Opinion
C.A. No. 09C-04-085 MJB.
Submitted: May 18, 2010.
Decided: July 12, 2010.
Upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. GRANTED.
L. Vincent Ramunno, Esquire, Ramunno Ramunno, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Plaintiff.
Stephen P. Casarino, Esquire, Casarino Christman Shalk Ransom Doss, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
This is a negligence action filed by Plaintiff Brenda Hall ("Hall") on April 10, 2009. The Complaint alleges that Hall sustained personal injuries in an automobile collision between herself and Defendant Karena Machulski ("Machulski"). Hall has also named, as a co-defendant, Machulski's part-time employer, Engine Dynamics, Inc. ("Engine Dynamics").
On March 23, 2010, Engine Dynamics filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. Hall filed a response in opposition to the Motion on April 21, 2010. On May 18, 2010, this Court held a hearing on the Motion. For the reasons that follow, Engine Dynamic's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 7, 2007, a collision occurred in Newark, Delaware between the vehicles driven by Hall and Machulski. In the Complaint, Hall alleges that her injuries were caused by the negligence of Defendant driver, Machulski. Hall also alleges that Engine Dynamics is vicariously liable since Machulski was operating the vehicle "in pursuance and furtherance of her employer's business."It is undisputed that at the time of the collision, Machulski was traveling to Richards Layton Finger, a law firm where she worked part-time as a legal secretary. Machulski was also employed as a partner in her husband's business, Engine Dynamics. The vehicle that she was driving on the date of the collision was owned by Engine Dynamics.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard for granting summary judgment is high. Summary judgment may be granted where the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "In determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." "When taking all of the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, if there remains a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial, summary judgment may not be granted." "Nor will summary judgment be granted if, upon an examination of all the facts, it seems desirable to inquire thoroughly into them in order to clarify the application of law to the circumstance."PARTIES' CONTENTIONS
Defendant's Contentions
Engine Dynamics contends that the Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted because Hall cannot establish vicarious liability. First, Engine Dynamics argues that Machulski was not performing any activity in connection with Engine Dynamics at the time of the collision. Second, Engine Dynamics argues that the mere ownership of a motor vehicle at the time of the collision caused by the operation of another does not subject the owner to liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.Plaintiff's Contentions
In opposition to the Motion, Hall argues that an agency relationship between Engine Dynamics and Machulski existed at the time of the collision because Machulski was performing duties in furtherance of the business of Engine Dynamics. Hall argues that a jury needs to determine whether Machulski was driving the vehicle for the benefit of the business on the date of the collision since Engine Dynamics owned the vehicle, and Machulski drove it exclusively and used it at her discretion.ANALYSIS
The issue before this Court is whether Engine Dynamics can be held vicariously liable for the collision between Hall and its employee, Machulski. Vicarious liability, as it applies to an employer-employee relationship, arises through the doctrine of respondeat superior. Under this doctrine, an employer can be held liable for the negligent actions of its employee. Generally, "if the principal is the master of an agent who is a servant, the fault of the agent, if acting within the scope of employment, will be imputed to the principal by the doctrine of respondeat superior." However, Delaware law requires that there be "some affirmative evidence of the relation of master and servant, and that the servant was acting within the scope of his master's employment at the time of the injury complained of before there can be recovery."
Fisher v. Townsends, Inc., 695 A.2d 53 (Del. Super. 1997).
Id.
Id.
Finkbiner v. Mullins, 532 A.2d 609 (Del. Super. 1987) (Emphasis added).
Affirmative evidence has been provided to this Court that Machulski was an agent of Engine Dynamics. In her deposition, she testified that she was a partner at Engine Dynamics, and that that she drove the vehicle [owned by Engine Dynamics] at times, but only used it for business purposes a small percentage of the time. Hall has not presented any affirmative evidence, however, that Machulski was acting within the scope of her employment with Engine Dynamics at the time of the collision. Machulski testified that she did not use the vehicle for business purposes when she was on her way to work to Richards Layton and Finger. It is uncontested that Hall was driving to Richards Layton and Finger at the time of the collision. The only evidence that has been provided to the Court to suggest that Machulski was acting within the scope of her employment with Engine Dynamics is that she was driving a vehicle that was owned by Engine Dynamics, and she was able to use it at her discretion.
Machulski Dep. 2:21-23, January 14, 2010.
Machulski Dep. 5:5-12, January 14, 2010.
Machulski Dep. 6:4-7, January 14, 2010.
This Court has previously held that the mere ownership of a motor vehicle at the time of the accident, by itself, is not enough to subject the owner to liability for negligence of the driver. Using this rationale, this Court cannot impute liability to Engine Dynamics because it owned the vehicle in which Machulski was driving at the time of the collision. Similarly, this Court will not allow a jury to speculate that Machulski was using the vehicle in the course of her employment simply because she was able to use it at her discretion.
Finkbiner v. Mullins, 532 A.2d 609 (Del. Super. 1987).
No affirmative evidence has been presented to this Court that indicates that Machulski was acting within the scope of her employment with Engine Dynamics or furthering any purpose of Engine Dynamics at the time of the collision. Thus, Engine Dynamics cannot be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.