Opinion
37508.
DECIDED JANUARY 27, 1959.
Action on contract. Bulloch Superior Court. Before Judge Renfroe. October 9, 1958.
W. G. Neville, Wm. J. Neville, for plaintiff in error.
Cohen Anderson, contra.
In the absence of any error of law appearing, where there is any competent evidence to support a verdict approved by the trial court, this court is without authority to reverse a judgment denying a new trial.
DECIDED JANUARY 27, 1959.
Hugh Strickland, trading as Statesboro Sheet Metal Shop, entered into a contract with Nathan Halpern under the terms of which Strickland was to install a heating and air conditioning system in the Halperns' home. At a time after installation of the system was begun and before it was completed a controversy arose between the parties, and as a result Halpern refused to permit Strickland to complete the installation. Strickland then brought the present action to recover the balance alleged to be due on the contract less the alleged cost of completing the installation. Halpern, in his answer, admitted that the contract existed, that installation of the system had been started by the plaintiff, but contended that he had the work completed by others only after the plaintiff had stopped working on the installation, and alleged that he was entitled to recover from the plaintiff an amount alleged to be due him because the cost of completing the installation was more than the amount alleged to be due on the contract, and that the plaintiff had refused to complete installation although the contract stated: "Time is of the essence." The parties presented evidence on the trial of the case to support the allegations of the pleadings, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff but in a lesser amount than that sued for. The defendant's motion for new trial, based on the usual general grounds only, was denied and it is to this judgment that he now excepts.
"As was said by the Supreme Court in Adler v. Adler, 207 Ga. 394, 405 ( 61 S.E.2d 824), `This court does not pass upon the credibility of witnesses, nor the weight to be given evidence on disputed facts. These are questions for the jury. Whether their verdict is contrary to the evidence, or contrary to its weight, or decidedly and strongly against its weight, is a question the law vests in the trial judge's discretion. He may grant a new trial on these grounds, but this court has no such power. Where the trial judge approves the verdict, the sole question for determination by this court is whether there is any evidence sufficient to authorize it.' See also Knox v. Knox, 213 Ga. 677, 679 ( 101 S.E.2d 89)." Canal Ins. Co. v. Winge Bros., 97 Ga. App. 782, 787 ( 104 S.E.2d 525).
On the trial of the case the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff but in a lesser amount than that sued for. The plaintiff testified as to the cost of completing the installation of the system, and the defendant presented evidence that many of the things done by the plaintiff had to be done over because such work had been improperly done in the beginning. As to many of these items the cost was shown and the jury would have been authorized to find that in addition to the work admitted by the plaintiff to be necessary, some, but not all, of the other items were deductible from the amount which would have been due the plaintiff under the contract if the installation of the heating and air conditioning system had been completed by him. The verdict was authorized by the evidence, and the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for new trial based on the usual general grounds only.
Judgment affirmed. Felton, C. J., and Quillian, J., concur.