Opinion
No. 99 C 1433
October 23, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Plaintiff sued Defendant1 claiming that Defendant's failure to hire her for a full-time position was in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (West 2000), and the Equal Protection Clause of the TJ.S. Constitution, For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on both counts is granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Cathey Hall, an African-American female, worked as a part-time substitute custodial helper during the summer of 1996 for Defendant, Thornton Fractional Township High School District No. 215 ("the District"). During her temporary summer employment, Ms. Hall applied for two positions as a full-time custodial helper at the District. Ms. Hall alleges that racial discrimination prevented her from being hired for full-time positions at Defendant's high schools, Thornton Fractional North ("T.F. North") and Thornton Fractional South ("T.F. South").
The hiring process at T.F. North and T.F. South for full-time custodial positions is as follows: The principal of the high school submits a letter to the superintendent recommending a candidate for the custodial position. (Plaintiff's Rule 56.1(a) (3) Statement of Material Facts ["Pl.'s 56.1"] ¶ 86; Defendant's Rule 56.1(a)(3) Statement of Material Facts ["Def.'s 56.1"] ¶ 74) The superintendent, if he or she agrees with the choice, then recommends that candidate to the school board. (Ahrens Dep. at 3; Ahrens Aff. ¶ 5, Ex. J to Defendant's Reply Statement of Facts Pursuant to Rule 56.1(a)(3) ["Def.'s Reply"].) In all instances, the school board must approve the superintendent's recommendation before a final hiring decision is made. (Ahrens Aff. ¶ 5, Ex. J to Def.'s Reply.) The Superintendent of the District, Emerson Ahrens, has always recommended the same candidate for custodial jobs that the principals have recommended to him. (Ahrens Dep. at 4.) Likewise, the School Board has always approved custodial candidates recommended by Mr. Ahrens. (Ahrens Dep. at 5.)
In the summer of 1996, T.F. North and T.F. South each had one position available for a full-time custodial helper.
A custodial helper's responsibilities include cleaning the school hallways, lockers, and classrooms. (Plaintiff's Deposition ["Pl.'s Dep.] at 91-93.) The available custodial helper positions at both T.F. North and T.F. South began the work-day at 2:45 p.m. and ended at 10:45 p.m. (Pl.'s 56.1 § 100.) The regular school day ends at 3:25 p.m. ( Id. at § 101.)
A. T.F. North Custodial Position
Ms. Hall applied for the position of full-time custodial helper at T.F. North on or about July 22, 1996, and interviewed for the position with both Steven Toth, the Principal of T.F. North, and Neal Wheeler, Building Foreman and Custodial Supervisor who had supervised Ms. Hall's part-time work at T.F. North. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 18; Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 34). Principal Toth and Mr. Wheeler also interviewed Judy Martinez, a Hispanic-American woman, for the same position. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 44.) Like Ms. Hall, Ms. Martinez worked at the District during the summer of 1996 as a part-time custodial helper, starting, in fact, at the same time as Ms. Hall. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 8; Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 13.) While Ms. Hall had worked for both T.F. North and T.F. South during the summer of 1996, Ms. Martinez had only worked for T.F. South. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 25.)
During their respective interviews, Principal Toth and Mr. Wheeler asked both candidates the same questions. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 52.) After evaluating their interview performances, Principal Toth felt that Ms. Martinez demonstrated better interpersonal skills than Ms. Hall, and would, therefore, cope better with individual students and staff. (Toth Dep. at 31, 39.) Similarly, Mr. Wheeler, who had supervised Ms. Hall during the summer that she worked at T.F. North, (Wheeler Aff. ¶ 1, Ex. G to Def.'s Reply) felt that Ms. Martinez was the better candidate for the full-time custodial position, based largely on his observation of Ms. Hall's lackluster performance, describing her as a "below-average worker." ( Id. at ¶ 2.) Significantly, Mr. Wheeler had also contacted Roy Cantu, the Building Foreman and Custodial Supervisor at T.F. South, for information about Ms. Martinez' work performance. ( Id. at ¶ 5.) Mr. Cantu informed Mr. Wheeler that Ms. Martinez was an "excellent worker and was very capable of working unsupervised." (Cantu Aff. ¶¶ 7-8, Ex, I to Def.'s Reply.) In turn, Mr. Wheeler told Principal Toth that he thought Ms. Martinez was the better worker, and therefore, the preferred candidate for the full-time custodial position. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 56.)
Specifically, Mr. Wheeler stated that he believed that Ms. Hall did not perform as expected, because she was not being paid to work as hard as the full-time custodial workers, who were receiving higher wages. (Wheeler Aff. ¶ 2, Ex. G to Def.'s Reply.) Furthermore, Mr. Wheeler stated that Ms. Hall was not as thorough, complete or efficient as her co-workers, and did not have much self-motivation. Consequently, Mr. Wheeler expressed that he was concerned about Ms. Hall's ability to work unsupervised. ( Id.)
Mr. Cantu further described Ms. Martinez as an efficient and productive employee who "demonstrated an excellent ability to follow instructions and complete her work quickly." (Cantu Aff. ¶¶ 7-8, Ex. I to Def.'s Reply.)
Because Principal Toth believed that Ms. Martinez performed better at her interview, was the more productive worker, who could work unsupervised, and was the overall better candidate, he recommended that the District hire Ms. Martinez for the custodial position. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 56, 59, 60.) Accordingly, Principal Toth submitted a letter recommending Ms. Martinez to Superintendent Ahrens, ( Id. at ¶ 60), and Mr. Ahrens recommended Ms. Martinez to the School Board. The School Board approved the recommendation, and the District hired Ms. Martinez for the position. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 17.)
Ms. Hall alleges that the District racially discriminated against her when they hired Ms. Martinez for the position of full-time custodial helper at T.F. North High School instead of her. Ms. Hall claims that she had more experience for the position than Ms. Martinez. Ms. Hall contends that, during the interview, she had explained that she had thirteen years of custodial experience while working at the Premier Candy Company between 1981 and 1994. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 18.) Unlike Ms. Hall, Ms. Martinez had not specified any previous custodial experience on her application to T.F. North. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 105.)
Her application lists employment as a custodian at Premier Candy Company beginning September 14, 1981, but does not provide an end date for her employment. (Ms. Hall's Application for Employment, Ex. 5 to Thomas. Dep.)
Principal Toth, however, asserts that Ms. Martinez performed better in her interview than Ms. Hall, stating that "coming out of the interview, . . . Judy had the better interpersonal skills and would be better able to cope with the students and staff." (Toth Dep. at 31.) Principal Toth maintains that interpersonal skills are critical to any job position in a high school, and that interpersonal skills fall within the catch-all qualification within the job description: "Such alternatives to the above qualifications as the Board may find appropriate and acceptable." (Toth Dep. at 8-9.) According to Principal Toth, one reason that interpersonal skills are so significant is that T.F. North had experienced problems with adversarial relationships between the staff and students in the past. (Toth Dep. at 62.) Mr. Wheeler further concurs that the full-time custodial position involves frequent contact with people, and that Ms. Martinez' interpersonal skills surpassed those of Ms. Hall. (Wheeler Aff. ¶ 8, Ex. G to Def.'s Reply.)
Nonetheless, Plaintiff maintains that the District's reliance on interpersonal skills is a pretext for racial discrimination. In order to buttress her allegation of discrimination, Ms. Hall submitted the affidavit of Will Butcher, an independent contractor for the District, who commended Ms. Hall's work performance. During the relevant time period, Mr. Butcher was responsible for training new custodial employees for the District, (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 148), and accordingly, provided Ms. Hall's training while she worked for the District during the summer of 1996 as a part-time custodial helper. (Butcher Aff. ¶ 7, Ex. 2 to Pl.'s 56.1.) Mr. Butcher asserts that he recommended Ms. Hall as his first choice for the vacant position, based on her work performance at the District and her superior prior custodial experience. (Butcher Aff. ¶¶ 13-14, Ex. 2 to Pl.'s 56.1.) Furthermore, Mr. Butcher states that he observed Ms. Martinez neglect her duties, ( id. at § 16), although he never claims that he communicated this information to Principal Toth. Finally, Mr. Butcher disputes that interpersonal skills are a requirement for the custodial helper positions, ( id. at ¶ 18), because the District never requested that he provide training to new employees on interpersonal skills. ( Id. at ¶ 9.)
The Court notes that while the written vacancy notices for the position do not explicitly list interpersonal skills as a job qualification, (Ex. 3 to Toth Dep.; Ex. A to Thomas Dep.), the job description describes a custodial helpers' duties to include "maintain[ing] a positive public relations attitude with all staff and student personnel." (Ex. 1 to Toth Dep.)
Mr. Butcher's official title was Director of Building and Grounds. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 148.) However, he was not a District employee, and according to Mr. Wheeler, had no supervisory responsibilities. Rather, his sole job function was to "assist in the training of the District's custodial workers to make them more efficient." (Wheeler aff. ¶ 6, Ex. G to Def.'s 56.1.)
The District disputes that Mr. Butcher recommended Ms. Hall as his first choice to be hired, agreeing only that he had recommended that the District interview Ms. Hall for the position. (Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Rule 56.1(a)(3) Statement of Material Facts ["Def.'s Response"] ¶ 157.)
Despite Mr. Butcher's support, Principal Toth recommended Ms. Martinez for the job, believing that she was the better candidate based on her interview performance and Mr. Wheeler's assessment. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 59.)
B. T.F. South Custodial Position
Ms. Hall further alleges that the District racially discriminated against her when they hired Barbara McDonald, a Caucasian woman, for the position of full-time custodial helper at T.F. South High School. Ms. Hall applied for the position at T.F. South on or about August 22, 1996. (Pl.'s Dep. at 165; Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 22.) Ms. McDonald, who began working as a part-time substitute custodial helper on September 30, 1996, also applied for the position. (Ahrens Aff. ¶ 4, Ex. J to Def.'s Reply.)
Roy Cantu supervised the custodial staff at T.F. South during the summer of 1996, (Thomas Dep. at 5-6), and he screened the applications and performed preliminary interviews before sending candidates to Steven Thomas, T.F. South's Principal, for consideration. (Thomas Dep. at 6-7.) Mr. Cantu recommended that Principal Thomas interview Ms. Hall and Ms. McDonald. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 79; Cantu Aff. ¶ 2, Ex. I to Def.'s Reply.) Principal Thomas believes that Mr. Cantu told him that both candidates were "equally good and he [Mr. Cantu] was relying on [Principal Thomas] to make the final decision." (Thomas Dep. at 18.) On August 26, Mr. Butcher also sent Principal Thomas a memorandum recommending that he interview Ms. Hall for the position. (Ex. 2 to Thomas Dep.)
Principal Thomas subsequently interviewed both candidates. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 22.) Principal Thomas was aware of Ms. Hall's thirteen years of prior custodial experience at the time of her interview. (Def.'s Response ¶ 53.) By contrast, Ms. McDonald's application did not indicate any custodial experience prior to her part-time work for the District. (Ex. C to Thomas Dep.)
Similar to Principal Toth, Principal Thomas asserts that Ms. McDonald exhibited better people skills than Ms. Hall during the interview, and that people skills were an important component of the job, because the custodians would frequently come into contact with the public ( e.g. students and adults) for certain events or meetings held at night. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 94.) Furthermore, Principal Thomas felt that Ms. McDonald performed better at the interview. In particular, Principal Thomas asked the candidates questions compiled in part from a list provided by Mr. Butcher. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 71; Def.'s Response ¶ 71.) The tenth question examined the proper procedure for dealing with blood borne pathogens. (Ex. D to Thomas Dep.) According to Principal Thomas, the issue of blood borne pathogens was of special concern to both himself and the District, given that the custodial position was in a school setting. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 89.) While Principal Thomas does not recollect each candidate's exact response to this question, he does remember that Ms. Hall had difficulty answering it (Def.'s Response ¶ 54.), while Ms. McDonald provided a superior response, and was overall very articulate in answering all questions. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 91-93.) Conversely, Principal Thomas reported that Ms. Hall's answers to other questions lacked detail. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 91.)
The question was, "Are you familiar with the term `Bloodborne [sic] Pathogen,' and if so, what precautions could you take to prevent a bloodborne [sic] pathogen incident from happening?" (Ex. D to Thomas Dep.)
Mr. Butcher testified that he "recommended Cathey Hall over Barbara McDonald because of Hall's experience in and out of the district and was concerned about the district's hiring of Barbara due to her lack of experience which [Mr. Butcher] communicated to Steven Thomas." (Butcher Aff. ¶ 19, Ex. 2 to Pl.'s 56.1.) Principal Thomas does not recall Mr. Butcher ever making a recommendation on whom to hire, as opposed to whom to interview, for the position. (Thomas Dep. at 13-14; Thomas Aff. ¶ 14, Ex. H to Def.'s Reply.) Principal Thomas also reports that Mr. Butcher never informed him of any concerns with regard to hiring Ms. McDonald. (Thomas Aff. ¶ 14, Ex. H to Def.'s Reply.)
Ms. Hall alleges that Principal Thomas told her during the interview: "Mr. Butcher is recommending you highly for the position, that you are a good worker," and "I also talked to some of the full-time custodians that work at [T.F. South], and they say that you are an excellent worker, too." (Hall Dep. at 176-77.) Principal Thomas denies that he made these statements. (Thomas. Aff. ¶ 12, Ex. H to Def.'s Reply.)
Principal Thomas based his recommendation for the position on his interviews with the candidates, as well as information gathered from Mr. Cantu and Mr. Butcher. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 64; Wheeler Aff. ¶ 15; Def's 56.1 ¶ 96.) Once Principal Thomas conducted his own interviews of the candidates, he told Mr. Cantu about his preference for Ms. McDonald, based on the interviews, and Mr. Cantu approved of the choice. (Thomas Dep. at 25.) Mr. Cantu concurred with Principal Thomas' recommendation of Ms. McDonald based on Mr. Cantu's observation of both women's work performance, as well as the preliminary interview he conducted with each candidate. (Cantu Aff. ¶¶ 4-6, Ex. I to Def.'s Reply.) Accordingly, Principal Thomas submitted a memorandum to Mr. Ahrens, recommending Ms. McDonald for the position. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 96, Ex. F to Thomas Dep.) Principal Thomas' recommendation then moved to the School Board for their approval. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 74, 96.) The District School Board awarded the position to Ms. McDonald.
Ms. Hall alleges that the District racially discriminated against her when they hired Ms. McDonald for the position of full-time custodial helper at T.F. South instead of her. Ms. Hall claims that the District's reasons for not hiring her, including inferior interpersonal skills and incomplete answers to interview questions, are pretextual. Ms. Hall again relies on Mr. Butcher's affidavit to support her claim. As a part of his training program, Mr. Butcher instructed employees on the appropriate way to handle blood borne pathogens, and administered ten-question tests to the new employees to gauge their understanding of training material. (Butcher Aff. ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. 2 to Pl.'s 56.1.) Mr. Butcher testified that "Cathey [Ms. Hall] had an excellent understanding of blood born [sic] pathogens, knew how to appropriately deal with situations involving them, and passed the test 100%." (Butcher Aff, ¶ 8, Ex. 2 to Pl.'s 56.1.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ms. Hall filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging racial discrimination, and received her right to sue letter from the EEOC on or about December 17, 1998. (Plaintiffs' Complaint ["Pl.'s Comp."].) Ms. Hall filed a two-count Complaint against the District in federal court on March 4, 1999. Her Complaint alleges that the District discriminated against her, in violation of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. On April 24, 2000, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on both counts.
MOTIONS TO STRIKE
Both Plaintiff and Defendant have submitted Motions to Strike various parts of their opponent's Rule 56.1 Statements of Material Facts. As will be explained, the Court denies both Plaintiff and Defendant's Motions to Strike.
In Plaintiff's Motion to Strike, she contends that Defendant relied on inadmissible hearsay when Principals Toth and Thomas, in their respective depositions, relay conversations they had with their respective Custodial Supervisors, Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Cantu, which were critical of Ms. Hall. First, the conversations are not being offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted, but rather to show that the statements were made to the decision-makers, the respective principals. It does not matter whether Ms. Hall was indeed the inferior candidate, as the custodial supervisors allege, but rather that these statements were made to the principals, who then made a decision not to hire Ms. Hall. The critical inquiry, discussed infra, is whether the principals honestly believed that Ms. Hall was the inferior candidate — not whether she was, indeed, the inferior candidate. See McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992). Moreover, Defendant also submitted the affidavits of both Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Cantu, which confirm their respective statements to the principals.
Plaintiff also, erroneously, moves to strike any "subjective evaluations" made by Defendant in its 56.1 Statement of Material Facts. Plaintiff contends, without citing any cases, that "subjective evaluations" are not capable of being refuted because they are opinions, and are, therefore, inappropriate for 56.1 statements. Such "subjective evaluations," and whether the decision-makers honestly believed them, however, are material facts in this case. Plaintiff could refute (but is unable to in this case) that the decision-makers honestly relied on the subjective statements when making their respective decisions. But, as Defendant points out, subjective evaluations are not "any less factual" than other statements in a 56.1 statement.
With respect to Defendant's Motion to Strike, the Court finds it unnecessary to substantively address its issues, since it finds for the Defendant on both counts of its Summary Judgment Motion.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment StandardSummary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that no evidence exists to support the non-moving party's contentions. Doe v. R.F. Donnelly Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1994). The non-moving party may not rest on her pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific allegations, that a genuine issue of material fact exists which requires a jury trial. Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (the non-movant must do more than simply "show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.")
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the record and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). However, the Court is "not required to draw every conceivable inference from the record [in favor of the non-movant] — only those inferences that are reasonable." Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M. v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1991). Also, the non-moving party has to "produce more than a scintilla of evidence in support of his position." Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir, 1999) (citations omitted)
B. Count One: Violation of Title VII
Title VII makes it illegal "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1). Ms. Hall may avert summary judgment either by providing direct evidence of unlawful discrimination, or by satisfying all of the elements of the indirect burden-shifting method of proof formulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also Bahl v. Royal Indem. Co., 115 F.3d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1997). As Ms. Hall offers no direct evidence of racial discrimination, the Court will analyze her claim under the burden-shifting approach.
A plaintiff may establish discriminatory intent by employing the burden-shifting multi-step approach originally formulated in McDonnell Douglas, supra. According to this framework, the plaintiff must first show, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Id. at 802; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To do so, Ms. Hall must demonstrate: (1) that she belongs to a protected class; (2) that she applied and was qualified for the job; (3) that she was rejected despite her qualifications; and (4) that the position remained open to other applicants. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, then a presumption of discrimination arises and the burden of production shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Id. Once a defendant provides a nondiscriminatory reason, the presumption no longer exists and the burden of proof shifts back to the plaintiff to "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
A plaintiff can establish pretext by showing that the defendant's proffered reasons are lies or completely without factual basis. Ghosh v. Indiana Department of Environmental Management, 192 F.3d 1087, 1091 (7th Cir. 1999). "To avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must produce evidence from which a rational trier of fact could infer that the defendant lied about its proffered reasons for failing to [hire] him or that the reasons had no basis in fact." Id. Circuits, however, have disagreed as to whether the plaintiff has a further burden to show that the true reasons were discriminatory.
Some courts require the plaintiff to not only establish that the proffered reasons were false, but also that the actual reasons were discriminatory: a "pretext-plus" approach. Anderson v. Baxter Healtheare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1990)). Other circuits provide that, if the plaintiff shows that the employer's reasons are false, then the factfinder must find for the plaintiff. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1122 (citing Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393 (3rd Cir. 1984)) . The Seventh Circuit has alternatively approved a "pretext only" approach that allows, but does not require, the trier of fact to conclude discrimination based solely on a finding that the employer's proffered reasons were false. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1122-23. Recently, the Supreme Court clarified the appropriate standard, supporting a "pretext only" approach analogous to that of the Seventh Circuit. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2102 (2000) ("a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.").
Therefore, according to the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit, to defeat a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff only needs to raise material facts that the defendant lied about its reason(s) for its action, not that the reasons are discriminatory per se. See Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 458 (7th Cir. 1999).
The parties disagree about whether Ms. Hall has established her prima facie case of discrimination. However, this Court need not resolve that dispute because, assuming Ms. Hall satisfied this initial requirement, this Court can decide the case based on the issue of whether the District's proffered reasons are pretextual. See EEOC v. Our Lady of the Resurrection Medical Center, 77 F.3d 145, 149-50 (7th Cir. 1996) (supporting advancement to dispositive issue of pretext without analysis of prima facie case); Malacara v. City of Madison, 224 F.3d 727, 729 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Where the defendant has met its burden, it is irrelevant whether a prima facie case has been made.") (citation omitted)
In this case, the District satisfied its burden of production: it enunciated several legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its decision not to hire Ms. Hall. With regard to the T.F. North custodial helper position, the District contends that Ms. Hall gave an inferior performance during the interview, and lacked interpersonal skills and an ability to work unsupervised. For the T.F. South position, the District maintains that Ms. Hall did not demonstrate the same depth of knowledge and ability to answer questions as her competitor for the position, in addition to demonstrating inferior interpersonal skills. Because the District supplied these non-discriminatory reasons, this Court need not address whether Ms. Hall established a prima facie case.
Even assuming that Ms. Hall were able to make a prima facie showing of discrimination, her claim, nevertheless, would fail because she cannot establish that the District's proffered reasons are pretextual. Because Ms. Hall does not successfully raise a question of material fact regarding any of the offered reasons, a rational jury could not determine that the proffered reasons were lies, and that the District's true reasons were discriminatory. While the Court could terminate its analysis once the plaintiff fails to establish that one reason is pretextual, the Court will examine each reason offered by the District in turn. See Mills, 171 F.3d at 459; Wolf v. Buss (America) Inc., 77 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 1996) . In this case, Plaintiff claims that the District's three proffered reasons for not hiring her are pretextual, and further points to the racial make-up of the District staff to create an inference of discrimination.
1. Job Performance/Ability to Work Independently
One reason that the District submits for its decision not to hire Ms. Hall is concern about her ability to work independently and related job performance. The District submitted the affidavits of four individuals, all employees in the District acting as supervisors or principals, who support the determination that the District honestly believed that Ms. McDonald and Ms. Martinez were superior candidates to Ms. Hall. Ms. Hall, by contrast, only presents the affidavit of a non-employee to support her contention that she was the superior candidate. Indeed, Ms. Hall attempts to discredit the District's determination by providing an affidavit of Mr. Butcher, an independent contractor with the District, who was responsible for training custodial employees. Mr. Butcher claims that Ms. Hall was the superior candidate and that Ms. Martinez, the candidate who was hired at T.F. North, neglected her work.
Mr. Butcher's opinions regarding the candidates' work performance do not create a material issue of fact as to whether the District's proffered reasons for not hiring Ms. Hall were pretextual. "The mere submission of materials from a co-worker or supervisor indicating that an employee's performance is satisfactory . . . does not create a material issue of fact." Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1125; see also Kephart v. Inst. of Gas Tech., 630 F.2d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding that affidavits of other employees declaring plaintiff's work performance to be satisfactory was insufficient to create a material issue of fact where employer considered the plaintiff's work unsatisfactory). In this case, Mr. Butcher was not even a District employee, serving only as an independent contractor, and thus presumably did not have the same interest in the school's welfare as District employees. If co-workers' and supervisors' opinions about work performance do not create issues of material facts, then a fortiori an independent contractor's opinion cannot defeat a summary judgment motion.
In the case sub judice, the principals at T.F. North and T.F. South considered the opinions of Ms. Hall's actual supervisors, Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Cantu, when making their respective recommendations. There was consensus among the supervisors and principals that Ms. Hall was not the best candidate for these positions. Indeed, Ms. Hall's supervisors, Mr. Cantu and Mr. Wheeler, questioned the quality of Ms. Hall's job performance as a part-time custodial helper. There was concern about her ability to work independently, as well as her ability to answer questions regarding the appropriate job procedures. It was within the discretion of the principals, when making their decision as to whom to recommend for the jobs, to rely on the opinions of the supervisors of the custodial departments, rather than the opinion of a non-employee.
Nonetheless, Ms. Hall argues that the District's aforementioned reasons are pretextual, because she had thirteen years of experience as a custodian for a previous employer, while Ms. Martinez and Ms. McDonald only had worked part-time for the District. This difference in experience, however, fails to raise an issue of material fact as to whether the District's proffered reasons for not hiring her were pretextual. The District never claimed to have hired Ms. McDonald or Ms. Martinez because they had more experience as custodians than Ms. Hall. Indeed, the position of a custodial helper only requires a finite amount of experience, and thus, the District was more concerned with the quality of work performance than total years of custodial experience. (Ahrens Dep. at 15.)
Mr. Ahrens stated that "there isn't really a lot of skill involved in custodian and custodial helper position," and the District is "interested in the ability to follow directions, attendance patterns, and a number of other kind of generic skills and abilities that might be important since it's real easy to teach people . . . custodial skills." (Ahrens Dep. at 15-16.)
Furthermore, Ms. Hall's argument about her level of custodial experience addresses the wisdom of the District's decisions, not the basis of its decisions. A pretext determination considers the honesty of offered reasons, and not whether the decision was good or bad. "This Court does not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity's business decisions." Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming summary judgment for employer where employee offered only his own assertions that his work performance was adequate and that the skills required by the employer were unnecessary for the position). While Ms. Hall may not believe that the District made a wise decision, "[t]he question is not whether [Defendant] exercised prudent business judgment, . . . but whether [Ms. Hall] has come forward to refute the articulated, legitimate reasons for [not being hired]." Id. In this case, Ms. Hall has failed to provide evidence from which a jury could reasonably determine that the District's reasons related to job performance and ability to work independently were unworthy of credence.
2. Interpersonal Skills
Besides deficient job performance and an inability to work independently, the District also contends that Ms. Hall displayed interpersonal skills inferior to those of the other candidates for the positions at T.F. North and T.F. South. Both Principal Toth and Principal Thomas claim that strong interpersonal skills were necessary for a custodial helper. In response, Ms. Hall contends that such skills were not required for custodial helpers, and that the District's reliance on interpersonal skills is a pretext for discrimination. Ms. Hall, however, fails to provide sufficient evidence that interpersonal skills were not a requirement for the jobs. Furthermore, Ms. Hall does not allege that her interpersonal skills were in fact equal or superior to that of the other candidates, nor does she offer any evidence that the District, in fact, admired her interpersonal skills.
The only way that Ms. Hall attempts to undermine the District's contention that the principals believed she displayed inferior interpersonal skills is through an offer of a part-time activities position by Principal Toth (after he did not offer her the full-time position). (Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment ["Pl.'s Memo."] at 16.) Not only does Ms. Hall claim that the offer never occurred, but she fails to provide any evidence that the activities position requires interpersonal skills commensurate with that of a custodial helper. Therefore, assuming that she was offered this part-time position, it does not create an issue of material fact as to whether the principal honestly believed she lacked the necessary interpersonal skills for a full-time custodial position.
As the Seventh Circuit has held, subjective qualifications, such as the display of interpersonal skills during an interview, are legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for failing to hire an individual. In Mills, supra, the court affirmed an award of summary judgment to an employer who offered interpersonal skills displayed during an interview, including how much the plaintiff smiled, as one of its many legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons not to hire the plaintiff. Mills, 171 F.3d at 458. The court noted that the plaintiff failed to show, inter alia, that "the results of oral interviews were anything other than [defendant's] honest opinion of which employee was a better fit . . . for the position." Id. at 459.
While Ms. Hall may believe that interpersonal skills should not be a requisite skill for custodial helpers, she fails to create a question of material fact as to whether the principals and District valued such skills for the positions. Ms. Hall provides the affidavit of Mr. Butcher, who concludes that such skills are rarely required for the position. Mr. Butcher's ability to draw such a conclusion, however, is questionable, since he was not present in the school buildings for most of the shift in question. Moreover, as discussed supra, opinions by co-workers (and a fortiori independent contractors) are not sufficient to create an issue of a material fact when the decision-maker honestly believes something else. See Debs v. Northeastern Illinois University, 153 F.3d 390, 396 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that plaintiff cannot prevail on summary judgment if employer "honestly believed in the nondiscriminatory reasons it offered, even if the reasons are foolish or trivial or even baseless.") (citation omitted). Here, while the District did not ask Mr. Butcher to provide training in interpersonal skills, this fact alone is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the principals and District valued such abilities. Indeed, Plaintiff does not dispute that Principal Thomas looks for "good communication skills, the ability to work with others, and the ability to be self-sufficient." (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 72.) These qualities all constitute interpersonal skills that can be evaluated during a job interview. Furthermore, the job description for custodial helper includes, "[m]aintain[ing] a positive public relations attitude with all staff and student personnel." (Ex. 1 to Toth Dep.) In sum, Ms. Hall has failed to put forward specific facts that would allow a rational jury to determine that the District lied when it stated that interpersonal skills were important for school custodial helpers, and that the other candidates displayed interpersonal skills superior to those of Ms. Hall.
Mr. Butcher's workday concluded at 4:00 p.m. (Def.'s Response § 155.) The shift for the custodial helper positions at issue began at 2:45 p.m. and ended at 10:45 p.m. (Def.'s 56.1 § 54.)
3. Responses to Interview Questions
Another reason that the District did not hire Ms. Hall for the T.F. South position was her inferior responses to interview questions, including a question about blood borne pathogen procedures. The District claims that Ms. Hall provided incomplete answers to interview questions. Once the District puts forward this non-discriminatory reason, Ms. Hall has to specifically address this allegation. "But an opportunity for rebuttal is not an invitation to criticize the employer's evaluation process or simply to question its conclusion about the quality of an employee's performance." Kariotis v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 131 P.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 1997).
While Ms. Hall submits evidence, through Mr. Butcher's affidavit, that she was aware of the appropriate procedure for handling blood borne pathogens, she does not explicitly contend that she actually answered the question satisfactorily during the interview. Ms. Hall provides no evidence that she put forward an acceptable answer. For example, she does not provide interview notes that indicate that she did provide comprehensive answers. While she may have had the requisite knowledge of the subject matter, it was equally important that she fully communicate this understanding in her interview response. Ms. Hall does not provide any evidence that she did this. Therefore, Ms. Hall fails to raise a material question of fact about whether the District did not hire her, in part, because she answered the blood borne pathogen interview question incompletely.
4. Racial Statistics
Finally, Ms. Hall contends that disparities in the number of African-American and Caucasian custodial staff members is evidence of disparate treatment. However, Plaintiff cites no controlling authority for the proposition that numerical disparities can establish a discriminatory failure to hire an individual. McDonnell Douglas, supra, warns that "[findings on the racial composition of the workforce], while helpful, may not be in and of themselves controlling as to an individualized hiring decision, particularly in the presence of an otherwise justifiable reason . . ." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805 n. 19. While Plaintiff reports the racial composition of the custodial staff, Plaintiff makes no showing as to how many African-Americans applied for custodial positions, or whether Defendant has hired Caucasians over African-Americans when the two candidates were similarly situated. See Mays v. Chicago Sun-Times, 865 F.2d 134, 137 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1989) ("In a race-discrimination case, statistical evidence of few black workers without concomitant evidence that substantial numbers of blacks had actually applied for the particular jobs is not probative of the charge that the employer had excluded blacks from employment. The employer might in fact have hired all the blacks that actually applied for the positions.").
In sum, Ms. Hall has not produced evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the District's stated reasons for deciding not to hire her are unworthy of credence, or that she was not hired, more likely than not, for a discriminatory reason. Therefore, the Court finds that Ms. Hall has failed to show that Defendant's stated reasons for not hiring her were pretextual. Accordingly, the District is entitled to summary judgment on this count.
C. Count Two: Equal Protection Clause, § 1983 Violation
Ms. Hall also asserts a § 1983 claim, maintaining that Defendant violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant counters that it cannot be held vicariously liable for the conduct of its principals under § 1983. The Court agrees.
A local government unit may not be held liable on a respondeat superior basis under § 1983. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Auriemma v. Rick, 957 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Municipalities are answerable only for their own decisions and policies; they are not vicariously liable for the constitutional torts of their agents."). "Rather, `it is when execution of a government policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may be fairly said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.'" Baxter v. Vigo County School Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 734 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). A local government unit directly violates a person's civil rights when: (1) its express policy causes the constitutional deprivation; (2) its widespread custom or practice, which is so permanent that it has the force of law, causes the injury; or (3) the person was injured by a local government official or employee with "final policymaking authority." Looper Maintenance Serv. Inc. v. Indianapolis, 197 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 1999).
In the instant case, Ms. Hall attempts to demonstrate the District's § 1983 liability under the third Monell example, arguing that Principals Toth and Thomas had final policymaking authority with respect to hiring school employees. Ms. Hall notes that District Superintendent Ahrens had never failed to recommend to the School Board a candidate selected by Principals Toth or Thomas, and that the School Board had rejected only one of 70 recommendations that Superintendent Ahrens submitted for hiring non-certified personnel. This evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to establish that either Principals Toth or Thomas had final policymaking authority with respect to hiring personnel.
Although Ms. Hall references the paltry number of African-Americans the District hired as custodial employees, she does not argue nor submit any evidence that this was the result of the District's express policy or widespread practice or custom. Rather, Ms. Hall confines her § 1983 argument to her assertion that Principals Toth and Thomas were final policymakers.
The one individual who was not hired by the School Board was not applying for a custodial position. (Ahrens Dep. at 5.) The School Board has approved every recommendation Superintendent Ahrens has submitted for a custodial position.
Courts look to state law to determine whether an official has final policymaking authority. Duda v. Board of Education of Franklin Park Public School Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir. 1998). Defendant has submitted uncontroverted evidence that the ultimate authority to make hiring decisions lies with the School Board. Conversely, Principals Toth and Thomas are charged with interviewing and recommending candidates to Superintendent Ahrens, who, in turn, makes recommendations for hire to the School Board.
Although Ms. Hall submits evidence supporting an inference that the School Board rarely rejected what were, in effect, Principal Toth and Thomas' hiring recommendations, she has not introduced any evidence that the Board delegated to the principals the authority to make policy. In City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988), a plurality of the Supreme Court held that, "[s]imply going along with discretionary decisions made by one's subordinates . . . is not a delegation to them of the authority to make policy." See also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) ("The fact that a particular official . . . has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion.") By definition, "a person who has authority only to recommend, and whose recommendations can be implemented only upon subsequent approval by a governing body", does not have final policymaking authority. Adkins v. Board of Education of Magofein County, 982 F.2d 952, 959 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that, even when the Board could not hire personnel without the superintendent's recommendation, the superintendent did not have final authority because the Board had subsequent approval or rejection authority).
Because Ms. Hall has failed to introduce any evidence demonstrating that the School Board delegated its authority to hire personnel to Principals Toth and Thomas, she cannot establish that they had final decisionmaking authority with respect to the District's failure to hire her. Therefore, Defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983, and Ms. Hall's equal protection claim must fail.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Hall has not raised a genuine issue as to any material facts. The District is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both counts of Plaintiff's Complaint.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.