Opinion
HHDCV166070152S
04-07-2017
Heather Hall v. Community Health Resources, Inc. et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (ENTRY #104)
Kevin G. Dubay, J.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
The defendant, Community Health Resources, Inc. (" Defendant CHR") moved to strike Count Four (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) of Plaintiff Heather Hall's complaint dated July 21, 2016, arguing that the claim must fail because Ms. Hall did not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that her alleged emotional distress was the result of extreme and outrageous conduct by Defendant CHR.
The matter was argued at Short Calendar on February 6, 2017.
LAW
Allegations that Cleary, as the plaintiff's direct supervisor, continuously threatened to fire the plaintiff if she did not abort their unborn child are sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 443, 815 A.2d 119 (2003) (" Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society . . . Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous!" [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]); Montague v. Accelent, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-16-6057274-S (October 5, 2016, Krumeich, J.) (63 Conn.L.Rptr. 259, 262, ) (" extreme abuse of power may tip the balance in favor of upholding [an intentional infliction of emotional distress] claim").
Because Cleary's threats against the plaintiff could be construed as a misguided attempt at supervising the plaintiff and maintaining order in the office, the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged liability on the part of CHR. See Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn.App. 759, 765-66, 700 A.2d 1377 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Cefaratti v. Aranow, 321 Conn. 593, 141 A.3d 752 (2016) (" a trier of fact could reasonably determine that [the psychologist priest's] sexual relationship with the plaintiff [and parishioner] was a misguided attempt at pastoral-psychological counseling, or even an unauthorized, unethical, tortious method of pastoral counseling, but not an abandonment of church business"); Glucksman v. Walters, 38 Conn.App. 140, 142-43, 148, 659 A.2d 1217, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 914, 665 A.2d 608 (1995) (assault by YMCA employee on man who fouled him during basketball game could be considered " misguided effort" at maintaining order on basketball court); Pelletier v. Bilbiles, 154 Conn. 544, 548, 227 A.2d 251 (1967) (" The beating of an unruly customer . . . is an extremely forceful, although misguided, method of discouraging patrons of the [employer] . . . from causing disturbances on the premises in the future. The fact that the specific method a servant employs to accomplish his master's orders is not authorized does not relieve the master from liability. Also, the fact that the battery . . . may have been motivated by personal animosity . . . does not exonerate the defendant." [Citation omitted.])
The motion to strike is denied.