correctional Institution. [Doc. 1-2 at 1.] Proceeding pro se, Petitioner filed this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking habeas corpus relief from his sentence. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons below, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
This matter arises from Petitioner's conviction and sentence in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida at case number 6:19-cr-00237-RBD-GJK-1.[Id.]; see also United States v. Hampton, No. 6:19-cr-00237-RBD-GJK-1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2019) (“Hampton”). Petitioner commenced the present action by filing a typed document captioned as a “Motion to Vacate Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” [Doc. 1.] Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on the standard form. [Doc. 1-2.] The Court construes both of these documents together as the Petition filed in this matter.
The Court takes judicial notice of the records in Petitioner's criminal case in the sentencing court. See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
Petitioner's Conviction and Sentence
On July 31, 2019, a criminal complaint was filed against Petitioner in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, charging him with distribution of a controlled substance, specifically heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. See Hampton, Doc. 1. On November 13, 2019, an information was entered charging Petitioner with the crime identified in the complaint, and Petitioner waived an indictment. Id., Docs. 25; 26. Thereafter, Petitioner pled guilty to the single count in the information. Id., Docs. 27; 33; 36. On February 24, 2020, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 180 months. Id., Docs. 41; 42.
Petitioner did not file a direct appeal from his conviction and sentence. [Doc. 1-2 at 2.] Likewise, Petitioner has not sought to challenge his conviction or sentence through a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court. [Id. at 3.]
Petitioner's Present Action
Petitioner now seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this Court, “challenging a sentencing enhancement that was applied to [his] sentence.” [Doc. 1-2 at 2.] Petitioner asserts a single ground in his Petition:
GROUND ONE: Due to recent Circuit Court rulings I am no longer eligible for a career offender enhancement.
Supporting facts: Inchoate offenses cannot be used to support a career offender sentencing enhancement. I was given a careeroffender enhancement with my instant offense being conspiracy to distribute drugs.[Doc. 1 at 6.] For his relief, Petitioner requests that his career offender status be removed and that he be resentenced without the sentencing enhancement. [Id. at 7.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se pleadings pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Because Petitioner is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Petition is subject to summary dismissal.
Further, this Court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine if “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; see also Rule 1(b) Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (2012) (explaining that a district court may apply these rules to a habeas corpus petition not filed pursuant to § 2254).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner's Argument
As noted, Petitioner seeks to vacate his sentence arguing that the career offender sentencing enhancement no longer applies to him. [Doc. 1-2 at 7.] Specifically, Petitioner contends the Fourth Circuit recently ruled in United States v. Campbell, 22 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2022), that a drug possession conviction for an inchoate offense cannot be used to support a career offender sentencing enhancement as § 4B1.2(b) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) excludes inchoate offenses. [Doc. 1 at 3-4.] Petitioner contends he satisfies the savings clause test announced in United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 426, 429 (4th Cir. 2018), to proceed under § 2241 and seek habeas relief from his sentence. [Id. at 2.]
In Wheeler, the Fourth Circuit established a test for determining whether a petitioner meets the savings clause to seek habeas corpus relief under § 2241. The undersigned notes that Jones v. Hendrix, 143 S.Ct. 1857 (2023), appears to have overruled Wheeler. See, e.g., Hall v. Hudgins, No. 22-6208, 2023 WL 4363658, at *1 (4th Cir. July 6, 2023) (noting Jones held a petitioner cannot use § 2241 to mount a successive collateral attack on validity of a federal sentence and affirming district court's dismissal of § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction).
The Savings Clause
Ordinarily, “defendants convicted in federal court are obliged to seek habeas relief from their convictions and sentences through § 2255.” Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997)). However, § 2255 includes a savings clause, which permits a district court to consider a § 2241 petition challenging the validity of a prisoner's conviction or sentence when § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of . . . detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). Accordingly, Petitioner can challenge his federal sentence under § 2241 only if he can satisfy the requirements of the § 2255 savings clause, which states:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). Nevertheless, “the remedy afforded by § 2255 is not rendered inadequate or ineffective merely because an individual has been unable to obtain relief under that provision, or because an individual is procedurally barred from filing a § 2255 motion.” In re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1194 n.5 (citation omitted).
The District Court may raise a petitioner's failure to satisfy the savings clause sua sponte, and if a petitioner cannot meet the savings clause requirements, then the § 2241 petition “must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Rice, 617 F.3d at 807; see also Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a district court has an independent duty to ensure that jurisdiction is proper and to dismiss a case whenever it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking).
Analysis
Petitioner cannot bring his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. On June 22, 2023, the Supreme Court held that the savings clause of § 2255(e) does not authorize “a prisoner [to] seek[] relief based on a newly adopted narrowing interpretation of a criminal statute that circuit precedent had foreclosed at the time of the prisoner's trial, appeal, and first § 2255 motion[,]” thus abrogating the Fourth Circuit's savings clause test announced in In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 2000). Jones, 143 S.Ct. at 1868. The Supreme Court noted there are only two conditions under § 2255(h) in which a second or successive § 2255 motion may proceed: (1) newly discovered evidence or (2) a new rule of constitutional law. Id. The Supreme Court further explained as follows:
The statute identifies those two conditions as follows:
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
The inability of a prisoner with a statutory claim to satisfy those conditions does not mean that he can bring his claim in a habeas petition under the saving clause. It means that he cannot bring it at all. Congress has chosen finality over error correction.Id. at 1869.
Here, Petitioner has not satisfied either of the two conditions in § 2255(h) to proceed under § 2241. Petitioner has not identified any newly discovered evidence and he concedes that his claim “is not a new rule of constitutional law.” [Doc. 1-2 at 4.] Instead, Petitioner's claim is premised on an intervening change in statutory interpretation. However, “§ 2255(e)'s saving clause does not permit a prisoner asserting an intervening change in statutory interpretation to circumvent AEDPA's restrictions on second or successive § 2255 motions by filing a § 2241 petition.” Jones, 143 S.Ct. at 1864.
Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction under § 2241 over Petitioner's challenge to his sentence based on an intervening statutory interpretation of whether his predicate crimes are controlled substance offenses under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 to qualify for an enhanced sentence. See, e.g., Odie v. Knight, No. 22-cv-5249-RMB, 2023 WL 4759547, at *2 (D.N.J. July 26, 2023) (“This Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction under § 2241 over Plaintiff's challenge to his sentence based on intervening statutory interpretation of § 851, and his challenge to whether his predicate crimes are ‘controlled substance offense[s]' under U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2.”); Brown v. Gilley, No. 6:23-cv-106-GFVT, 2023 WL 4748174, at *3 (E.D. Ky. July 25, 2023) (“In light of Jones, a federal prisoner may no longer seek relief from his conviction or sentence based upon a favorable change in statutory interpretation in a § 2241 petition filed via the saving clause of § 2255(e).”); Wade v. Williams, No. 22-cv-480-SMY, 2023 WL 4236190, at *1 (S.D. Ill. June 28, 2023) (noting the Supreme Court's decision in Jones “closed the door” on the ability of prisoners to bring § 2241 habeas actions to “challenge sentencing enhancements if intervening statutory cases demonstrated errors in their conviction or sentencing that were grave enough to be deemed miscarriages of justice”).
Conclusion
Accordingly, Petitioner's claim may not be considered under § 2241, and this Court is without jurisdiction to consider the Petition. See Hubbard v. Brown, No. 23-6023, 2023 WL 4839396, at *1 (4th Cir. July 28, 2023) (holding that Jones precluded the petitioner's § 2241 challenge to his conviction by way of the savings clause on the basis of an intervening change in statutory interpretation); Holmes v. United States, No. 23-6434, 2023 WL 4839596, at *1 (4th Cir. July 28, 2023) (holding that Jones precluded the petitioner's § 2241 challenge to his conviction and sentence by way of the savings clause); Covington v. Andrews, No. 22-7118, 2023 WL 4701179, at *1 (4th Cir. July 24, 2023) (same). When subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist, “the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Reinbold v. Evers, 187 F.3d 348, 359 n.10 (4th Cir. 1999).
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons explained above, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the Petition. Therefore, it is recommended that the § 2241 Petition be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the Respondent to file an answer or return.
See Platts v. O'Brien, 691 Fed.Appx. 774 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A dismissal for . . . [a] defect in subject matter jurisdiction[ ] must be one without prejudice, because a court that lacks jurisdiction has no power to adjudicate and dispose of a claim on the merits.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).