Opinion
9:23-cv-00883-SAL-MHC
06-07-2024
Samuel Vance Hall, II, Plaintiff, v. Joseph Williford, Brianna Hegeman, M. Ringgaberg, and “Jane” Neal, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Samuel Vance Hall, II, (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights while he was a pretrial detainee at the Chester County Detention Center (“CCDC”). ECF Nos. 1, 15. Defendants Joseph Williford, Brianna Hegeman, M. Ringgaberg, and Jane Neal (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). ECF No. 49. After the Court issued an order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff filed Responses in Opposition. ECF Nos. 52, 56. Defendants filed a Reply. ECF No. 60. The matter is, therefore, ripe for review.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) and (e) (D.S.C.). Because the Motion is dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends granting the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges his constitutional rights were violated while he was a pretrial detainee at CCDC. Specifically, he maintains the conditions of confinement at CCDC violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiff entered CCDC on January 20, 2023, because of multiple outstanding warrants originating in Ohio. ECF No. 49-2 at 1, ¶ 4. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hegeman halted the intake and processing procedure and told Defendant Williford “to place Plaintiff in [a] segregated holding cell for protected speech.” ECF No. 15 at 6. He maintains Defendant Hegeman did this as punishment for “unpopular political opinions.” ECF No. 15 at 4. Plaintiff claims that the cell he was placed in was “unnecessarily filthy” and had “evidence of feces improperly cleaned and sanitized visible on surfaces[,]” the presence of roaches, and holes in the wall allowing for pest entry. ECF No. 15 at 6. Plaintiff claims that after he voiced his opinion about the alleged cell conditions, Defendant Ringgaberg used a high-pitched, high-decibel sound to punish him. ECF No. 15 at 6. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Williford shut off all water to his cell. ECF No. 15 at 6. He contends he was housed in these filthy conditions for 48 hours and not given clean sanitary bedding for 24 hours at a time when temperatures were “low enough to cause constant shaking and shivering.” ECF No. 15 at 6.
Plaintiff states that Defendant Williford transferred him to another cell on January 22, 2023, and alleges his living conditions were unnecessarily filthy with rancid food in the cell and black mold in the shower. ECF No. 15 at 7. He claims he was denied toilet paper for four hours and his requests for cleaning supplies were ignored for six days. ECF No. 15 at 7.
On January 28, 2023, Plaintiff allegedly was transferred to another dorm. ECF No. 15 at 7. He claims the dorm had inoperable toilets, a strong odor of sewer gas, excessive rust, flaking paint, and mold. ECF No. 15 at 7-8. Plaintiff claims he endured mental anguish from the conditions, and he asserts Defendant Williford told him, “if you don't like it, bond out.” ECF No. 15 at 8.
Defendants submitted various evidence to the Court, including declarations from all Defendants, assorted jail records, incident reports, and inmate request forms. According to Defendants Ringgaberg and Hegeman, upon Plaintiff's arrival at CCDC, he was extremely uncooperative, combative, and disruptive. ECF No. 60-1 at 1, ¶ 4; ECF No. 49-3 at 1-2, ¶¶ 3-5. Plaintiff's uncooperative behavior prevented CCDC staff from being able to complete the booking process, which is necessary for the safety of jail staff and inmates. ECF No. 60-1 at 1-2, ¶¶ 4-5. Therefore, Defendant Ringgaberg averred that it was necessary to place Plaintiff in a holding cell until the booking process could be completed. ECF No. 60-1 at 2, ¶ 6. After the booking process was complete, Plaintiff was transferred to a COVID isolation cell. ECF No. 60-2 at 2. Defendants Neal and Hegeman averred that Plaintiff was put into isolation for a short period so that he could quarantine as a COVID precaution. ECF No. 49-2 at 1-2, ¶ 4; ECF No. 49-3 at 1-2, ¶¶ 3-5. Thereafter, he was moved to general population. ECF No. 49-2 at 1-2, ¶ 4; ECF No. 49-3 at 2, ¶ 5.
According to Defendants, Plaintiff was generally combative and disagreeable, and frequently complained of various conditions while threatening litigation. ECF No. 49-3 at 1-2, ¶¶ 4, 6; ECF No. 49-5 at 2, ¶ 6; ECF No. 49-7 at 1, ¶ 3. On one occasion, Plaintiff flooded his cell, necessitating water being shut off to his toilets. ECF No. 49-7 at 1-2, ¶¶ 4-7. Defendants also noted that they responded to Plaintiff's complaints about the alleged mold and attempted to clean it. ECF No. 49-5 at 1-2, ¶ 5. It was determined that the spots Plaintiff complained of were not mold or mildew; rather, someone had thrown food on the ceiling which had dried. ECF No. 49-5 at 1-2, ¶ 5.
Defendant Neal further averred that CCDC detainees are responsible for cleaning their own cells and areas. ECF No. 49-2 at 2. Because of this, CCDC distributes cleaning supplies to detainees every day. ECF No. 49-2 at 2, ¶¶ 5-6; ECF No. 49-5 at 1, ¶ 4. As to the high-decibel sound device, Defendant Neal averred that Plaintiff is likely referring to the fire alarm system. ECF No. 49-2 at 2, ¶¶ 8-9. She noted that CCDC employees do not have any control over when the fire alarm goes off, as it is triggered by certain events like fires, smoke, or detainees breaking sprinkler heads. ECF No. 49-2 at 2, ¶¶ 8-9. Defendant Neal noted that medical staff have never indicated that the fire alarm or any other sound device have ever caused any adverse effect or injury on any detainee, including Plaintiff. ECF No. 49-2 at 2, ¶¶ 8-9.
Plaintiff requests monetary damages for future medical treatment required from his exposure to the various conditions and for his pain and suffering. ECF No. 15 at 11.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 49. Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact” and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.
Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, although the Court views all the underlying facts and inferences in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving “party nonetheless must offer some ‘concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor.'” Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC, 809 F.3d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). That is to say, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
Additionally, pro se filings are to be “liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting “we are obliged to construe [a complaint's] allegations liberally and with the intent of doing justice”). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.”).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants maintain they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has failed to show any violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. ECF No. 49-1 at 3-10. Additionally, Defendants maintain that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars claims against Defendants in their official capacities. ECF No. 49-1 at 14-15. They further argue Plaintiff has failed to show Defendant Neal was personally involved in any of the alleged constitutional violations. ECF No. 49-1 at 10-11. Finally, they argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons that follow, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants argue they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as to any claims brought against them in their official capacities. ECF No. 49-1 at 14. The Court agrees.
Under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts are barred from hearing claims for monetary damages against a state or its agents, instrumentalities, and employees, unless the state has consented to the suit. Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 279 (4th Cir. 2020); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (“It has long been settled that [the Eleventh Amendment's] reference to ‘actions against one of the United States' encompasses not only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.”). Unless a state has consented to suit or Congress has waived a state's immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, a state (and its agencies) may not be sued in federal or state court. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Congress has not abrogated the states' sovereign immunity under § 1983, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979), and South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal district court. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e). This Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to arms of the state, “including state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity,” Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996), because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office,” such that it “is no different from a suit against the State itself,” Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
In this case, there is no dispute that Defendants were all employees of CCDC at the time of the alleged incidents. Thus, any claims for monetary damages brought against Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Fauconier, 966 F.3d 279 (noting, under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts are barred from hearing claims for monetary damages against a state or its agents, instrumentalities, and employees, unless the state has consented to the suit); Williams v. Dorchester Cnty. Det. Ctr., 987 F.Supp.2d 690, 692-93 (D.S.C. 2013) (noting a county detention center is under the control of the county sheriff's office and is considered a state agency (citing S.C. Code § 24-5-10)); see also Barfield v. Cunningham, No. 8:20-CV-02388-DCN-JDA, 2021 WL 1526508, at *5 n.6 (D.S.C. Mar. 15, 2021) (noting the Florence County Sherriff is charged with the administration of the Florence County Detention Center and reasoning the employees of the detention center are ultimately entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity), report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:20-CV-2388 DCN, 2021 WL 1526486 (D.S.C. Apr. 5, 2021). Accordingly, Defendants, in their official capacities, are entitled to summary judgment.
Moreover, for purposes of § 1983, Defendants, in their official capacities, are not considered “persons” amenable to suit. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.”); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26-27 (1991).
B. Defendant Neal
Defendants argue that Defendant Neal is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has failed to show any personal involvement with the various claims brought in this action. ECF No. 49-1 at 10-12. The Court agrees.
To state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001).
Here, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint sets forth no specific facts showing how Defendant Neal was personally involved in any of the alleged unconstitutional actions or circumstances he identified. See ECF No. 15. Rather, Plaintiff simply makes a conclusory allegation that Defendant Neal is liable by virtue of her position as the Director at CCDC and the fact she is aware of prison policy. ECF No. 15 at 4. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to show, much less allege, Defendant Neal had any personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171 (noting a plaintiff must show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights); Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting liability will only lie in § 1983 actions where it is “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights” (citation omitted)).
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff alleges Defendant Neal is vicariously liable by virtue of the actions of her subordinates, that claim also fails. Pure supervisory liability will not lie in § 1983 actions. Wrightv.Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.” (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977))). Rather, to hold a supervisor liable for a constitutional injury inflicted by a subordinate under § 1983, Plaintiff must show facts establishing the following elements: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to people like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the subordinate's conduct; and (3) there is an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the plaintiffs constitutional injury. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence showing any of these required elements.
Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to point to evidence in the record that would support threshold essential elements of a § 1983 claim, summary judgment is appropriate as to Defendant Neal. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 (noting the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action to survive summary judgment).
C. Conditions of confinement
Plaintiff maintains Defendants impermissibly punished him while he was a pretrial detainee. Plaintiff further raises general conditions of confinement claims.
As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff possesses a constitutional right to be free from punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534-36 (1979). Claims as to conditions of confinement for state pretrial detainees are evaluated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (rather than under the Eighth Amendment). See id. at 535 n.16; Williamson, 912 F.3d at 174 n.15.
An individual pretrial detainee may raise a substantive due process challenge to these conditions where they are so disproportionate or arbitrary that they are not related to legitimate penological objectives and amount to punishment. Williamson, 912 F.3d at 174-76. To prevail on such a claim, a detainee must show that the challenged treatment or conditions were either (1) imposed with an express intent to punish, or (2) not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive objective, in which case an intent to punish may be inferred. Id. at 178.
Absent a showing of expressed intent to punish on the part of the correctional officials, the determination of whether a particular action is punitive turns on whether it was rationally connected to legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives and whether it was excessive in relation to that purpose. Bell, 441 U.S. at 537-40, 561; Williamson, 912 F.3d at 178; see also Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 608-09 (4th Cir. 2023) (“The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees from ‘governmental action' that is not ‘rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose' or that is ‘excessive in relation to that purpose.'” (citation omitted)).
Plaintiff alleges he was punished by: (1) Defendant Hegeman placing Plaintiff in isolation upon arriving to CCDC, (2) Defendant Williford shutting off all water in his isolation cell, and (3) Defendant Ringgaberg using a “high decibel sound” to punish him. ECF No. 15 at 4. Plaintiff further alleges other general conditions of confinement claims, namely that during his stay he was exposed to mold and mildew and that during a portion of his stay he was housed near toilets. ECF No. 15 at 5-6. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff has failed to show he was impermissibly punished under the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Defendant Hegeman
Plaintiff first claims that he was put into isolation as punishment for “unpopular political opinions.” ECF No. 15 at 4. While it is unclear to what political opinions Plaintiff is referring, the evidence before the Court indicates Plaintiff was isolated for two reasons. First, because of Plaintiff's uncooperative and generally combative behavior, Defendant Ringgaberg averred that it was necessary to place Plaintiff in a holding cell until the booking process could be completed. ECF No. 60-1 at 1-2, ¶¶ 4-6. Second, after the booking process was finished, Plaintiff was moved into a different cell for quarantining to ameliorate concerns with COVID-19. ECF No. 49-2 at 1-2, ¶ 4; ECF No. 49-3 at 2, ¶ 5. As the evidence reflects, CCDC policy during this time was to place newly-booked detainees into a quarantine cell in I Pod for a short amount of time. ECF No. 49-2 at 1-2, ¶ 4; ECF No. 49-3 at 2, ¶ 5. Indeed, Plaintiff's own Amended Complaint confirms that the reason for his initial isolation was per COVID protocol. See ECF No. 15 at 5, ¶ 6 (indicating he was placed in isolation per COVID protocol for a period of six days). After quarantining, Plaintiff was moved to general population. ECF No. 49-2 at 1-2, ¶ 4; ECF No. 49-3 at 2, ¶ 5. All told, Plaintiff spent a total of eight days in isolation. ECF No. 60-2 at 2.
Upon review, it is clear the individually-imposed restriction-moving Plaintiffto a holding cell-was an administrative measure imposed so the booking process could be completed. This is not unconstitutional “punishment.” See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 175 (noting jail officials are entitled “to impose restrictions for administrative purposes without running afoul of Bell” which include measures “to maintain security and order”). Further, the subsequent move to a quarantine cell was done for the general safety, health, and welfare of everyone at the facility. Indeed, the quarantine restriction imposed on Plaintiff was clearly directly related to the legitimate interest of protecting the health and welfare of inmates and jail staff by slowing the spread of an infectious disease, COVID-19. Plaintiff's short time of eight days spent outside of general population was directly related to the safety of CCDC staff and inmates. See Smith v. Clary, No. CA 9:12-1779-RBH-BM, 2012 WL 4059977, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2012) (“Confinement in even administrative segregation for medical and security reasons does not violate a detainee's or prisoner's constitutional rights; no infringement on the prisoner's liberty interests has taken place because confinement, restriction of movement and/or access to privileges, and heightened security measures are quintessential to the nature of prison life.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. CA 9:12-1779, 2012 WL 4059908 (D.S.C. Sept. 14, 2012).
Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to show, much less allege, that the administrative measure here was excessive or arbitrary, such that it rose to the level of prohibited punishment. See, e.g., Phomphackdi v. Spartanburg Cnty., No. 9:05-3084-DCN-GCK, 2006 WL 4391127, at *8-9 (D.S.C. Nov. 20, 2006) (finding administrative segregation of a disruptive pretrial detainee for eight months did not amount to unconstitutional punishment, but instead was for the legitimate purpose of protecting Plaintiff as well as other inmates, and to ensure order and safety at the facility), report and recommendation adopted in part, No. 905-3084-DCN-GCK, 2007 WL 858736 (D.S.C. Mar. 20, 2007). Accordingly, this claim fails, as no reasonable juror could view Plaintiff's placement into these cells as “so disproportionate, gratuitous, or arbitrary” that it violated his substantive due process guarantees. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 175.
2. Defendant Williford
Next, Plaintiff complains that Defendant Williford temporarily shut off water in his cell. ECF No. 15 at 4. The evidence before the Court shows that, although the water was shut off in the Plaintiff's cell for a limited amount of time, this was not done for the purpose of punishing Plaintiff. ECF No. 49-7 at 1-2, ¶¶ 4-7. Rather, just prior to the Plaintiff's water being shut off, Plaintiff began repeatedly flushing his toilet in an apparent attempt to flood his cell. ECF No. 497 at 1-2, ¶¶ 4-7. Thereafter, Defendant Williford received a directive to shut off water access so Plaintiff would be unable to flood his cell. ECF No. 49-7 at 1-2, ¶¶ 4-7. This water access was only shut off as to Plaintiff's toilet, as the water in his sink still worked. ECF No. 49-7 at 1-2, ¶¶ 4-7. Additionally, the water to the toilet was manually turned on for Plaintiff as needed. ECF No. 49-7 at 1-2, ¶¶ 4-7. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that controverts Defendant Williford's declaration.
Upon review of the evidence before the Court, Plaintiff has not shown he was unconstitutionally punished. Rather, as Defendants argue, this was directly related to a legitimate penological interest of ensuring that a detainee could not succeed in flooding his cell, thereby ensuring the safety of the Plaintiff, other detainees, and jail staff. Further, this temporary restriction, which only lasted for a maximum of 48 hours, see ECF No. 15 at 6, was not excessive in comparison to the legitimate interest it sought to remedy, especially considering that water was manually turned on an off as needed. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to show this temporary restriction of water in this case constituted “punishment.” See, e.g., Kidwell v. Buchanan, 996 F.2d 1225, 1993 WL 230224, at *1 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table opinion) (finding the temporary restriction of amenities was not punishment of a pretrial detainee, “especially given that turning off the water was related specifically to [the detainee's] misconduct”); Thompson v. Brown, No. CIV.A. 3:11-318-TMC, 2011 WL 6012592, at *1-3 (D.S.C. Nov. 8, 2011) (finding alleged lack of access to toilet tissue and running water for six days was not sufficient to state a constitutional claim as Plaintiff failed to show “any expressed intent on the part of Defendants to punish him,” because Defendants' actions were taken in response to Plaintiff breaking sprinkler heads and “after they reasonably believed Plaintiff flushed a blanket and washcloth down the sewer”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:11-318-TMC, 2011 WL 6012550 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2011). Thus, Defendant Williford is entitled to summary judgment on this claim, as his actions were not “so disproportionate, gratuitous, or arbitrary” that it violated Plaintiff's substantive due process guarantees. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 175.
3. Defendant Ringgaberg
Plaintiff claims that some sound device was used by Defendant Ringgaberg as punishment. ECF No. 15 at 4. Based upon the evidence before the Court, because no CCDC employees or staff have access to “high-decibel sound devices,” it appears Plaintiff is referring to a CCDC fire alarm. ECF No. 49-2 at 2, ¶¶ 8-9. While possibly uncomfortable to hear, this does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Perhaps more importantly, the timing and volume of the fire alarm is out of the control of CCDC officers, including Defendant Ringgaberg, and may be set off by a number of triggers, including fire, smoke, and inmates breaking sprinkler heads. ECF No. 49-2 at 2, ¶¶ 89. Indeed, Defendant Ringgaberg averred that she had never utilized a “high-decibel” sound device on any detainee. ECF No. 60-1 at 2. Further, Defendant Neal noted that medical staff have never indicated that the fire alarm or any other sound device have ever caused any adverse effect or injury on any detainee, including Plaintiff. ECF No. 49-2 at 2, ¶¶ 8-9.
Upon review, Plaintiff has failed to show he was unconstitutionally punished. Other than his conclusory statements that the declarations Defendants provided were false, Plaintiff has failed to rebut the evidence before the Court indicating that (1) no employee of CCDC has access to a “high-decibel” sound device, (2) that this was, in fact, the alarm system at CCDC, (3) that no CCDC employee has any control over when the fire alarm goes off, and (4) rather, the alarm Plaintiff is referring to goes off because of fires, smoke, or detainees breaking sprinkler heads. See ECF Nos. 52, 56. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact regarding this claim. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 (noting the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action to survive summary judgment).
The necessity of working fire alarms at CCDC is clearly essential for the safety of jail staff and detainees. Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown how he was harmed by this fire alarm. See Thompson, No. CIV.A. 3:11-318-TMC, 2011 WL 6012592, at *3 (“Plaintiff fails to show that his living conditions caused him anything more than de minimis injuries. A de minimis injury does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”), adopted, No. 3:11-318-TMC, 2011 WL 6012550. That the fire alarm apparently bothered Plaintiff is not harm of a constitutional dimension. See generally, Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting not every hardship suffered during pretrial detention amounts to “punishment” in the constitutional sense (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 537)). Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted on this claim.
4. General conditions of confinement
Finally, Plaintiff complains of his general conditions of confinement, including alleged unsanitary conditions, mold, and sleeping next to a toilet. See ECF No. 15 at 4-5. Plaintiff maintains that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to these conditions. ECF No. 15 at 4-5.
The Fourth Circuit recently recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson “repudiates a subjective requirement for pretrial detainees' Fourteenth Amendment claims and permits pretrial detainees to state Fourteenth Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to a serious risk of harm on the purely objective basis that the ‘governmental action' they challenge is not ‘rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose' or is ‘excessive in relation to that purpose.'” Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 611 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015)). Specifically, Kingsley directed courts “to be more solicitous of the Fourteenth Amendment claims of a pretrial detainee than the Eighth Amendment claims of a post-conviction detainee,” because “pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all.” Id. at 609.
As a result, pretrial detainees are no longer required to show that prison officials had subjective knowledge of an excessive risk of harm in order to assert a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, while Eighth Amendment claims brought by convicted detainees still necessitate such a showing. See id. at 608-11 (noting that Kingsley abrogated prior Fourth Circuit precedent requiring pretrial detainees to allege both an objective risk of serious harm and subjective knowledge and disregard of that substantial risk for deliberate indifference claims). Instead, it “is sufficient that the plaintiff show that the defendant's action or inaction was, in Kingsley's words, ‘objectively unreasonable.'” Id. at 611 (quotingKingsley, 576 U.S. at 397). That is, “it is enough that the plaintiff show that the defendant acted or failed to act ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.'” Id. (citation omitted). Still, however, it is not enough “for the plaintiff to allege that the defendant negligently or accidentally failed to do right by the detainee.” Id. at 611-12.
Consequently, in light of Kingsley and the Fourth Circuit's clarification in Short, to succeed on a claim for deliberate indifference, a pretrial detainee must show (1) that he was subjected to a condition of confinement that posed a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) that “the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed to act to appropriately address the risk that the condition posed”; (3) that the defendant “knew or should have known” that “the defendant's action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as a result, the detainee was harmed.” See id. at 611; see also Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2017) (adopting a similar test for claims of deliberate indifference to conditions of confinement under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (same).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to show any injury resulting from the conditions of confinement or that Defendants' actions where objectively unreasonable in the face of those conditions. That is, even assuming the conditions he complained of posed a substantial risk of harm, Plaintiff has failed to produce competent medical evidence indicating that he has suffered any kind of injury- or risk of injury-resulting from any of his alleged conditions of confinement. Though Plaintiff alleges he has suffered some adverse health effects, there is no actual medical evidence showing Plaintiff has suffered any kind of injury outside of Plaintiff's bare, self-serving allegations.See Crouchman v. Pickens Cnty. Council, No. CV 9:16-0804-CMC-BM, 2017 WL 767185, at *11 (D.S.C. Feb. 3, 2017) (“While Plaintiff alleges in his [verified] Complaint that he is suffering sinus or respiratory problems that he contends are the result of his stay at the Detention Center, he has submitted no actual medical evidence that shows this to be the case, or to tie any serious medical issues he may be having to anything that happened to him while at the Detention Center.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 9:16-804-CMC-BM, 2017 WL 749393 (D.S.C. Feb. 27, 2017). Therefore, even taking as true Plaintiff's allegations regarding the sanitary conditions at CCDC or his housing next to a toilet, Plaintiff is unable to provide evidence that any of these conditions of his confinement actually resulted in any injury, nor has he put forth any competent evidence showing there was any risk of such injury. See Id. at *13 (“Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence (aside from his own conclusory allegations [in his verified Complaint] that he ‘has received serious physical and emotional injuries' due to his exposure to these conditions) that he suffered any injury whatsoever as a result of the conditions he complains of. This lack of any evidence of a compensable injury is fatal to Plaintiff's damages claim based on his general conditions of confinement.” (internal citations omitted)); Tolbert v. Haug, No. 7:23-CV-00533, 2024 WL 1719936, at *3 (W.D. Va. Apr. 22, 2024) (finding a plaintiff failed to state a conditions of confinement claim where the complaint did not “allege that [plaintiff] has actually suffered any harm as a result of either using the dayroom toilet or waiting to use the toilet in his cell”).
Plaintiff filed a verified Response in Opposition, wherein he swore under penalty of perjury that his allegations were true. See ECF No. 56 at 14. A pro se litigant's verified complaint or-as in this case-other verified submission must be considered as an affidavit and may, standing alone, defeat a motion for summary judgment when the allegations contained therein are based on personal knowledge. See Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Valindv.Wright, No. 05-C-0702, 2007 WL 9734863, at *5-6 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 30, 2007) (finding Plaintiff's verified response should be considered an affidavit for summary judgment purposes and rejecting Defendant's arguments to the contrary).
Finally, the evidence before the Court shows that Defendants took reasonable steps to address Plaintiff's concerns. First, these Defendants attempted to clean the purported mold about which Plaintiff complained, which ultimately turned out not to be mold. ECF No. 49-5 at 1-2, ¶ 5. Further, the detention center provided Plaintiff with cleaning supplies every day so he would have the opportunity to clean any mold or other unsanitary conditions. ECF No. 49-5 at 1, ¶ 4; ECF No. 49-2 at 2, ¶¶ 5-6. This evidence does not constitute “deliberate indifference.” Rather, it shows that Defendants took affirmative steps to ensure that Plaintiff lived in a healthy, sanitary environment. Thus, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants' actions were “objectively unreasonable.” See Short, 87 F.4th at 611 (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397). Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment.
D. Qualified immunity
Defendants also maintain they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court agrees.
The doctrine of qualified immunity offers some protection to a government employee being sued in his or her individual capacity, as is the case with Defendants here. The Supreme Court has held that “[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Renn by and Through Renn v. Garrison, 100 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 1996).
“The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether a plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a clear constitutional violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002). If a violation of a constitutional right in fact exists, qualified immunity nonetheless shields a prison official from liability, unless the violation was of a “clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Because Plaintiff has failed to show any constitutional violations, Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion, ECF No. 49, be GRANTED.
The parties are directed to the attached Notice for their rights to file objections to this recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).