Opinion
Case No. 4:20-cv-10058-KMM
08-17-2020
Jonathan HAIM, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MONROE COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
Alan A. Fowler, Alan Fowler Law, PLLC, Key West, FL, Angelo M. Martin, Counselaw, Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs. Patrick James McCullah, Jr., Robert Blake Shillinger, Jr., Monroe County Attorney's Office, Key West, FL, Michael Thomas Burke, Johnson Anselmo Murdoch Burke Piper & Hochman PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants Monroe County, Monroe County Board of County Commissioners, Monroe County Sheriff's Office, Mayor Heather Carruthers, Shannon Weiner. Bruce Wallace Jolly, Richard A. Giuffreda, Purdy Jolly Giuffreda Barranco & Jisa PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Gregory James Jolly, Purdy, Jolly, Giuffreda and Barranco, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Defendant Rick Ramsay.
Alan A. Fowler, Alan Fowler Law, PLLC, Key West, FL, Angelo M. Martin, Counselaw, Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs.
Patrick James McCullah, Jr., Robert Blake Shillinger, Jr., Monroe County Attorney's Office, Key West, FL, Michael Thomas Burke, Johnson Anselmo Murdoch Burke Piper & Hochman PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants Monroe County, Monroe County Board of County Commissioners, Monroe County Sheriff's Office, Mayor Heather Carruthers, Shannon Weiner.
Bruce Wallace Jolly, Richard A. Giuffreda, Purdy Jolly Giuffreda Barranco & Jisa PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Gregory James Jolly, Purdy, Jolly, Giuffreda and Barranco, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Defendant Rick Ramsay.
ORDER
K. MICHAEL MOORE, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant Rick Ramsay's Motion to Dismiss ("Ramsay Mot.") (ECF No. 6) and Defendants Monroe County, Monroe County Board of Commissioners, Heather Carruthers, in her official capacity as Mayor of Monroe County, and Shannon Weiner, in her official capacity as Emergency Management Director of Monroe County's (collectively, "County Defendants") Motion to Dismiss ("County Mot.") (ECF No. 10). Plaintiffs Jessica Haim ("Jessica"), Jonathan Haim ("Jonathan"), and Bettina Haim ("Bettina") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed responses in opposition. ("Ramsay Mot. Resp.") (ECF No. 20); ("County Mot. Resp.") (ECF No. 13). Defendants filed replies. (ECF Nos. 18, 21). The Motions are now ripe for review.
The Court uses "Defendants" to refer to Defendant Rick Ramsay and County Defendants.
The background facts are taken from the Complaint ("Compl.") (ECF No. 1–2) and accepted as true for purposes of ruling on this Motion. Fernandez v. Tricam Indus., Inc. , No. 09-22089-CIV-MOORE/SIMONTON, 2009 WL 10668267, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2009).
This case arises from two emergency directives issued in Monroe County, Florida: Emergency Directive 20–02 ("ED 20–02") and Emergency Directive 20–03 ("ED 20–03") (collectively, the "Emergency Directives"). Id. ¶ 1. Jonathan and Jessica are married residents of Monroe County, Florida who own and operate several small businesses in Key West, Florida. Compl. ¶¶ 14–15. Plaintiff Bettina Haim is Jonathan Haim's mother and Jessica Haim's mother-in-law who resides in Seminole County, Florida. Id. ¶ 16. Defendants were involved in either promulgating or enforcing the Emergency Directives. See id. ¶¶ 18–25.
On March 1, 2020, the Governor of the State of Florida issued Executive Order Number 20–51 declaring that a public health emergency existed in the state due to the spread of COVID-19. Id. ¶ 29. On March 13, 2020, a national emergency was declared in the United States because of the novel coronavirus outbreak. Id. ¶ 28. On March 15, 2020, without holding a meeting, Defendant Carruthers declared a state of emergency for Monroe County pursuant to Section 11-1 of the Monroe County, Florida Code. Id. ¶ 30.
On March 20, 2020, Defendant Weiner entered ED 20–02 pursuant to Section 11-3 of the Monroe County, Florida Code, which ordered that "[t]he Florida Keys are closing to all tourists and leisure visitors" immediately but did not include a reference to the duration of the restriction. Id. ¶ 31. Thereafter, on March 27, 2020, Defendant Weiner executed ED 20–03, which requested that the Sheriff of Monroe County, Defendant Ramsay, erect checkpoints on both roads entering the Florida Keys to determine if at least one occupant in the vehicle has legitimate business to be in Monroe County during the state of emergency. Id. ¶ 32. ED 20–03 defined a person with a "legitimate business" as (1) a resident of Monroe County; (2) an owner of property in Monroe County; (3) a person employed or performing contractual services in Monroe County; or (4) military personnel assigned to work in Monroe County. Id. Further, ED 20–03 made clear that the checkpoint would be a military-style checkpoint where occupants would have to produce documents to prove residency or employment, and if no such person could provide such documents to the County's satisfaction, "the vehicle shall be refused entry into Monroe County and directed to return to Miami-Dade County." Id.
Subsequently, Defendant Weiner amended ED 20–03 several times. Notably, on April 16, 2020, Defendant Weiner amended ED 20–03 to state that documents establishing ownership of Florida Keys property owned by a limited liability company or other business entity is insufficient to establish residency for purposes of the directive. Id. ¶ 34.
As a result of the Emergency Directives, Jonathan and Jessica's businesses have been adversely impacted and Bettina has been prohibited from visiting Jonathan and Jessica while Jessica was pregnant. Id. ¶¶ 1, 16.
On May 14, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in the Circuit Court of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Monroe County, Florida, seeking a declaratory judgment and/or permanent injunction that (1) Section 11-3(b)(4).a of the Monroe County, Florida Code, from which the Emergency Management Director derives its authority to issue directives, is unconstitutional ("Count I"); (2) ED 20–02 and ED 20–03 were not adopted in conformity with Florida law and are therefore unenforceable ("Count II"); and (3) ED 20–02 and ED 20–03 are unconstitutional ("Count III"). See id. On June 5, 2020, Defendants removed this case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. (ECF No. 1). Now, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint. See Ramsay Mot.; County Mot.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This requirement "give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citation and alterations omitted). The court takes the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell , 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).
A complaint must contain enough facts to plausibly allege the required elements. Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ. , 495 F.3d 1289, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2007). A pleading that offers "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal." Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis , 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002). "Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) come in two forms[:]" facial and factual attacks. Lawrence v. Dunbar , 919 F.2d 1525, 1528–29 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). "Factual attacks challenge subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings." Morrison v. Amway Corp. , 323 F.3d 920, 924 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). A factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction empowers a trial court to "weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.... [T]he existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." Dunbar , 919 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Williamson v. Tucker , 645 F.2d 404, 412–13 (5th Cir. 1981) ). By contrast, "[o]n a facial attack, a plaintiff is afforded safeguards similar to those provided in opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, meaning that the court must consider the allegations of the complaint to be true." Fru Veg Marketing, Inc. v. Vegfruitworld Corp. , 896 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1179 (S.D. Fla. 2012). The burden is on the party seeking to invoke the Court's jurisdiction to establish that jurisdiction exists. Kokkonen , 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant Ramsay moves to dismiss Count III of the Complaint arguing that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a Fourth Amendment challenge to the roadblocks. See Ramsay Mot. In response, Plaintiffs argue that they have standing to bring the claims without personally suffering the violation. See Ramsay Mot. Resp.
As to the contentions in Counts I and II of the Complaint, Defendant Ramsay relies on and adopts the arguments set forth by County Defendants because Defendant Ramsay's role was limited to the enforcement of the Emergency Directives. See Ramsay Mot. at 2.
County Defendants move to dismiss Count III of the Complaint arguing that (1) Count III was mooted when the Emergency Directives were rescinded; and (2) Plaintiffs lack standing because they do not allege that they were seized or searched. See County Mot. Further, County Defendants argue that because Count III, the only federal claim, should be dismissed, the Court should decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims in Counts I and II. Id. at 9. Moreover, County Defendants argue that if the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Counts I and II, the Counts should be dismissed because they are moot since the Emergency Directives have been rescinded. Id. In response, Plaintiffs argue that (1) the claims are not moot under the doctrine of voluntary cessations; (2) Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims without personally suffering the violation. See County Mot. Resp.
Defendants also argue that the Court should dismiss the claims based on the merits, but as set forth herein, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over the claims and therefore need not address these arguments.
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As an initial matter, "it is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking." Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co. , 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, because Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing and that Plaintiffs’ claims are moot, the Court must first determine whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). "It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Id. (internal citations omitted). Such jurisdiction must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Osting-Schwinn , 613 F.3d 1079, 1085 (11th Cir. 2010). The Court addresses the its subject matter over each Count in turn.
A. COUNT I
First, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Count I because Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged facts indicating that there is a substantial likelihood that Plaintiffs will be injured in the future.
The federal courts are confined by Article III of the Constitution to adjudicating only actual "cases" and "controversies." Allen v. Wright , 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. , 572 U.S. 118, 129, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014). The Article III case or controversy requirement sets fundamental limits on the federal judiciary's power in our society. Id. One of the most important of these constitutionally-based limits is the requirement that a litigant have "standing" to invoke the power of a federal court. "In essence[,] the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues." Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). In order to demonstrate that a case or controversy exists to meet the Article III standing requirement when a plaintiff is seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, a plaintiff must allege facts from which it appears there is a substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons , 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) ; Cone Corp. v. Florida Dep't of Transp. , 921 F.2d 1190, 1205 (11th Cir. 1991).
Consistent with the "cases" and "controversies" requirement of Article III, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, specifically provides that a declaratory judgment may be issued only in the case of an "actual controversy." See Emory v. Peeler , 756 F.2d 1547, 1551–52 (11th Cir. 1985). Based on the facts alleged, there must be a substantial continuing controversy between two adverse parties. Id. at 1552. "The plaintiff must allege facts from which the continuation of the dispute may be reasonably inferred. Additionally, the continuing controversy may not be conjectural, hypothetical, or contingent; it must be real and immediate, and create a definite, rather than speculative threat of future injury." Id. (internal quotations omitted). "The remote possibility that a future injury may happen is not sufficient to satisfy the ‘actual controversy’ requirement for declaratory judgments." Id. (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs lack standing to seek the requested declaratory and injunctive relief in Count I. Given the procedural posture in this case, the Court looks to the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint to determine standing. Church v. City of Huntsville , 30 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 1994) ; Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc. , 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005). Plaintiffs allege that they "are and will be threatened with adverse treatment and a denial of due process and their constitutional rights, on the basis that a non-elected official is enacting law in contradiction of the general and specific laws of the state, and such laws interfere with Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights." The alleged harm is not immediate or definite and is speculative because past alleged violations do not establish a continuing violation. Thus, a speculative accusation that elected officials will enact further unspecified laws in violation of the U.S. and Florida Constitutions is insufficient to confer standing. Therefore, Plaintiffs lack standing to bring Count I because Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently alleged facts indicating that there is a substantial likelihood that Plaintiffs will be injured in the future. Accordingly, Count I is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
B. COUNTS II AND III
Second, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Counts II and III because the claims are moot. County Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are moot because ED 20–02 and ED 20–03 were rescinded on June 1, 2020 and therefore no longer exist. County Mot. at 5–6. In response, Plaintiffs argue that the claims are not moot because the doctrine of voluntary cessation applies. County Mot. Resp. at 4–7.
When "events that occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or an appeal deprive the court of the ability to give the plaintiff or appellant meaningful relief" a claim must be dismissed as moot. Hall v. Sec'y, Alabama , 902 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). "A case is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the Court can give meaningful relief." Aaron Private Clinic Mgmt., LLC v. Berry , 912 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2019). If the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, such as because the controversy becomes moot, it must dismiss the claim. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't , 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998).
However, there is an exception to mootness, the doctrine of voluntary cessation. "[A] defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice." City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. , 455 U.S. 283, 289, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982). "[I]f it did, the courts would be compelled to leave ‘[t]he defendant ... free to return to his old ways.’ " Id. at 289, 102 S.Ct. 1070 n.10 (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co. , 345 U.S. 629, 632, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953) ). In accordance with this principle, the standard the Supreme Court has announced for determining whether a case has been mooted by the defendant's voluntary conduct is stringent: "A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n , 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89 S.Ct. 361, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968). The "heavy burden of persua[ding]" the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again lies with the party asserting mootness. Id.
Here, Defendants advance a factual attack on the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot because ED 20–02 and ED 20–03 were rescinded on June 1, 2020, after the Complaint was filed, and no longer exist. County Mot. at 5–6; Monroe County Emergency Directive 20–09 (June 1, 2020), available at https://www.monroecounty-fl.gov/DocumentCenter/View/23338/Emergency-Directive-20-09--reopening-lodging-travel-lifting-related-rest (rescinding ED 20–02 and ED 20–03). Because the Emergency Directives were subsequently rescinded, a declaration of the constitutionality or enforceability of ED 20–02 and ED 20–03, as Plaintiffs request in Counts II and III, would provide no meaningful relief. Further, Plaintiffs’ argument that the doctrine of voluntary cessation saves their claims from mootness is unavailing. It is speculative that the circumstances regarding COVID-19 will rise to the level requiring the imposition of restrictions such as those in ED 20–02 and ED 20–03, and even more speculative that another infectious virus such as COVID-19 will again impact Monroe County at some time in the future. Moreover, even if such circumstances arose, ED 20–02 and ED 20–03 have been rescinded, effectively repealing them, and therefore, even if the Defendants were to enact and enforce new restrictions, it's mere speculation that they would be the same as those imposed in ED 20–02 and ED 20–03. See also Coral Springs Street Sys., Inc. v. City of Sunrise , 371 F.3d 1320, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[G]overnmental entities and officials have been given considerably more leeway than private parties in the presumption that they are unlikely to resume illegal activities."). Therefore, it cannot be reasonably expected that ED 20–02 and ED 20–03 will be reinstated. Thus, because ED 20–02 and ED 20–03 have been rescinded, Plaintiffs’ Counts II and III—requesting declarations that ED 20–02 and ED 20–03 are unenforceable and unconstitutional—are moot and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IV. CONCLUSION
UPON CONSIDERATION of the Motions, the pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant Rick Ramsay's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) and County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) are GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Count I of the Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and COUNTS II and III are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 17th day of August, 2020.