Opinion
24-CV-2444 (LTS)
05-28-2024
JANICE HALL, Plaintiff, v. CHILD SUPPORT INFORCEMENT (CSU); LAMONT JOHNSON; JUDGE FREDA, Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action alleging that Defendants have violated her rights. Named as Defendants are the “Westchester County Child Support,” alternately referred to as “Child Support Enforcement” or “CSU,” which the Court understands to be the Westchester County Department of Social Service's Office of Child Support Enforcement (“OCSE”); Lamont Johnson; and “White Plains County Court” Judge “Freda,” “Freia,” or “Fria,” which is possibly a reference to White Plains City Court Judge Jo Ann Friia.By order dated April 16, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. The Court dismisses the complaint for the reasons set forth below.
For the purposes of this order, the Court will refer to this defendant as “Judge Friia.”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings her claims using the court's general complaint form. She does not specify a basis for this court's jurisdiction of her claims, but in response to the question on the complaint form asking which of her federal constitutional or federal statutory rights have been violated, Plaintiff writes, “The Child Support Inforcement is taking money from both of my jobs more than 30% and I have two other children and one who is still of school age. I currently being evicted because I can't pay my rent.” (ECF 1, at 2.)
Plaintiff writes using irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standard capitalization when quoting from the complaint. All other spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated.
In the “facts” section of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges,
The CSU and the other parties are making it hard for me to live. I can pay $175.00 a month for my daughter Ja'lynn. They are taking to[o] much of my money out of both of my jobs. Im in college and in hope to obtain a degree in business and administrations and I work as an EMT, to take care of all my children. Its like Im sinking they took 1,300 of my income tax[.] Im already caught up in child support and they are still taking my money. They owe me so much back money to pay my rent. Im asking them to vacate the order and return all my extra money that was taken out of my pay checks.(Id. at 5-6.)
Plaintiff further alleges, “Judge Fria was very bias to me I told her I had 2 other children she acted as if she didn't hear me.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff maintains that she “[does not] mind paying to take care of [her] children,” but that she wants to “make it fa[ir] and just.” (Id.)
Plaintiff requests that the child support orders be vacated, and that the money she has previously paid in child support be returned to her. She also seeks $10,000 in damages.
DISCUSSION
The Court construes the complaint as attempting to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Defendants violated Plaintiff's federal constitutional rights in the course of child support proceedings in the White Plains City Court. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
A. Judicial Immunity
Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Judges are also immune from claims for injunctive relief based on actions taken in their judicial capacities, “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209 (citations omitted). This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation ....” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994).
Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes action “outside” her judicial capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
Plaintiff alleges that her rights were violated because Judge Friia was “very bias[ed]” against her and apparently issued child support decisions that were adverse to her. Plaintiff, however, fails to allege any facts showing that, in presiding over Plaintiff's child support proceedings and issuing orders, the judge acted beyond the scope of her judicial responsibilities or outside her jurisdiction. See Mireles, 509 U.S. at 11-12.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against the judge, she does not allege facts suggesting that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Declaratory relief against a judge for actions taken within her judicial capacity is ordinarily available by appealing the judge's order. See Salem v. Paroli, 260 B.R. 246, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing Section 1983 claim for injunctive relief because declaratory relief was available through an appeal in state court); LeDuc v. Tilley, No. 3:05-CV-0157 (MRK), 2005 WL 1475334, at *7 (D. Conn. June 22, 2005) (same). Here, Plaintiff's remedy lies in an appeal within the state court system, rather than in federal court. Plaintiff has alleged no facts suggesting that she was unable to appeal any decision made by Judge Friia. Because Plaintiff has not alleged facts suggesting that the judge violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable, Section 1983 precludes any award of injunctive relief against this defendant.
B. Claims against the OSCE
Plaintiff's claims against the Westchester County OSCE must be dismissed because municipal agencies or departments do not have the capacity to be sued under New York law. See Omnipoint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange, 658 F.Supp.2d 539, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In New York, agencies of a municipality are not suable entities.”); Hall v. City of White Plains, 185 F.Supp.2d 293, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Under New York law, departments which are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and cannot sue or be sued.”); see also N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 2 (“The term ‘municipal corporation,' as used in this chapter, includes only a county, town, city and village.”). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims against this defendant for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Inasmuch as Plaintiff's complaint can be construed as asserting claims under Section 1983 against Westchester County, the Court dismisses those claims. When a plaintiff sues a municipality, like Westchester County, under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality's employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.” (quoting Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978))); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a claim under Section 1983 against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing: (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and; (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); see Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff alleges no facts showing that a policy, custom, or practice of Westchester County contributed to the violation of her federal constitutional rights. Instead, Plaintiff's claims are focused on concerns about her individual case only. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Westchester County for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
C. Claims against Lamont Johnson
A claim for relief under Section 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties therefore generally are not liable under the statute. Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”). Although Plaintiff does not describe Defendant Lamont Johnson's relationship to her or his role in the events giving rise to her claims, her allegations suggest that Johnson may be the father of Plaintiff's child and the person to whom Plaintiff owes child support. (See ECF 1, at 6.) Because Johnson appears to be a private party who is not alleged to work for any state or other government body, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Johnson for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
D. The Younger Doctrine
Plaintiff asks this Court to vacate orders issued by the state court in her child support proceedings. If Plaintiff's child support proceedings are pending in the state court, this Court may not intervene in them. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a federal court may not enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding in the absence of special circumstances suggesting bad faith, harassment, or irreparable injury that is both serious and immediate. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1973) (citing Younger, 404 U.S. 37). Application of the Younger abstention doctrine has been extended to the three following categories of state court proceedings: (1) state criminal prosecutions; (2) civil enforcement proceedings that are “akin to criminal prosecutions”; and (3) civil proceedings “that implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.” Sprint Commc'n, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (“Sprint”). Courts have held that pending state child support proceedings involve at least one of the circumstances mentioned in Sprint in which the Younger abstention doctrine should be applied. See Francis v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 22-CV-6860, 2023 WL 5096145, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2023) (“The merits of that appeal -challenging both the Family Court order and Francis's need to exhaust administrative remedies through [the Department of Social Services] - implicate New York's state interest in managing and enforcing child support payments.”); Perso v. Perso, No. 19-CV-2858, 2019 WL 4415399, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2019) (same as to ongoing divorce and child support proceedings); Bowman v. Morris, No. 8:19-CV-0097, 2019 WL 5150196, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2019) (“[T]o the extent that the child support issues are continuing in Family Court, the Court should abstain from interfering with that process.”), report & recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3759174 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2019); Gravagna v. Eisenpress, No. 19-CV-0700 (CM), 2019 WL 1469289, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2019) (“[T]his Court must abstain under Younger from interfering in Plaintiff's ongoing state-court proceedings[] involving . . . child support issues and ‘implicat[ing] a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.'” (citation and second alteration omitted)); Brock v. City of New York, No. 19-CV-0957, 2019 WL 438356, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2019) (applying Younger abstention to a claim in which the plaintiff asked the federal district court “to enjoin [a New York City official] from continuing to prosecute [the plaintiff's] child support obligations in New York family court” because “actions to enforce child support orders implicate important state interests”).
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing bad faith, harassment, or irreparable injury that is both serious and immediate has occurred with respect to her child support proceedings that may be pending in the White Plains City Court. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff asks this Court to intervene in those pending proceedings, the Court dismisses his claims under the Younger abstention doctrine.
E. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
To the extent that Plaintiff asks this Court to overturn a final order or judgment issued in child support proceedings in the White Plains City Court that have concluded, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine requires the dismissal of her claims for such relief. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court lacks authority to review a final state court order or judgment where a litigant seeks relief that invites the federal district court to reject or overturn such a final state court order or judgment. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291-92 (2005); see also Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331[,] [the statute granting federal district courts federal question jurisdiction,] is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments....”); Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 101 (2d Cir. 2021) (The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “bars federal district courts from hearing cases that in effect are appeals from state court judgments, because the Supreme Court [of the United States] is the only federal court with jurisdiction over such cases.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257)); Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine reflects the principle set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1257 that the Supreme Court [of the United States] is the only federal court that has jurisdiction to review state court judgments, unless otherwise provided by Congress, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (habeas corpus review).” (citation omitted)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “precludes a United States district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction.” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 291. This applies to cases in which a litigant seeks relief that invites a federal district court to reject or overturn a final decision of a New York Family Court as to a child support dispute brought in that state court. See, e.g., Legister, 2020 WL 7405672, at *3 (“A plaintiff's challenge in a federal district court to ‘the validity or enforcement of [a] child support order itself' is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” (quoting Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 404 (2d Cir. 2013))).
District court review of claims is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when four requirements are met: (1) the litigant lost in state court; (2) the litigant complains of injuries caused by a final state court order or judgment; (3) the litigant invites district court review and rejection of the final state court order or judgment; and (4) the final state court order or judgment was rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. Dorce, 2 F.4th at 101 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Inasmuch as Plaintiff criticizes any final child support decision of the White Plains City Court, asking this Court to overturn that final decision, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this Court from granting Plaintiff such relief. The Court therefore dismisses any claims that essentially challenge a final decision of the White Plains City Court, arising from Plaintiff's concluded child support proceedings in that court, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 291.
In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has instructed federal district courts to abstain from exercising federal question jurisdiction of claims involving domestic relations issues, so long as those claims could be fully and fairly determined in the state courts. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Block, 905 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990); Deem v. DiMella-Deem, 941 F.3d 618, 621 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that American Airlines remains good law regardless of the Supreme Court's decision in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992)). For example, a federal district court should abstain from exercising its federal question jurisdiction of claims in which it is “asked to grant a divorce or annulment, determine support payments, or award custody of a child.” American Airlines, 905 F.2d at 14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court must therefore abstain from considering any request by Plaintiff to alter or amend the amount of child support she owes.
F. Procedural Due Process Claims
The Court understands Plaintiff's complaint as also attempting to assert claims under Section 1983 of violations of her right of procedural due process with respect to the garnishment of her wages to satisfy her child support obligations.
The right of procedural due process only protects “against deprivations without due process of law.” Rivera-Powell v. N.Y. City Bd. of Elections, 470 F.3d 458, 464 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard . . . at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Determining whether the process provided is adequate requires a weighing of: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable value of further safeguards; and (3) the governmental interest at issue. See Rivera-Powell, 470 F.3d at 466 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
Generally, some kind of predeprivation process must be provided before a person's property rights are infringed upon. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 299 (1981); DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 302 (2d Cir. 2003). Where that person is deprived of a property right because of a random and unauthorized act, rather than through the operation of established state procedures, however, the right of procedural due process is satisfied if the State provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Rivera-Powell, 470 F.3d at 465.
In the State of New York, a child support debtor is entitled to the administrative remedies outlined in Article 52 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“Article 52”). For example, when a local social services district's Support Collection Unit issues an execution for enforcement of current child support or child support arrears, but there is “an error in the amount” purportedly owed, the debtor may assert that error as a “mistake of fact” and challenge it administratively. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5241(a)(8), (e). If the agency does not agree with the debtor's objection, the debtor may seek judicial review of the agency's determination in a proceeding brought in a state court under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“Article 78”). Beattease v. Washington Cnty. Support Collection Unit, 92 A.D.3d 1037, 1038 (2d Dep't 2012); see Phillips v. Wagner, No. 22-CV-0833, 2022 WL 17406092, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2022), report & recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17403441 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2022), appeal dismissed, No. 23-68, 2023 WL 4445323 (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2023); Ketan v. Lopez, No. 20-CV-1626 (LLS), 2020 WL 3871209, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2020); Basciano v. Child Support Enf't Mt. Vernon Off., No. 19-CV-11797 (CM), 2020 WL 550569, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2020); Smith v. N.Y. Child Support Process Ctr., No. 19-CV-9266 (CM), 2019 WL 6312178, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2019), appeal dismissed, No. 20-26, 2020 WL 3643569 (2d Cir. May 7, 2020).
State law, specifically, Articles 52 and 78, provides procedural due process to child support debtors facing garnishment. If state officials failed to comply with state law, such an omission would constitute a random and unauthorized deprivation of property. That deprivation does not, however, constitute a violation of procedural due process so long as the state provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy.
Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that she has sought Article 52 administrative review or Article 78 judicial review, or that either remedy is inadequate. Without seeking Article 52 administrative review or Article 78 judicial review, Plaintiff cannot assert that she was denied procedural due process. Basciano, 2020 WL 550569, at *4 (citing Vialez v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 783 F.Supp. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), and Smith, 2019 WL 6312178, at *3). Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims under Section 1983 that her right of procedural due process has been violated with regard to her child support arrears obligations, the Court dismisses such claims for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
G. State Law Claims
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). Having dismissed the federal claims of which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.'” (quoting City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997))).
H. Leave to Amend is Denied
District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because the defects in Plaintiff's complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's complaint, filed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed for the reasons set forth in this order.
Plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief is denied as moot. (ECF 2.)
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in this action.
SO ORDERED.