Opinion
G044204 Super. Ct. No. 05CC07279
11-29-2011
THOMAS HAFEN, as Cotrustee, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. RHONDA A. NIELSEN, Defendant and Appellant.
Edward M. Picozzi for Defendant and Appellant. Mazur & Mazur, Janice R. Mazur and William E. Mazur, Jr., for Plaintiffs and Respondents. Defendant Rhonda A. Nielsen appeals from a postjudgment order awarding her attorney fees against plaintiffs Thomas and Renee Hafen, Trustees of the Hafen Trust.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Kazuharu Makino, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Edward M. Picozzi for Defendant and Appellant.
Mazur & Mazur, Janice R. Mazur and William E. Mazur, Jr., for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Defendant Rhonda A. Nielsen appeals from a postjudgment order awarding her attorney fees against plaintiffs Thomas and Renee Hafen, Trustees of the Hafen Trust.
Nielsen contends the trial court abused its discretion in awarding her only $1,050 of the $179,900 in attorney fees she incurred in successfully defending the Hafens' action to enforce two unrecorded agreements granting view easements and other interests in a vacant parcel Nielsen purchased adjacent to the Hafens' home.
As explained below, although we agree with the trial court's decision to apportion Nielsen's attorney fees among the claims relating to the two separate agreements, only one of which included an attorney fees provision, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying the requisite legal standards in making the apportionment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand the matter for the trial court to reapportion Nielsen's attorney fees based on the correct legal standards.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On our own motion, we judicially notice our earlier opinion affirming the trial court's judgment on the merits (Hafen v. Nielsen (June 30, 2011, G043337) [nonpub. opn.]). (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a); Fink v. Shemtov (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1171.) We take many of the facts leading to the judgment from our prior opinion.
The Hafens contend we should affirm the trial court's decision because Nielsen failed to provide a sufficient appellate record regarding all pretrial and trial proceedings. We decline to do so because we have a record of the trial proceedings from the Hafens' earlier appeal challenging the trial court's judgment. In any event, we reverse the trial court's decision regarding the fee award because the trial court failed to properly apply the governing legal standards. A comprehensive record of all trial court proceedings is therefore unnecessary to our decision.
In April 2001, Terry and Linn Moshenko and Mark and Linda Frauman owned adjoining, hillside parcels in Trabuco Canyon, California. The Moshenkos and the Fraumans entered into the "AGREEMENT FOR PROPERTY AND EASEMENT EXCHANGE" (2001 Agreement) to trade equal-sized portions of their parcels and to grant one another view easements across their properties. The 2001 Agreement, however, was "contingent upon, and of no force and effect unless" the parties completed the land exchange and granted the easements it described. Neither the Moshenkos nor the Fraumans recorded the 2001 Agreement and Terry Moshenko died before the couples exchanged any land or granted any easements.
The Hafens purchased the Moshenkos' property in August 2002 and Michael Meacher purchased the Fraumans' property in January 2004. In July 2004, Meacher listed his property for sale, but experienced difficulty attracting potential buyers. He blamed the unsightly conditions on the Hafens' property for repelling prospective buyers and therefore negotiated an agreement with the Hafens to clean up their property and confirm the property exchange and view easements described in the 2001 Agreement. Meacher and the Hafens signed the agreement in January 2005 (2005 Agreement).
Theodore Carlson actually purchased the Fraumans' property for Meacher because Carlson's superior credit score enabled Meacher to obtain a more favorable loan. Meacher, however, was the equitable and true owner.
In the 2005 Agreement, Meacher and the Hafens agreed to exchange similar-sized portions of their properties and to "keep" one another's view "unobstructed." The Hafens also agreed to clean up their property "to enhance the value for the sale of [Meacher's] property" and Meacher agreed to pay the Hafens a portion of any sale price exceeding $300,000. The 2005 Agreement also expressly rescinded the 2001 Agreement and provided that it was "confidential and shall run with the land" and "will not be disclosed to other property owners in the neighborhood." Neither the Hafens nor Meacher recorded the 2005 Agreement. The Hafens eventually recorded the agreement after they filed the underlying lawsuit.
Nielsen purchased Meacher's property in May 2005. She refused to be bound by either the 2005 Agreement or the 2001 Agreement because she claimed she knew nothing about them before escrow closed on her purchase. The Hafens sued Nielsen in June 2005 to enforce the two agreements.
The operative second amended complaint alleged five causes of action against Nielsen on the theory both the 2005 Agreement and the 2001 Agreement were enforceable against her as equitable servitudes. The first and second causes of action sought specific performance and declaratory relief regarding the land exchange and view easements described in the 2005 Agreement. The third cause of action alleged the Hafens acquired a prescriptive easement for the nonexclusive use of a portion of Nielsen's property because the Hafens and their predecessors continually used the area for approximately 20 years. If the 2005 Agreement's land exchange and view easements could not be enforced for any reason, the fourth and fifth causes of action sought specific performance and declaratory relief regarding the view easements described in the 2001 Agreement.
Following a bench trial, the court refused to enforce the 2005 Agreement or the 2001 Agreement against Nielsen as equitable servitudes and entered judgment in Nielsen's favor. In its statement of decision, the trial court concluded the Hafens failed to establish the elements of their equitable servitude claim. Specifically, the court found Nielsen had no knowledge of the 2005 Agreement and the Hafens failed to show that declining to enforce the 2005 Agreement against Nielsen was inequitable. The trial court also declined to enforce the 2001 Agreement because the parties to the 2005 Agreement rescinded it.
Based on an attorney fees provision in the 2001 Agreement, Nielsen filed a motion to recover the attorney fees she incurred defending the Hafens' claims. The trial court granted the motion, but awarded just $1,050 of the $179,900 Nielsen sought, apportioning three hours of attorney time billed at the $350 hourly rate Nielsen's lawyer charged. The court's minute order explained, "The only basis for recovery of attorney fees is contained in the 2001 Moshenko agreement. That agreement had been expressly rescinded and never was recorded so could not be enforced against [Nielsen]. The fees attributable to that agreement must be apportioned." Nielsen now appeals.
II
DISCUSSION
Nielsen challenges the trial court's decision to award one-half of one percent of the attorney fees she sought to recover. She contends the trial court should have awarded the full amount requested because the time spent on the claims relating to the 2005 Agreement cannot be segregated from the time spent on the claims relating to the 2001 Agreement. The Hafens do not dispute Nielsen's right to recover some portion of her attorney fees. A. Standard of Review
"'California courts have long held that trial courts have broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee award. This determination is necessarily ad hoc and must be resolved on the particular circumstances of each case.' [Citation.] In exercising its discretion, the trial court may accordingly 'consider all of the facts and the entire procedural history of the case in setting the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee award.' [Citation.]" (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1394 (Bernardi).)
"'The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong' — meaning that it abused its discretion. [Citations.]" (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (PLCM Group); Bernardi, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1394 ["An attorney fees award '"will not be overturned in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence"'"].)
"'The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the "legal principles governing the subject of [the] action . . . ." Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an "abuse" of discretion.' [Citation.]" (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 393 (Horsford).) B. Contractual Attorney Fees Awards
Civil Code section 1717 allows a prevailing party in an "action on a contract" to recover reasonable attorney fees "incurred to enforce that contract" if the contract allows recovery for attorney fees. (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).)
"Where a cause of action based on the contract providing for attorney's fees is joined with other causes of action beyond the contract, the prevailing party may recover attorney's fees under [Civil Code] section 1717 only as they relate to the contract action. [Citation] . . . A litigant may not increase his recovery of attorney's fees by joining a cause of action in which attorney's fees are not recoverable to one in which an award is proper." (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 129 (Reynolds); Amtower v. Photon Dynamics, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1582, 1603-1604 (Amtower).) Accordingly, a prevailing party seeking contractual attorney fees generally must apportion fees between claims that support the recovery of attorney fees and those that do not. (Ibid.)
But a litigant's "joinder of causes of action should not dilute its right to attorney's fees. Attorney's fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they are not allowed. All expenses incurred with respect to [issues common to all causes of action] qualify for award." (Reynolds, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 129-130; Amtower, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1603-1604.)
Thus, where the issues are "'"inextricably intertwined,"'" the prevailing party need not apportion attorney fees and may recover fees for all time reasonably spent. (Abdallah v. United Savings Bank (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1111; Erickson v. R.E.M. Concepts, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1085.) The governing test is whether the "issues are so interrelated that it would have been impossible to separate them into claims for which attorney fees are properly awarded and claims for which they are not." (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133 (Akins); Amtower, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1604.)
"Where fees are authorized for some causes of action in a complaint but not for others, allocation is a matter within the trial court's discretion." (Amtower, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1604; Thompson Pacific Construction, Inc. v. City of Sunnyvale (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 525, 555.) C. Nothing About the Hafens' Claims Prevented the Trial Court From Apportioning Nielsen's Attorney Fees
The Hafens alleged two causes of action seeking specific performance and declaratory relief regarding the 2005 Agreement, two causes of action seeking specific performance and declaratory relief regarding the 2001 Agreement, and one cause of action seeking a prescriptive easement. The 2001 Agreement authorized the prevailing party to recover attorney fees "[i]n any action to interpret of [sic] enforce the terms of this agreement," but the 2005 Agreement did not have an attorney fees clause. Based on these facts, the trial court ruled Nielsen could recover her fees only for work her counsel performed regarding the 2001 Agreement. The court therefore apportioned Nielsen's attorney fees by dividing the fees among the claims pertaining to the 2001 Agreement and the Hafens' other claims.
Nielsen contends the trial court lacked any basis for apportioning her attorney fees and therefore abused its discretion by failing to award her the fees she incurred. Nielsen offers two reasons why the trial court erred in apportioning her attorney fees, but we find neither reason persuasive and agree with the trial court's conclusion that an apportionment was appropriate.
First, Nielsen contends the trial court should not have apportioned her attorney fees because "[p]arties prevailing on a contract claim also are entitled to compensation for time spent on noncontract claims that contribute to the success of the contract claim." In Nielsen's view, the trial court should have awarded her fees for the time her lawyer spent defending the claims under the 2001 Agreement and the 2005 Agreement because the Hafens sought to enforce both agreements alternatively. According to Nielsen, she had to successfully defend the claims on the 2005 Agreement as a "prerequisite" to opposing the claims on the 2001 Agreement and therefore the attorney fees provision in the 2001 Agreement applies to the 2005 Agreement.
Nielsen fails to explain how this contention entitles her to fees incurred on the prescriptive easement claim.
The sole authority Nielsen cites to support this contention is Finalco, Inc. v. Roosevelt (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1301 (Finalco),but Nielsen's reliance on that decision is misplaced. Finalco involved a complaint to enforce a promissory note on which the lender could not prevail unless it defeated the borrower's cross-complaint challenging the note's validity. (Id. at p. 1304.) In affirming an attorney fees award to the lender for fees incurred in prosecuting the complaint and defending the cross-complaint, the Court of Appeal explained, "California law is settled that a borrower's obligation to pay attorneys' fees incurred in the collection of the note includes attorneys' fees incurred in defending against a challenge to the underlying validity of the obligation." (Id. at p. 1308.)
Here, however, two separate contracts were alleged alternatively in the same pleading. The Hafens sought to enforce the 2005 Agreement and, if for any reason it could not be enforced, they sought to enforce the 2001 Agreement. The basis alleged for enforcement of the 2005 Agreement did not hinge on the validity of the 2001 Agreement and the claims on the 2001 Agreement did not undermine the 2005 Agreement's validity. Contrary to Nielsen's contention, she had to defend the claims on the 2001 Agreement regardless of whether the Hafens would prevail on the 2005 Agreement. The Hafens' complaint to enforce the 2001 and 2005 Agreements alternatively meant the trial court was not required to decide whether the Hafens could enforce the 2001 Agreement if the court decided the Hafens prevailed on the 2005 Agreement. This possible outcome did not mean Nielsen could ignore issues pertaining solely to the 2001 Agreement. Although Nielsen may recover attorney fees on issues common to the 2001 Agreement and the 2005 Agreement, Finalco does not entitle her to recover all the fees she incurred in opposing enforcement of the 2001 Agreement and the 2005 Agreement. Finalco presented an entirely different factual scenario and its holding does not apply in this case.
As a second reason not to segregate her attorney fees claim, Nielsen argues the issues raised by the attempt to enforce the 2005 Agreement were inextricably intertwined with the issues raised on the validity of the 2001 Agreement. As explained above, "[w]hen the . . . issues are so interrelated that it would have been impossible to separate them into claims for which attorney fees are properly awarded and claims for which they are not, then allocation is not required." (Akins, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133; Amtower, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1604.) Nielsen, however, fails to establish that the issues on the 2005 Agreement and the 2001 Agreement were so interrelated that it was impossible to segregate them.
Again, Nielsen fails to explain how this contention entitles her to any fees incurred on the prescriptive easement cause of action.
We agree the 2005 Agreement claims and the 2001 Agreement claims share some common issues. For example, both sought to enforce an agreement affecting the use of real property as an equitable servitude. The same legal requirements applied to both sets of claims and therefore time spent researching those requirements and resolving any legal issues was likely common to both sets of claims. But we do not agree that all the issues raised in the 2005 Agreement are necessarily shared or inextricably intertwined with the issues raised by the 2001 Agreement. For example, the factual issues regarding whether Nielsen knew about the 2005 Agreement before purchasing Meacher's property were not issues common to enforcement of the 2001 Agreement. The 2005 Agreement and the 2001 Agreement were separate agreements entered into at different times by different people. Knowledge of one did not necessarily equate to knowledge of the other.
To support her contention the issues pertaining to the 2005 Agreement and the 2001 Agreement cannot be segregated, Nielsen cites our decision in Pellegrino v. Robert Half Internal, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 278 (Pellegrino).That decision, however, does not support Nielsen's position.
In Pellegrino, a group of employees sued their employer for violating statutory wage and hour requirements and for unfair competition. The employees prevailed and then sought an attorney fees award based on a statute authorizing employees to recover attorney fees on successful wage and hour claims. (Pellegrino, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 282-283.) We affirmed the trial court's decision that the factual and legal issues surrounding the wage and hour claims were interrelated with the unfair competition claim because the employees had to prove the statutory wage and hour violations to prove the unfair competition claim. (Id. at p. 289.) Here, as explained above, we reject Nielsen's contention she could not successfully defend the Hafens' claims on the 2001 Agreement without also successfully defending efforts to enforce the 2005 Agreement. Accordingly, Pellegrino does not support Nielsen's contention the issues pertaining to the 2005 Agreement and the 2001 Agreement cannot be segregated.
Moreover, although Pellegrino affirmed the trial court's decision the factual and legal issues on the wage and hour claims and unfair competition claim were interrelated, it also affirmed the trial court's decision to reduce the fees requested by 15 percent to account for the factual and legal issues unique to the unfair competition claim. (Pellegrino, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 289-290.) Accordingly, rather than support Nielsen's efforts to recover all the attorney fees she incurred, Pellegrino supports reducing Nielsen's fees to account for the issues unique to the 2005 Agreement and prescriptive easement claims. D. The Trial Court Applied Erroneous Legal Standards in Performing Its Apportionment
Although we agree with the trial court's conclusion to apportion Nielsen's attorney fees among the various claims, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in how it apportioned Nielsen's fees. Specifically, the two reasons the trial court offered for apportioning $1,050, or just three hours of work, to the 2001 Agreement claims show the trial court misapplied the governing legal standards in performing its apportionment. (Horsford, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 393-396 [trial court abused discretion by applying erroneous legal standards to determine amount of attorney fees award]; see also Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1493 ["'"A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standards applicable to the issue at hand"'"].)
In explaining its apportionment decision, the trial court stated, "This issue [that is, the 2001 Agreement claims] I think could have been done in a half hour. [¶] . . . [¶] As soon as someone told me, hey, there's a statute that says covenants running with the land have to be recorded, that's the end of the case. [¶] . . . [¶] The amount of time you would have to address [the 2001 Agreement claims] compared to the rest of the case is almost zero. It's very minimal. That cause of action would have been out in a minute."
The trial court relied on Civil Code section 1468, which prohibits the enforcement of an unrecorded agreement affecting the use of real property against a subsequent owner as a covenant running with the land. (Civ. Code, § 1468, subd. (d).) This section would apply if the Hafens had sought to enforce the 2001 Agreement against Nielsen as a covenant running with the land. The Hafens, however, sought to enforce the agreement as an equitable servitude.
When an agreement affecting the use of real property cannot be enforced as a covenant running with the land, it nonetheless may be enforced as an equitable servitude if (1) the subsequent owner took title with knowledge of the covenant's terms, and (2) it would be inequitable to permit the subsequent owner to avoid the restrictions the covenant imposed. (Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co. (1940) 15 Cal.2d 375, 378; Oceanside Community Assn. v. Oceanside Land Co. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 166, 175-176.) Accordingly, the trial court's conclusion the 2001 Agreement could not be enforced as a covenant running with the land did not prevent the Hafens from enforcing it as an equitable servitude, and did not justify limiting Nielsen to three hours of attorney fees in opposing enforcement of the 2001 Agreement.
The trial court's statement of decision regarding the merits of the Hafens' claims acknowledged the distinction between a covenant running with the land and an equitable servitude, but the court's ruling on the attorney fees motion nonetheless assumed the Hafens sought to enforce the 2001 Agreement as a covenant running with the land.
The difficulty or complexity of the issues presented is a factor the court may consider in determining reasonable attorney fees. (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1095-1096 ["'The trial court makes its determination [regarding the amount of attorney fees to award] after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case'"].) The trial court, however, concluded the issues regarding the 2001 Agreement claims were simple based on a misunderstanding of the claims and the applicable law. That misunderstanding cannot justify the trial court's apportionment.
The trial court also rested its apportionment decision on the assumption that Nielsen's counsel would have spent the same amount of time on the issues pertaining to the 2005 Agreement and prescriptive easement claims even if the Hafens had not sought to enforce the 2001 Agreement. As the trial court explained, the parties "would have gone to trial anyway, [Nielsen] would have paid all those fees, she wouldn't have had to spend any money on [the 2001 Agreement claims] because this was unnecessary."
The logical extension of the trial court's rationale would negate the recovery of attorney fees for any interrelated claims. As explained above, however, joining interrelated claims should not dilute a prevailing party's right to recover contractual attorney fees. (Reynolds, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 129-130; Amtower, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1603-1604.) Attorney fees are recoverable for time spent on issues that are common to claims which allow the recovery of fees and those that do not. (Ibid.) Here, the trial court denied fees even though common issues existed on the Hafens' claims.
Based on the attorney fees provision in the 2001 Agreement, Nielsen may recover for the time her lawyer reasonably spent on (1) issues relating exclusively to the 2001 Agreement, and (2) issues common to the 2001 Agreement and either the 2005 Agreement or the prescriptive easement claim. Put another way, Nielsen is not entitled to recover for fees incurred on the 2005 Agreement or the prescriptive easement claim if the issues raised related solely to those claims.
The Hafens attempt to uphold the trial court's decision by arguing Nielsen may not recover attorney fees on any equitable claim because an equitable claim is not "on the contract" for purposes of Civil Code section 1717. According to the Hafens, their cause of action seeking declaratory relief regarding the 2001 Agreement is an equitable claim for which Nielsen cannot recover contractual attorney fees. It is well established, however, that "'[a]ctions for a declaration of rights based upon an agreement are "on the contract" within the meaning of Civil Code section 1717.' [Citation]" (Kachlon v. Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 316, 348 (Kachlon).)
Although the Hafens argue their declaratory relief claim regarding the 2001 Agreement is an equitable claim on which attorney fees may not be recovered, they do not argue their action for specific performance of the 2001 Agreement is an equitable claim. To the contrary, the Hafens expressly concede Nielsen may recover her attorney fees on the specific performance claim.
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To support their contention that fees may not be recovered on an equitable claim, the Hafens rely on Exxess Electronixx v. Heger Realty Corp. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 698 (Exxess). Exxess, however, is inapposite. There, the Court of Appeal concluded claims for equitable contribution and indemnity did "not fall within the scope of the attorneys' fee provision in the lease" at issue. (Id. at p. 715.) The Exxess court explained that the rights to equitable contribution and indemnity at issue "were created solely by operation of law and principles of equity, not by the parties' underlying obligation (i.e., the lease)," and those rights "did not arise from, nor were they contingent upon, the lease." (Ibid.)
Although the Hafens sought specific performance and declaratory relief to enforce the 2001 Agreement as an equitable servitude, these claims were not created solely by operation of law and principles of equity. Unlike the claims in Exxess, the rights the Hafens sought to enforce arose from and are contingent upon the 2001 Agreement. Indeed, the Hafens' claims sought to enforce the rights created by and described in the 2001 Agreement, not to use equitable principles to apportion liability among parties who are jointly liable for an injury or obligation. (Exxess, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 714-715.) "In determining whether an action is 'on the contract' under section 1717, the proper focus is not on the nature of the remedy, but on the basis of the cause of action." (Kachlon, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 347 [claims seeking equitable relief in the form of an injunction and a judgment quieting title support a contractual attorney fees award when the claims were "founded" on a contract].) The Hafens' 2001 Agreement claims were based on the 2001 Agreement and therefore were "on the contract" for purposes of section 1717.
As explained above, the apportionment of attorney fees among recoverable claims and claims on which fees may not be recovered is a matter for the trial court's discretion. (Amtower, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1604.) We reverse the trial court's apportionment in this case because the trial court misapplied the governing standards in making its apportionment. We remand the matter for the trial court to reapportion Nielsen's attorney fees using the appropriate legal standards. (See, e.g., Heppler v. J.M. Peters Co. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1297-1298 [reversing a trial court attorney fees award for failing to properly apportion fees and remanding the matter to the trial court to make a proper apportionment].) "'The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his or her court'" (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095) and should make the apportionment in the first instance.
III
DISPOSITION
We reverse the trial court's order awarding Nielsen $1,050 in attorney fees and remand the matter for the trial to reapportion Nielsen's attorney fees consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. Nielsen shall recover her costs on appeal.
ARONSON, J. WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J. IKOLA, J.