Opinion
2:99cv44-T
April 11, 2000
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS MATTER is before the court upon defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Alternative Motion to Stay, plaintiffs' Motion to File Amended Complaint, and defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss, which the court deems to be a reply to plaintiffs' response.
I. Procedural History
Defendants filed their dispositive motion on September 21, 1999. On October 5, 1999, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking an extension of their time to respond to defendants' motion, claiming that "personal circumstances of health prevent them from responding." Docket Entry 20. Taking such contention as true, the court allowed plaintiffs until November 8, 1999, to respond.
On November 4, 1999, plaintiffs again moved for an extension of time to respond, that time for 90 days. In support of such extraordinary relief, plaintiffs filed a supporting memorandum, in which they stated that the previous "incapacitating medical conditions and surgical necessit[ies]" had "not yet been resolved or fully investigated" and listed a number of serious surgeries from which they were recovering or for which they were preparing. In their response, defendants did not oppose the motion, but did request that the court require plaintiffs to respond at the end of the second extension by filing either a responsive brief or a motion to amend their complaint. Within the time provided, plaintiffs did both — they filed the now pending Motion to File Amended Complaint, a proposed Amended Complaint, and their Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or In the Alternative to Stay.
II. The Proposed Amended Complaint
The proposed amended pro se complaint consists of 262 pages, 949 paragraphs, and 142 purported causes of action. Inasmuch as the proposed amended complaint has come on to be filed before the submission of an answer by defendants, and inasmuch as a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading that would prohibit unilateral amendment, the court finds that Rule 15, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, does not require leave of court for such amendment to be filed. Smith v. Blackledge, 451 F.2d 1201, 1202 (4th Cir. 1971)("The motion to dismiss was not a responsive pleading for the purpose of Rule 15(a), and thus plaintiff could still amend without leave of the court after the motion to dismiss had been made.")
While plaintiffs may be able to file their amended complaint, it is subject to being stricken for plaintiffs' failure to comply with other rules. The amended complaint is not a "short and plain" statement. Rule 8 (a) provides, as follows:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and
(3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
The undersigned is compelled to find that the 262-page amended complaint violates Rule 8(a) in that it is not a short and plain statement of the claim and does not adequately express the court's jurisdiction. Rule 12 (b) is also violated because this court would lack personal jurisdiction over the nearly two-score new defendants, who appear to reside in New Jersey, because the events allegedly giving rise to this action have absolutely no connection to this forum state. That plaintiffs decided to move to this state after their troubles began in New Jersey does not satisfy due process, the cornerstone of which is minimum contacts by those whom plaintiffs would hale into this court. The issue is whether exercise of jurisdiction would "offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). To require those defendants to be served and go to the expense of specially appearing in this court only to assert the lack of personal jurisdiction would be a patent abuse of process and offend traditional notions of substantial justice. Because of the failure to comply with Rule 8(a) and the patent lack of personal jurisdiction, the undersigned will recommend that the amended complaint be summarily dismissed. See Anderson v. Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law, 130 F.R.D. 616 (D.Md. 1989).
III. Motion to Dismiss the Original Complaint
A. Standard
Rule 12(b) authorizes dismissal based upon a dispositive issue of law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832 (1989);Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). As the Court discussed in Neitzke:
This procedure [for dismissal], operating on the assumption that the factual allegations in the complaint are true, streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and fact finding. Nothing in Rule 12(b)(6) confines its sweep to claims of law which are obviously insupportable. On the contrary, if as a matter of law "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts . . . a claim must be dismissed, without regard to whether it is based on outlandish legal theory . . . . What Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance are dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations."Id., at 1832 (citation omitted). For the limited purpose of making a recommendation as to disposition of defendants' motion, the undersigned has accepted as true the facts alleged by plaintiffs in the complaint and viewed them in a light most favorable to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' conclusions of law contained in their complaint are not given such broad acceptance.
B. Background
Plaintiffs' dispute with these defendants stems from an automobile accident, which was amicably settled and for which voluntary dismissals were taken. The only matters which survive that settlement are certain claims subject to arbitration in New Jersey under the UIM coverage, over which this court has no jurisdiction.
As to the original complaint, defendants' Motion to Dismiss is still pending and has been timely responded to by plaintiffs. The undersigned has considered the plaintiffs' brief and must find that plaintiffs have misapprehended substantive federal law, the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, and the comity which this court affords the judgment of all other courts, both federal and state.
C. Discussion
Plaintiffs' action is barred by the doctrines of "accord and satisfaction" and res judicata. Both plaintiffs herein instituted litigation in New Jersey alleging that State Farm Indemnity had denied their medical insurance benefits improperly and in bad faith. Plaintiffs settled their New Jersey actions, and each signed a Release stating that it was intended to cover any claims made "during litigation between the parties in an action entitled [Plaintiff] v. State Farm." Each Plaintiff also filed a Stipulation of Dismissal reciting that his action had been "amicably adjusted" and concluding the claims asserted in that action. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this court in March 1999, and stipulations of dismissal were filed in the New Jersey actions in August 1999.
Stipulations of dismissal filed with a court are prima facie evidence of accord and satisfaction. Futrelle v. Duke Univ., 127 N.C. App. 244 (1997) (discussing elements of accord and satisfaction). Although the existence of accord and satisfaction is generally a question of fact, "where the only reasonable inference is existence or non-existence, accord and satisfaction is a question of law and may be adjudicated by . . . [the court] when the essential facts are made clear of record."Zanone v. RJR Nabisco, 120 N.C. App. 768, 771 (1995) (citation omitted).
[In North Carolina, an] "accord" is an agreement whereby one of the parties undertakes to give or perform, and the other to accept, in satisfaction of a claim, liquidated or in dispute, and arising either from contract or tort, something other than or different from what he is, or considered himself entitled to; and a "satisfaction" is the execution or performance, of such agreement.Sharpe v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 62 N.C. App. 564, 565, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 823 (1983)(quoting Allgood v. Trust Co., 242 N.C. 506, 515 (1955)). North Carolina courts have held, as follows:
Establishing an accord and satisfaction . . . as a matter of law requires evidence that permits no reasonable inference to the contrary and that shows the "unequivocal" intent of one party to make and the other party to accept a lesser payment in satisfaction . . . of a larger claim.Moore v. Frazier, 63 N.C. App. 476, 478-479 (1983). In this case, defendants have properly submitted proof of the bar of accord and satisfaction by tendering public records, proper in form. Where a party submits documents in support of a showing that concerns a court's jurisdiction, there is no need to convert the matter to summary judgment. McNair v. Lend Lease Trucks, Inc., 95 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 1996).
The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, holds that once a claim has been litigated and resolved, it may not be reasserted elsewhere. It bars attempts to relitigate or restate claims that have been resolved in another court proceeding, even under the federal torts developed under RICO. HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 637 F. Supp. 710, 716-18 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd, 828 F.2d 1071 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1009 (1988). Plaintiffs cannot now convert into a RICO action their previously resolved state-law claims for injuries received in a motor vehicle accident and any bad-faith insurance practice claims. The releases signed by the plaintiffs also released all claims relating to the denial of PIP insurance coverage and "bad faith," which are bases for all the claims plaintiffs have attempted to assert herein under the guise of RICO and various other tort causes of action.
As discussed above, only the UIM claim remains pending (in arbitration in New Jersey) because it was excepted from such global settlements: all other claims, including whatever claims plaintiffs have attempted to raise here, were released. Plaintiffs do not gain causes of action by simply moving from New Jersey to North Carolina or attempting to file claims in federal rather than state courts. For these reasons, the undersigned finds that plaintiffs' complaint, be it stated in 36 pages or 262, is barred as a matter of law by the doctrines of res judicata and accord and satisfaction.
Defendants clearly have shown that plaintiffs have also failed to state a RICO claim. The undersigned has not addressed that alternative basis for dismissal, inasmuch as this action is patently barred under the doctrines of "accord and satisfaction" and res judicata.
RECOMMENDATION
IT IS, THEREFORE, RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED that
(1) plaintiffs' Motion to Amend be DENIED as unnecessary under Rule 15, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(2) plaintiffs' 262-page Amended Complaint be STRICKEN for patent violation of Rule 8(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(3) defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED, the alternative Motion to Stay be DENIED, and this action be DISMISSED in its entirety with prejudice as barred by the doctrines of "accord and satisfaction" and res judicata.
The parties are hereby advised that, pursuant to 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(C), written objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation contained herein must be filed within ten (10) days of service of same. Failure to file objections to this Memorandum and Recommendation with the district court will preclude the parties from raising such objections on appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984).
This Memorandum and Recommendation is entered in response to defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Alternative Motion to Stay (#17), defendants' Renewed Motion to Stay (deemed to be a reply to plaintiffs' response), and plaintiffs' Motion to File Amended Complaint (#26).