Opinion
94 Civ 6665 (TPG)
September 30, 2002
OPINION
Plaintiff Michael Hamilton sues the City, claiming that prison guards employed by the City failed to protect Hamilton from assault by another inmate. The Second Amended Complaint alleges causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law.
At an earlier juncture the City moved for judgment on the pleadings, or for summary judgment, dismissing the federal causes of action. The City also moved, in the event the federal claims were dismissed, to have the court decline jurisdiction over the state law claims. In an opinion dated August 19, 1999 the court dismissed a claim asserted directly under the Eighth Amendment, but declined to dismiss the claim under § 1983, holding that there should be further discovery, after which the City might renew its motion. The court did not rule on whether it would retain jurisdiction over the state law claims.
Further discovery has taken place and the City has renewed its motion with respect to the § 1983 claim and the state law claims.
The court denies the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings. However, the court grants the City's motion for summary judgment dismissing the § 1983 claim. The court also declines to assert continued jurisdiction over the state law claims, and they are dismissed without prejudice to being asserted in state court.
Facts
Certain facts are undisputed. On August 3, 1993 plaintiff was an inmate at Rikers Island. He was in the infirmary and, while in the infirmary, was involved in an altercation with another inmate named Ricky Morris. During the altercation Morris beat plaintiff and repeatedly stabbed him with a sharpened metal object.
The precise designation of the infirmary location was Dormitory 2 of the Rikers Island North Infirmary Command, referred to as "Dorm 2." Dorm 2 contains two sides, A and B. The altercation between Morris and plaintiff occurred in the A side bathroom. There are three correction officer posts in Dorm 2, one on each side (the "B" posts) and one located in a glass-enclosed control booth at the entrance to Dorm 2 (the "A" post). During the time of the incident, correction officer Vannostrand was assigned to the B post on the A side and correction officer Holder was assigned to the A post in the control booth.
Following the incident, Vannostrand, Holder and a supervisor, Captain Reinstein, completed separate incident reports. Plaintiff and the City have different versions about the conduct of the officers in connection with the altercation.
Plaintiff's Version
Plaintiff's version is supported by his own affidavit and an affidavit of Stephen Jacks, another Dorm 2 inmate. On August 3, 1993 during the 5 PM "feed up" for the A side of Dorm 2 an argument occurred between plaintiff and Morris, which became known within a short period of time to the correction officers and inmates in the A side. Plaintiff refused to serve Morris more food. Morris challenged plaintiff to give him more food or they would have "a beef," which is slang for a fight. Plaintiff still refused to give Morris more food.
Sometime after this incident, Jacks witnessed Morris in the A side bathroom sharpening a long metal object referred to as a "shank." Plaintiff proceeded to the same bathroom in his wheelchair. Jacks was concerned and looked for the correction officer who was supposed to be at the B post (presumably Vannostrand), but did not find him. Jacks then rolled his wheelchair toward the A post, the glass-enclosed control booth, where he saw Vannostrand and Holder. Jacks knocked on the window and told Vannostrand that there was going to be trouble between Morris and plaintiff, and that Morris had some kind of weapon, to which Vannostrand responded with a smile and said that there is always trouble and that Jacks should wait until the trouble happened and should stop knocking on the window of the booth.
Within minutes of Jacks' conversation with Vannostrand, Morris assaulted plaintiff in the A side bathroom, stabbing him several times with the shank and beating him with the foot pedal of plaintiffs own wheel chair. Only after plaintiff wheeled himself out of the bathroom did any correction officers arrive, first Holder and a little while later Vannostrand.
The City's Version
The incident reports of the officers contain nothing about a warning which was ignored. Vannostrand's incident report, and Reinstein's incident report, quoting what Vannostrand told him, are to the effect that Vannostrand was working his post on side A and heard a commotion. Then, as he responded, he observed an altercation between inmates in the bathroom. The implication is that Vannostrand did not have advance warning of the altercation. Holder's incident report states that she was alone in her A post control booth, when she was notified by Vannostrand of the altercation in the bathroom, to which she responded by notifying Reinstein. This would mean that Holder learned of the incident only after it was gong on. Reinstein's incident report states that he was notified by Holder of the altercation, and then immediately went to the area where it had occurred. Reinstein also does not indicate that he had any advance warning.
Issues Raised on First Motion
If the outcome of this case depended solely on the question of whether the officers acted properly to protect plaintiff, there would clearly be triable issues of fact. The case could not be disposed of on motion. There would be questions of credibility as between plaintiffs version and the officer's version. Even if the officers' descriptions were to be taken as fact, there would still be questions about whether they acted with sufficient speed and effectiveness to protect plaintiff.
However, the suit is against the City. The officers are not defendants. Under familiar law, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 for civil rights violations by its employees solely on the basis of a respondeat superior theory. Rather, liability can only be imposed when the acts in question were carried out in the execution of a municipal policy, custom or practice, Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 1999); Knowles v. New York City Dep't of Corr., 904 F. Supp. 217, 218 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), or if there was a failure by the municipality to supervise or discipline its employees amounting to a policy of deliberate indifference to the known risks of constitutional violations. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 145.
Plaintiff concedes that he cannot recover under § 1983 simply by showing misdeeds on the part of the officers. Plaintiff understands that, in order to recover from the City, he must meet the standards set forth in the cases just cited.
In response to the first motion made by the City, plaintiff posed the following three theories:
(1) The City had actual knowledge, through the two officers whom Jacks warned, of the imminent attack, and failed to prevent it.
(2) The City was guilty of deliberate indifference in failing to properly supervise and discipline the correction officers with regard to inmate violence.
(3) The City, knowing of the problem of inmates' possession of weapons, should have established more effective procedures for detecting such weapons and was deliberately indifferent in failing to do so.
In the August 19, 1999 opinion, the court, in dealing with the first theory, rejected the idea that any knowledge possessed by the two officers could be said to constitute actual knowledge on the part of the City. As to the other two theories, the court held that there was no basis in the record as of that point for any claim that the City was guilty of deliberate indifference with respect to training correction offices about handling inmate violence or in respect to procedures for detecting weapons possessed by inmates. However, the court declined to finally dispose of the § 1983 claim because discovery had not yet been completed. The court then dismissed the § 1983 claim, but indicated that a renewed motion by the City could be made after completion of discovery. Such motion is now before the court.
Rulings on the Current Motion
The court adheres to the views that are expressed in its earlier opinion with regard to the three contentions made by plaintiff at that time. In any event, plaintiff has withdrawn these contentions.
Plaintiff now asserts three new claims as to why the City should be held liable, which he articulates in paragraphs 47-71 of the Second Amended Complaint, filed following the August 19, 1999 opinion. They are described below. It should be noted that plaintiff does not claim that the wrongdoing of the officers was carried out in the execution of a City policy, custom or practice. Instead, plaintiff seeks to come within the "deliberate indifference" branch of the applicable law. The claims now asserted are as follows.
First. The first of plaintiffs claims arises from the fact that as of August 1993 inmates charged with assaults on other inmates were generally "infracted" (subjected to prison discipline) rather than being arrested and subjected to criminal prosecution. Assaults by inmates againstemployees were referred for criminal prosecution but, as a general rule, this was not done with respect to assaults on other inmates. Plaintiff urges that the inmate-on-inmate assaults should have been given the same treatment as the assaults on employees and that failure to do so amounted to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of inmates needing protection from violence committed by other inmates. It appears that subsequent to 1993 it became more common to refer inmate-on-inmate assaults for criminal prosecution. Plaintiff claims that this reduced the violence between inmates.
Second. Plaintiff claims that there was deliberate indifference on the part of the City in failing to train officers to bring criminal charges against inmates for assault, rather than simply making them subject to prison discipline. This second theory is, of course, basically identical to the first.
Third. Plaintiffs third claim arises from the fact that, although the City segregated inmates based on risk of dangerous behavior when they were in the general population, this was not done in the infirmary where the incident in question occurred. Plaintiff claims that the failure to segregate in the infirmary amounted to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.
The court will now proceed to rule on the three claims made by plaintiff in response to the City's current motion.
As to the first claim, the Constitution simply does not mandate that a state prison must refer cases of inmate-on-inmate assault for criminal prosecution rather than dealing with them by prison discipline. By the same token, it cannot be said that a policy or practice favoring the prison discipline remedy constitutes deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of inmates. If punishment for assaults by inmates against inmates is meted out within the prison, this is hardly indifference to the need for remedying inmate violence. The decision about whether to use the criminal justice system or the prison's own system of punishments involves matters of judgment as between two reasonable alternatives. There is no basis for a court to rule that, as a matter of constitutional law, only one can be used. The court holds that the first claim described above is without merit and that there is no triable issue of fact. What has been said about the first claim obviously disposes of the second.
In connection with the last of the three claims, the deposition of Captain Tony Grayson indicates that at Rikers Island as of August 1993 there was an inmate classification system based on risk of violence. Utilizing these classifications, there was a certain degree of segregation in the general population, but for sleeping purposes only. This segregation was not used in the infirmary. However, if an inmate had an established record of violence in the prison, this was deemed a "high-profile" case, and the inmate might be segregated even in the infirmary.
No record can be located reflecting whether Ricky Morris was given a risk of violence classification, and, if so, what it was. Nor is there any evidence that he was regarded as a "high-profile" case.
It should be emphasized, however, that plaintiffs third claim is not about the particular handling of Ricky Morris. Based on the applicable law, plaintiff is arguing that there was a general policy which involved deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. It is in this regard that plaintiff cites the failure to segregate high risk inmates in the infirmary as was done in the general population.
The court notes that the segregation in the general population only applied at nighttime when the inmates were sleeping. Thus, the system would not have protected plaintiff even if it had been in effect in the infirmary and Morris had been classified and/or deemed a "high risk" case.
But the issue is more fundamental. Plaintiff is asserting in effect that Rikers Island was required, as a matter of constitutional law, to segregate risky inmates in the infirmary in the same way they were segregated in general population. But the Constitution, with rare exceptions, does not dictate the details of inmate housing. Moreover, the evidence now in the record negates conclusively any idea that the housing of inmates in the infirmary was attended by deliberate indifference to safety. The prison had officers posted in the infirmary whose duty was to watch the area and maintain discipline, including protecting inmates from violence. It may be (although the court does not so find on this motion) that the officers in question failed to perform their function adequately. But the dispositive point is that they were assigned to the infirmary with the duty of affording protection. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that there was deliberate indifference by the City to the risk of inmate violence, nor can it be said that there was deliberate indifference because the infirmary did not follow a particular housing arrangement. The court concludes that plaintiffs third claim is without merit and that there is no triable issue of fact.
For the reasons expressed above, the court holds that the City is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the claim under § 1983.
The remaining question is whether, with the federal claim disposed of, the court should retain jurisdiction over the state law claims.
The case is about eight years old. This circumstance provides some reason for the court to retain it so that a new lawsuit need not be brought in state court. However, other factors weigh in the other direction. A great deal of the work in the federal court thus far has been devoted to motions concerning whether there is a valid federal claim. Even the discovery has been, at least to a substantial degree, related to this question. It would appear that most of the work to develop the state law case remains to be done. This work may as well be carried out in the state court. Moreover, in applying the state law doctrines which will be applicable, while the federal court is surely capable of dealing with state law, it is the more natural province of the state court to do so.
For these reasons, the state law claims are dismissed, without prejudice to bringing them in state court.
Conclusion
Upon the renewed motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the court denies the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court grants the City's motion for summary judgment dismissing the § 1983 claim. This disposes of the federal law portion of the action. As to the state law claims, the court declines to retain jurisdiction and dismisses these claims without prejudice.