Opinion
C/A No. 6:20-cv-01114-HMH-JDA
03-25-2020
Terrance Terrell Hagood, Plaintiff, v. SC Highway Patrol, M.A. Taylor, Taylor Matthews, Lovelace Matthews, Jumper Williams, Callison Michael, Gibson Ryan, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Terrance Terrell Hagood ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is a detainee at the Greenville County Detention Center. He files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
The undersigned takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has the following charges pending against him in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions: driving under suspension, license suspended for DUI, third or subsequent offense at case number 20181090033557; trafficking in methamphetamine or cocaine base at case number 2017A2330202910; resisting arrest at case number 2017A2330202937; resisting arrest at case number 2017A2330202939; assaulting, beating, or wounding police officer serving process or while resisting arrest at case number 2017A2330207784; escape at case number 2017A2330207785; trafficking in methamphetamine or cocaine base at case number 2017A2330207786; driving under the influence at case number 6102P0462366; driving under suspension at case number 6102P0462367; and giving false information to law enforcement at case number 6102P0462368. See Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers) (last visited Mar. 24, 2020); see also Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'").
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [Id. at 5.] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendants subjected him to an unlawful search and seizure resulting from false warrants and drug analysis. [Id. at 6.] According to Plaintiff, Defendant Taylor, an officer with the South Carolina Highway Patrol, arrested him on August 21, 2017, for "trafficking in meth/cocaine base and resisting arrest/wound[ing], [a]ssault[ing] an officer serving process or while resisting arrest, [e]scape/[a]ttempt to [e]scape, DUS 3rd, DUI 1st, [and providing] false info[rmation] to police." [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that, according to the arresting officer's statement, certain drugs field tested positive for crack cocaine. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Taylor pulled him over for a traffic violation. [Id.] Defendant Taylor asked for Plaintiff's insurance and identification, but Plaintiff told the officer that, while he had a license, he did not have it on his person. [Id.] Defendant walked to his patrol car and then returned and said he smelled marijuana. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges Defendant Taylor did not process the traffic violation and that the marijuana smell had nothing to do with the reasons for which he was pulled over. [Id. at 6-7.] Plaintiff explained to the officer that he had asthma. [Id. at 7.] Plaintiff alleges the officer tried to get a blood sample to see if he was under the influence of alcohol. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges the officer claimed he was under the influence of a "'mix [d]rug'" but never said what mix of drugs. [Id.] Plaintiff explained to the officer that he suffers from PTSD. [Id.] For his injuries, Plaintiff alleges he suffers from asthma and PTSD and that he now has to speak with a mental health counselor and take medications. [Id. at 9.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $1.5 million and asks that the officers to disciplined. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, this Court is charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Amended Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, the Complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). "A claim has 'facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, Plaintiff asserts a claim for the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. However, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal because certain Defendants are entitled to dismissal, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under § 1983, and this action is duplicative of a prior action.
Defendants are entitled to dismissal
Defendants South Carolina Highway Patrol, Taylor Matthews, Lovelace Matthews, Jumper Williams, Callison Michael, and Gibson Ryan are each entitled to summary dismissal from this action.
First, the South Carolina Highway Patrol cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is not a person. Brooks v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 6:18-cv-0632-MBS-KFM, 2018 WL 2470746, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 20, 2018), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 2461897 (D.S.C. June 1, 2018); see also Harden v. Green, 27 F. App'x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a "person"). The South Carolina Highway Patrol is an arm of the State, and it is well settled that the State of South Carolina is not considered a person subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Cobb v. South Carolina, No. 2:13-cv-02370-RMG, 2014 WL 4220423, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2014); Ackbar v. South Carolina, No. 4:17-cv-1019-RMG-TER, 2017 WL 2348460, at *2 (D.S.C. May 17, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 2364302 (D.S.C. May 30, 2017).
Further, the South Carolina Highway Patrol, as an arm of the State, has Eleventh Amendment immunity from a suit for damages brought in this Court. See Belcher v. S.C. Bd. of Corr., 460 F. Supp. 805, 808-09 (D.S.C. 1978). The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts. U.S. Const. amend. XI; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1996); Bellamy v. Borders, 727 F. Supp. 247, 248-50 (D.S.C.1989). Since the Eleventh Amendment bars the relief that Plaintiff requests against the South Carolina Highway Patrol, the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted against this Defendant and, as a result, it should be dismissed. See Alkebulanyahh v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 6:10-cv-2976-MBS-KFM, 2010 WL 5625463, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 202987 (D.S.C. Jan. 21, 2011).
Defendants Taylor Matthews, Lovelace Matthews, Jumper Williams, Callison Michael, and Gibson Ryan are each entitled to dismissal because Plaintiff provides no factual allegations against them to assert a plausible claim for relief under § 1983. Weller, 901 F.2d at 397 (noting dismissal is proper where there were no allegations against defendants); Gibson v. Foster, No. 5:17-cv-01333-JMC-KDW, 2017 WL 7355301, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 690060 (D.S.C. Feb. 1, 2018) (finding summary dismissal proper where "the Complaint contains no allegations of wrongdoing by th[e] Defendant"). Plaintiff makes no allegations against these Defendants and only names them in the caption. "Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed." Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974); see also Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading).
Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal
Further, the Complaint as a whole is subject to summary dismissal as Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief that is plausible. As noted, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment guarantees, among other protections, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) ("§ 1983 allow[s] a plaintiff to seek money damages from government officials who have violated his Fourth Amendment rights."). Although "[t]he Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement officers from making unreasonable seizures, and seizure of an individual effected without probable cause is unreasonable," Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 85 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996), Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support a claim for relief as explained below.
To establish a Fourth Amendment claim, "Plaintiff must make a showing of a lack of probable cause for the issuance of the warrants for his arrest." Williams v. Sims, No. 3:10-cv-862-CMC, 2012 WL 4322085, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 20, 2012). To successfully challenge the probable cause statement in a warrant, the party challenging the warrant must "make a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly or intentionally, or with reckless disregard of the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit," Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978), or the party must show that the affiant omitted from the affidavit "material facts with the intent to make, or with reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading," Miller v. Prince George's Cty., Md., 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth." Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. "Reckless disregard" can be established by evidence that an officer acted "with a high degree of awareness of [a statement's] probable falsity," that is, "when viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported." Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, claims, such as the one asserted by Plaintiff here, are "properly 'founded on a Fourth Amendment seizure that incorporates elements of the analogous common law tort of malicious prosecution.'" Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 356 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 2000)). "To state such a Fourth Amendment claim, 'we have required that [1] the defendant have seized plaintiff pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause and [2] that the criminal proceedings have terminated in plaintiff's favor.'" Id. (quoting Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 188 (4th Cir. 2012)).
Here, other than his bald assertion that he was searched and arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that he was arrested without probable cause. Instead, Plaintiff appears to allege that he was arrested after a traffic stop based on the arresting officer's determination that Plaintiff had drugs and was possibly under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Plaintiff does not allege that the officer did not find drugs or that the officer's arrest was improper for any reason other than that the arrest was not related to the officer's reason for the initial stop. On the other hand, Plaintiff alleges that he was driving without his license, that the officer smelled marijuana, and that, after a search, the officer found drugs that field tested positive for cocaine. Based on these allegations, probable cause existed for the officer to search the vehicle and arrest Plaintiff. Simply put, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing the arresting officer lacked probable cause to search or arrest him. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief.
This action is duplicative
Further, this action should be dismissed because it is duplicative of another action recently filed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff's Complaint filed in this case raises claims identical to those raised in Hagood v. South Carolina, No. 6:20-cv-362-HMH-JDA (D.S.C. Jan. 30, 2020). A review of Plaintiff's prior case shows that he has already asserted similar claims to those he now attempts to raise here. Plaintiff's alleged injuries and requested relief are identical in his prior case and in this case. As such, Plaintiff is attempting to re-assert the same claims under the same facts as his prior case.
Because the present action is duplicative of another case filed by Plaintiff, this action warrants dismissal. "[R]epetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 as frivolous." Paul v. de Holczer, No. 3:15-cv-2178-CMC-PJG, 2015 WL 4545974, at *6 (D.S.C. July 28, 2015) (holding that "the instant Complaint should be summarily dismissed as a frivolous duplicate filing in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency"), aff'd 631 F. App'x 197 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2016). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed that, "[b]ecause district courts are not required to entertain duplicative lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e)." Cottle v. Bell, 229 F.3d 1142, 2000 WL 1144623, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug.14, 2000) (unpublished table decision) (citing Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1992) ("district courts may dismiss duplicative complaints under section 1915")); Wilkins v. Harley, Case No. 6:11-cv-3463-MBS-KFM, 2012 WL 256566, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 12, 2012) ("this duplicate § 1983 Complaint is frivolous and subject to summary dismissal"), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 260159 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2012). Therefore, in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, because the present action is a meritless duplicate of a prior lawsuit, the present case is frivolous and subject to summary dismissal. See Lester v. Perry Corr. Inst., No. 4:12-cv-971-TMC-TER, 2012 WL 1963592, at *3 (D.S.C. May 10, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 1963566 (D.S.C. May 31, 2012), aff'd, 479 F. App'x 509 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) ("The District Court clearly had the right to take notice of its own files and records and it had no duty to grind the same corn a second time. Once was sufficient.").
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
The undersigned recommends dismissal without leave to amend because any attempt to cure the deficiencies in the Complaint would be futile for the reasons stated herein. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge March 25, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).