Opinion
C. A. 1:20-3896-JMC-SVH
01-05-2021
Joshua Hampton, #31575-160, Plaintiff, v. Warden Ms. Barnes, Correctional Officer Mr. Knight, and Ms. Fletcher, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHIVA V. HODGES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Joshua Hampton (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed the amended complaint alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), while incarcerated at Federal Correctional Institution-Bennettsville in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). Plaintiff sues Warden Barnes, Correctional Officer Knight, and Ms. Fletcher (“Defendants”). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(i)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge.
Bivens established that victims of a constitutional violation perpetuated by a federal actor may sue the offender for damages in federal court despite the absence of explicit statutory authorization for such suits.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff's original complaint claimed defendant Knight confiscated evidence needed for summary judgment in his case pending in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Hampton v. Jones, C/A No. 1:19-751-JEJ-EBC (“Hampton I”). [ECF No. 1 at 5]. He further alleged defendants Barnes and Fletcher will not properly follow BOP policy regarding administrative remedies. Id. at 5-6. On November 20, 2020, the undersigned issued an order and notice detailing the defects in Plaintiff's complaint and permitting Plaintiff until December 11, 2020 to file an amended complaint.
On November 30, 2020, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint containing the same allegations regarding Knight's alleged confiscation of evidence related to Hampton I and Barnes and Fletcher's failure to follow BOP policy. [ECF No. 11]. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that Knight took his prescription eyeglasses, causing him to run into a water fountain, resulting in fracture to his upper jaw and loss of two teeth. Id. at 56, ECF No. 11-1 at 1.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
1. Access to the Courts
It is well-established that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). This right does not extend to frivolous claims. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 (1996) (“We think we envisioned, instead, that a new program would remain in place at least until some inmate could demonstrate that a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded.”).
To state a constitutional claim for denial of meaningful access to the courts, an inmate must allege specific injury resulting from the alleged denial. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349 (holding an inmate alleging denial of access to the courts must be able to demonstrate “actual injury” caused by the policy or procedure in effect at the place of incarceration in that his non-frivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded); Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1384 (holding that a prisoner had a “basic requirement that he show specific harm or prejudice from the allegedly denied access”). “[T]he inmate . . . must . . . demonstrate that his efforts to pursue a legal claim were somehow thwarted by the alleged denial of access to the courts.” Id. at 351 (internal quotation omitted). The inmate must make specific allegations as to the actual injury sustained. O'Dell v. Netherland, 112 F.3d 773, 776 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding inmate must show an “unconstitutional burden on his right of access to the courts” resulting in “actual injury” to “the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts”) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355). Conclusory allegations are insufficient. Sewell v. Shearin, C/A No. DKC-15-3040, 2016 WL 6525615, at *16 (D. Md. Nov. 2, 2016).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that his evidence related to summary judgment in Hampton I was destroyed, but he admits that Hampton I is still pending. A review of Hampton I reveals that Defendants' motion for summary judgment is pending. Because Plaintiff has not shown an actual injury, he has failed to state a claim for a First Amendment claim of denial of access to the courts.
2. Administrative Remedy Process
To the extent Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to properly respond to his grievances, this claim is also subject to summary dismissal. A prisoner has no constitutional right to a grievance procedure. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994); Daye v. Rubenstein, 417 Fed.Appx. 317, 319 (4th Cir. 2011); Ashann-Ra v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 112 F.Supp.2d 559, 569 (W.D. Va. 2000) (“[A] prison official's failure to comply with the state's grievance procedure is not actionable under § 1983.”). Accordingly, Defendants' alleged failure to appropriately process or respond to Plaintiff's grievances does not state a cognizable constitutional claim.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's claims for alleged confiscation of evidence related to Hampton I and claims related to Defendants' failure to follow BOP policy or the grievance policy be dismissed. By separate order, the undersigned has authorized service of process against Knight for allegedly taking Plaintiff's prescription eyeglasses.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).