Opinion
Case No. 4:92-CV-110.
March 31, 2005
ORDER
In accordance with the Opinion of this date;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Expedited Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 1846) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will not exercise jurisdiction over the JMF Facility and Blocks 9 and 10 of Parnell.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the other relief sought by Defendants is DENIED.
OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Expedited Motion to Dismiss. The Court has received briefing from both Plaintiffs and Defendants and has heard oral argument on the Motion on March 25, 2005.BACKGROUND
This suit is a long-standing prisoner civil rights action concerning conditions of confinement at portions of the Michigan Department of Corrections' prison complex in Jackson, Michigan. In 1980, Everett Hadix and other prisoners incarcerated at the State Prison of Southern Michigan, Central Complex brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan concerning those conditions. On April 4, 1985, the parties to that suit reached a comprehensive agreement concerning the remedy of various conditions of confinement, including fire safety. This agreement was approved as a Consent Decree by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Judge John Feikens. The Eastern District retained jurisdiction thereafter for the purposes of enforcing the Decree.
Through these many years, the Jackson prison complex has changed. The physical changes are summarized in the Affidavit of Barbara Hladki. (Defs.' Ex. 1.) There is no real dispute about the nature of those physical plant changes, though the constitutionality of the conditions is certainly at dispute.
In 1992, this action was born when the Eastern District Court transferred jurisdiction of certain provisions of the 1985 Consent Decree concerning medical care of prisoners to this Court. The reason for the transfer was that this Court then had pending another suit ( United States v. Michigan) concerning medical care and, it was believed, the transfer would accomplish the adjudication of disputes as to medical care by a single tribunal, eliminating potential problems that might be caused by inconsistent adjudications. The Court has subsequently dismissed some of these transferred provisions based on the achievement of constitutionally sufficient conditions and compliance. Other provisions relating to medical care remain within the jurisdiction of the Court.
In the same year, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also remanded portions of the case concerning prisoner access to the courts to this Court, again for uniformity purposes. See Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1014 (6th Cir. 1992). These provisions were subsequently dismissed based on the achievement of constitutionally sufficient conditions and compliance.
The Expedited Motion to Dismiss arises in the context of one other remaining provision of the 1985 Consent Decree — Section VIII. Section VIII involved the implementation of a management study that recommended the division of the SPSM complex into a set of smaller facilities. The history of this provision was discussed in the May 2004 decision of the Sixth Circuit. The District Court's current jurisdiction is based on Section VIII of the Consent Decree along with subsequent associated agreements and orders, and particularly the adoption by the Court, in January 1993, of the Defendants' S-2 Alternative Plan.
The 1993 Order required completion of the entire project within seven years, more than six years ago. To assure timely completion, the Order authorized delays only for specified circumstances: acts of neglect of the architect or contractor or their employees or subcontractors, labor disputes, fires, transportation delays, adverse weather conditions, casualties and arbitration. The current incomplete status of the project is not due to an interference, action or inaction by the Court or the Plaintiffs. Rather, the Defendants, in contravention to the order approving their plan, simply failed to proceed, unilaterally adopting alternative plans, apparently anticipating that the Court would approve their alternatives at some future time.
Much of the implementation of the S-2 Alternative Plan was achieved under the jurisdiction of the Eastern District. However, the Eastern District transferred jurisdiction in 1999 and 2001 with respect to implementation of Section VIII for two facilities — Facility A known as "Egeler" and Facility D known as "Parnall." At the time of the transfer orders, there were disputes between the parties as to how much of the scope of the S-2 Alternative Plan for these two facilities had to be completed to achieve fire safety, in view of the medical conditions and disabilities of the residents. The Michigan Department of Corrections often assigns medically-impaired prisoners to these buildings given the proximity to the Duane Waters Hospital. Thus, findings concerning fire safety, including fire evacuation safety, must be made with a view of the exceptional limitations of the occupants. ( See Defs.' Exs. 2 4.)
More particularly, on March 18, 1999, Judge Feikens ordered: Pursuant to § 1404(a), and in accordance with my March 18, 1999 opinion and order, I also ORDER that, as to Facility A, the determination of the adequacy of defendants' proposed alternatives to the Break-Up Plan is transferred to Judge Enslen.
While these provisions are not "on their face" medical issues, the pertinent legal question in each case will be whether continued noncompliance (or in the case of Facility A substitution of the Defendants proposed alternatives) endangers the health of prison inmates.
(Defs.' Ex. 2 at 2.)
On November 15, 2000, Judge Feikens ordered:
[P]laintiffs' claim that the same fire safety issues concerning Facility A previously transferred to Judge Enslen on March 18, 1999, are also at issue with regard to Facility D.
Accordingly, as to Facility D, this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), hereby transfer to Judge Enslen in the Western District of Michigan . . . the fire safety issues which are the same as those concerning Facility A previously transferred to the Western District.
(Defs.' Ex. 4 at 2.)
A few more threads must be woven into this fabric to complete the warp and woof of the cloth. One of those threads is the history of the fire safety adjudication. Upon the transfer, the fire safety issues in dispute were adjudicated after hearing of May 6-8, 2002 by Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Injunction of October 29, 2002. Said Order required further briefing on the issue of a compartmentalization fire safety remedy (based on the S-2 Alternative Plan) as well as other fire safety remedies. Compartmentalization refers to physical modifications which divide the cell blocks into smaller units with closer access to egress doors. Its purpose is so that mobility impaired prisoners can timely escape in the event of fire. It also succeeds in limiting the effects of smoke and fire on occupants, especially those residing in separate compartments.
This hearing also included the medical issues in this suit.
Compartmentalization has also had a history as an anti-violence remedy. The compartmentalization previously ordered in 1990 in this suit was directed to that issue. See Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d 513, 519 (6th Cir. 2004).
Upon completing of the briefing, the Court ordered compartmentalization (or a functional equivalent) as the fire safety remedy on February 25, 2003, and required the submission of detailed drawings and site plans by December 31, 2003, which plans were subsequently approved. These fire safety issues were the subject of an appeal to the Sixth Circuit. Its decision on the appeal reversed and remanded for more specific findings as to fire safety since, among other reasons, the Court of Appeals could not conclude whether some of the remedies made by Defendants after the hearing were sufficient by themselves to remedy the unconstitutional conditions. See Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d 513, 529 (6th Cir. 2004).
In the course of remanding, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the exercise of jurisdiction over Blocks 1 and 2 based on their use as support facilities. Hadix, 367 F.3d at 518. These terms relate to the original definition of a Hadix facility in the Consent Decree, which provided that: "The Hadix facilities were originally defined as `all areas within walls of the State Prison of Southern Michigan at the time this cause commenced [meaning the "Central Complex"] and all areas which will supply support services under the provisions of the Consent Judgment.'" Hadix, 367 F.3d at 517 (quoting Order Accepting Consent Judgment, May 13, 1985.)
The Sixth Circuit also provided an alternative rationale for this holding in a footnote:
We also note that in order for a district court to have jurisdiction over Blocks 1 and 2, there must be a finding of on-going constitutional violations taking place there. Therefore, Defendants' concerns would have had more substance prior to the enactment of PLRA in 1996, when the jurisdiction was based solely on the Consent Decree. Since the PLRA requires a continuing constitutional violation for the retention of jurisdiction, even were we to find that the district court abused its discretion in exercising jurisdiction over those facilities by misconstruing the Consent Decree, Plaintiffs could immediately file a new lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of prison conditions in Blocks 1 and 2. We would like to avoid that result in the interest of judicial efficiency.Hadix, 367 F.3d at 518 n. 7.
The later recognition was a bow to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (" PLRA"), Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996), which amended 18 U.S.C. § 3626. Whereas some prior public interest litigation was driven by the contractual nature of consent decrees, the enactment of the PLRA removed those cases, as far as they concerned prison conditions, from the rails of contract in large part and placed them on a statutory path which is aimed at the remedying of constitutional violations through the least intrusive means possible. With this said, the apparently harsh terms of the PLRA have been interpreted by the Sixth Circuit to preserve the Act's constitutionality. See, e.g., Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925, 937 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that PLRA did not displace the District Court's inherent equitable powers); Hadix v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 662, 672 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that Plaintiffs must be given an opportunity to present evidence as to any termination of PLRA jurisdiction).
Defendants still rely upon the contractual nature of the Consent Decree as a basis for not extending jurisdiction beyond its terms. ( See Expedited Mot. to Dismiss at 11.)
Within this context, the present Expedited Motion to Dismiss was filed on February 28, 2005 as the Court was preparing for the remand evidentiary hearing as to the fire safety remedy. The dispute arose in the context of discovery concerning certain prison facilities. The discovery was allowed, for the most part, while the parties presented to the Court the underlying dispute.
It was indicated at oral argument that Defendants had not permitted Plaintiffs' fire safety expert to inspect certain facilities.
Some of the discovery included Blocks 9 and 10 of the Parnell Facility, not on the theory that they were Hadix facilities, but on the theory that the information sought (the functioning of similar fire safety systems) illustrated the effectiveness of the fire safety systems in true Hadix facilities.
Oral argument was heard on the Motion on March 25, 2005. At that time, it was not disputed by Plaintiffs that the fire safety issues before the Court did not include cell blocks at the JMF Facility and Blocks 9 and 10 of the Parnell Facility. ( See Pls.' Resp. Br. at 5 n. 5.) The JMF facility (Facility B in the nomenclature of the S-2 Alternative Plan) had been dismissed by the Eastern District based on a finding that the Facility B plan had been fully implemented.
While the Plaintiffs stated that they will not seek fire safety remedies for Blocks 9 and 10, the law of the case is unambiguous that these facilities come under the jurisdiction of the Court. In Judge Feiken's January 1993 Order granting in part the Defendants motion to modify the initial version of the order adopting the S-2 Alternative Plan, the Court ordered as follows:
Defendants' statement that the Court has expanded the scope of the Consent Decree by extending this Court's jurisdiction over Blocks 9 and 10 is denied. The Court notes that the Consent Decree distinguishes between "SPSM-CC" which refers to the Central Complex and related facilities as defined in the "Order Accepting Consent Judgment," dated April 4, 1985, and "SPSM," which refers to the entire State Prison of Southern Michigan. The entire substantive record relating to Section VIII of the Consent Decree, including each of the studies and submissions of Defendants and their agents, has been consistent with this distinction. The Court also notes that the relief granted in the November 27, 1992 Order relating to Blocks 7, 8, 9, and 10 was based on the achievement through operational means of the separation and decentralization that was otherwise to be achieved through architectural means — at a substantial savings.
(Jan. 12, 1993 Order at 1-2.)
Oral argument focused on other facilities including the Michigan State Industries ("MSI") Laundry (which has traditionally been classified as part of Facility E). The argument is especially keen because the MSI Laundry experienced a significant fire on September 1, 2003. (Decl. of Tracy Botimer at ¶¶ 6-8.) Defense counsel urged that this was not a Hadix facility because it was not transferred and had been terminated by Order of June 29, 2001 of Judge Feikens. ( See Defs.' Ex. 5.) The argument also focused on the Jackson complex power plant and the MSI factory. As to the latter, it was argued that the transfer orders cannot be read to transfer this issue since MSI factory prisoners are medically cleared to work in the factory and are not the medically infirm prisoners which motivated the transfer orders (even though some Block 8 prisoners work in the factory). It appears that prisoners also work in the MSI Laundry (Botimer Decl. at ¶ 8), and also the power plant. Defense counsel did concede, however, that the prisoner dining halls serving Egeler and Parnall prisoners were Hadix facilities (because they provided support facilities to transferred cell blocks).
This is distinct from the Block 8 laundry facility which is attached to Block 8 and which clearly is a Hadix facility.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
This battle is pitched as a dispute concerning the District Court's subject matter jurisdiction to enforce an existing decree. As a general proposition, until termination, a district court retains jurisdiction to enforce a consent decree. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa Chippewa Indians v. Dir., Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 141 F.3d 635, 641 (6th Cir. 1998); Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 23 F.3d 1013, 1018 (6th Cir. 1994); Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983). Nevertheless, consent decrees are by their nature contractual such that the enforcement jurisdiction does not extend beyond the four corners of the contract. See United States v. State of Mich., 940 F.2d 143, 155 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 574 (1984) and United States v. Armour Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971)).
In this case, the contract is a curious one because it derives not only from the original Consent Decree entered in 1985, but also the transfer orders issued by the Eastern District. This fact, together with the subsequent adoption of the S-2 Break-Up Plan and the PLRA, has caused real difficulties in interpreting jurisdiction. However, with that said, the Court is confident that the present Motion should be denied with the exception of the uncontested arguments. As to the uncontested arguments, there is sparse support for the exercise of jurisdiction in those areas. In any event, the exercise of jurisdiction under the PLRA cannot continue as to those matters in the absence of showing of particular ongoing constitutional violations (which will not be shown since Plaintiffs agree with the arguments). As such, the Court will not take enforcement action concerning these facilities, which are deemed terminated as to fire safety. The Court will also not entertain evidence or argument as to those facilities concerning fire safety, except to the extent that the evidence or argument is relevant to another Hadix facility.
However, as to the other facilities, there are strong reasons for denying Defendants' Motion. First of all, both of the parties have adopted an understanding of the Consent Decree, consistent with prior rulings of the Sixth Circuit, that the Decree includes not only Facilities A and D, but also facilities providing support services to prisoners in those facilities. This is a rational understanding of the transfer orders, which explicitly referenced those facilities. It is also rational to assume that "support facilities" were included in the transfer orders because of the manner and custom of describing the facilities in the court documents. Indeed, the terms of the S-2 Break-Up Plan documents describe these areas as prisoner service areas and include fire safety requirements as to these areas, indicating an intent to make them subject to the transfer. (Pls.' Ex. 5.)
The question raised by Defendants' arguments is whether there was an implicit limitation of the transfer orders which excluded work facilities (on the premise that working prisoners are healthy and, therefore, not entitled to the special medical considerations which underlie the transfer orders). Although this is a fair question, the wording of the transfer orders contains no such limitation. These issues are very pertinent to remedy, but not to the extent of the transfer orders themselves. Moreover, as explained below, it may be argued to good effect that the transfer orders were even broader than the interpretation adopted as part of the prior rulings of the Sixth Circuit. Thus, the Court interprets its jurisdiction as extended to the disputed facilities and rejects any notion of an implicit limitation on the transfer orders.
There is a second analysis which supports the Court's finding. The pertinent language of the transfer orders is the clause which transfers "the determination of the adequacy of defendants' proposed alternatives to the Break-Up Plan." The Break-Up Plan was adopted as part of a June 1990 stipulation of the parties, along with a subsequent January 1993 Order by Judge Feikens, adopting the S-2 Break-Up Plan. "This agreement acknowledged the importance of decentralization of the SPSM-CC facility, and it provided for the creation of the `SPSM Decentralization Team' (`SDT'), which was to oversee the plans for renovation. . . . The result of this effort was a break-up plan mandating the creation of four new correctional facilities and an administration facility (Facilities A through E) at the SPSM-CC." Hadix v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 662, 665 (6th Cir. 2000). The terms "alternatives to the Break-Up Plan" refer to the fact that the Department of Corrections had proposed and Defendants had agreed to drop "unitization" of Blocks 7, 8, 9, and 10 of Facility D — the Parnall facility. These alternatives represented significant changes to the Plan because of their attendant effects on fire safety. In the January 1993 Order adopting the alternate plan, the Eastern District Court ordered: "Defendants are not required to further subdivide Blocks 7, 8, 9, and 10, provided that Defendants include, with each subsequent plan element relating to these housing units, appropriate measure to assure the "integrated system designed to achieve fire safety" as required by the Degree." (Order, at 18.) The alternatives to unitization meant that the various affected facilities were not receiving the benefit of a compartmentalized facility and, thus, were at a greater danger due to fire, and that because of this greater danger, additional operational measures were to be proposed and consistently implemented.
The transfer of "alternatives to the Break-Up Plan" refers to the approved Plans for Facility A and Facility D, which had not yet been found by the Eastern District Court to have been implemented. The Defendants were obligated and continue to be obligated to complete implementation of these two plans, either by fully implementing the approved versions, or by obtaining modifications of the approved plans based on alternative approaches that achieve constitutional conditions. These modifications can be achieved by order of the Court or by consensus of the SDT Committee as provided in a stipulation of the parties. This analysis, therefore, supports the exercise of jurisdiction as to the disputed facilities.
Finally, there is a third and important reason for exercising jurisdiction. This is the reason given by the Sixth Circuit in its footnote 7 in the fire safety remand. Even if this Court is mistaken that the exercise of jurisdiction is proper under the four corners of the Decree, the Court would be permitted to modify the Decree or to consolidate this case with a new action for the purpose of remedying any unconstitutional violations proven as to the nearby support facilities. See also Groseclose v. Dutton, 829 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir. 1987) (setting forth policy that individuals affected by a consent decree should have claims heard as part of the decree suit in order to avoid inconsistent adjudications). These concerns are live and real in this suit, especially when some of the support facilities have recently experienced serious fire incidents.
While saying so, the Court does not intend to tip its hand that more enforcement is in the offing. Rather, the Court will review the conditions at all of these facilities to determine the present conditions and whether any unconstitutional dangers pertaining to fire safety persist and need remedy. The PLRA will be given its due interpretation and those facilities which are proven safe will be readily terminated. Only the unconstitutionally dangerous facilities will be subject to further jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the Court's rulings of this date, an Order shall enter denying Defendants' Expedited Motion to Terminate except as to those facilities which the parties agree are not subject to jurisdiction.