Opinion
No. 18-60026 BAP No. 17-1223 No. 18-60027 BAP No. 17-1126
11-21-2019
In re: CHRISTOPHER JOHN HAMILTON; ELIZABETH LEIGH TESOLIN, Debtors, CHRISTOPHER JOHN HAMILTON; ELIZABETH LEIGH TESOLIN, Appellants, v. ELITE OF LOS ANGELES, INC.; SAN DIEGO TESTING SERVICES, INC., Appellees. In re: CHRISTOPHER JOHN HAMILTON; ELIZABETH LEIGH TESOLIN, Debtors, CHRISTOPHER JOHN HAMILTON, Appellant, v. ELITE OF LOS ANGELES, INC.; et al., Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MEMORANDUM Appeal from the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Faris, Lafferty III, and Brand, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding Submitted November 6, 2019 Pasadena, California Before: MURGUIA and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and GUIROLA, District Judge.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Honorable Louis Guirola, Jr., United States District Judge for the Southern District of Mississippi, sitting by designation. --------
Christopher Hamilton and Elizabeth Tesolin filed a Chapter 11 petition after Elite of Los Angeles, Inc. and San Diego Testing Services, Inc. (collectively, "Elite") obtained a state court judgment against them. The bankruptcy court held that Elite's judgment against Hamilton was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) because of his willful and malicious conduct; the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP") affirmed. See Elite of Los Angeles, Inc. v. Hamilton (In re Hamilton), 584 B.R. 310, 322 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2018). Hamilton appeals that ruling, and both he and Tesolin appeal the BAP's determination regarding assessment of post-judgment interest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) and affirm.
1. The bankruptcy court and the BAP did not err in finding that Hamilton's conduct was "willful" under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) because he "had a subjective motive to inflict injury or . . . believed that injury was substantially certain to occur as a result of his conduct." See Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Ormsby v. First Am. Title Co. of Nev. (In re Ormsby), 591 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2010); Carrillo v. Su (In re Su), 290 F.3d 1140, 1142, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 2002).
2. The BAP correctly awarded post-judgment interested at the ten percent rate imposed by California Code of Civil Procedure § 685.010 for the full post-judgment period because the bankruptcy court only had authority to determine whether Hamilton's debt was dischargeable, and "interest at the state's judgment interest rate continues to accrue postpetition on nondischargeable debts." See Schoen v. Schoen (In re Schoen), 176 F.3d 1150, 1166 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.