Opinion
2014-03-5
Ishelli Oliver, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellants-respondents. Audrey A. Thomas, Rosedale, N.Y., for respondent-appellant.
Ishelli Oliver, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellants-respondents. Audrey A. Thomas, Rosedale, N.Y., for respondent-appellant.
In an action, inter alia, to impose a constructive trust on certain real property, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kitzes, J.), entered March 28, 2012, as, upon a decision of the same court made after a nonjury trial, adjudged the plaintiff and her husband the rightful owners of the subject property, directed the defendant Keisha McDonald to reconvey the subject property to the plaintiff and her husband, and, in effect, conditioned the plaintiff's payment of the sum of $51,000 to the defendant Keisha McDonald upon that defendant's reconveyance of the subject property to the plaintiff and her husband, and the plaintiff cross-appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of the same judgment as directed her to pay the defendant Keisha McDonald the sum of $51,000.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the facts, and the complaint is dismissed; and it is further,
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as cross-appealed from; and it is further,
ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendants.
“The elements of a constructive trust are a confidential or fiduciary relationship, a promise, a transfer in reliance thereon, and unjust enrichment” ( Williams v. Eason, 49 A.D.3d 866, 868, 854 N.Y.S.2d 477;see Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121, 386 N.Y.S.2d 72, 351 N.E.2d 721;O'Brien v. Dalessandro, 43 A.D.3d 1123, 1124, 843 N.Y.S.2d 348). The ultimate purpose of a constructive trust is to prevent unjust enrichment, and it will be imposed “ ‘[w]hen property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest’ ” ( Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d at 121, 386 N.Y.S.2d 72, 351 N.E.2d 721, quoting Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E. 378;see Rowe v. Kingston, 94 A.D.3d 852, 853, 942 N.Y.S.2d 161).
In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, the power of this Court is as broad as that of the trial court, and we may render a judgment we find warranted by the facts, bearing in mind that in a close case, the trial court had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses ( see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v. Town of Bedford, 60 N.Y.2d 492, 499, 470 N.Y.S.2d 350, 458 N.E.2d 809;Marini v. Lombardo, 79 A.D.3d 932, 933, 912 N.Y.S.2d 693).
Here, the Supreme Court erred in concluding that the plaintiff satisfied her burdenof proof with respect to the elements necessary to impose a constructive trust. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendants would be unjustly enriched by retaining legal title to the subject premises ( see Losner v. Cashline, L.P., 41 A.D.3d 789, 838 N.Y.S.2d 665;Potter v. Davie, 275 A.D.2d 961, 964, 713 N.Y.S.2d 627;see also McGrath v. Hilding, 41 N.Y.2d 625, 629, 394 N.Y.S.2d 603, 363 N.E.2d 328). Thus, the Supreme Court erred in adjudging the plaintiff and her husband the rightful owners of the subject property and directing the defendant Keisha McDonald to reconvey and transfer the deed to the subject property to the plaintiff and her husband.
However, the Supreme Court properly awarded the defendant Keisha McDonald damages in the amount of $51,000 on her counterclaim as, despite the plaintiff's contention otherwise, those damages were sufficiently established. DILLON, J.P., BALKIN, CHAMBERS and COHEN, JJ., concur.