Opinion
21A-IF-2846
06-01-2022
Charles C. Hadden, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff,
Attorney for Appellant J. F. Beatty Landman Beatty, Lawyers Indianapolis, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana George P. Sherman Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court The Honorable P. Chadwick Hill, Magistate Trial Court Cause No. 29D05-2106-IF-3393
Attorney for Appellant
J. F. Beatty Landman Beatty, Lawyers Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee
Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
George P. Sherman Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ROBB, JUDGE
Case Summary and Issues
[¶1] Charles Hadden was issued a traffic citation for speeding in a worksite. Hadden moved to dismiss the citation, but the trial court denied his motion. Following a bench trial, the trial court issued an infraction judgment order against Hadden for speeding in a worksite while workers were not present. Hadden filed a motion to correct error which was denied by the trial court. Hadden now appeals, raising two issues for our review which we restate as: (1) whether Hadden's traffic citation was enforceable as a matter of law; and (2) whether the deputy prosecutor's failure to file an appearance constituted fundamental error. Concluding that Hadden's traffic citation was enforceable and that Hadden was not prejudiced by the deputy prosecutor's failure to file an appearance, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On June 7, 2021, Officer Patrick Clennon of the Hamilton County Sheriff's Department was traveling south through a construction zone on State Road 37. In the area where Officer Clennon was driving there were signs which stated, "Speed limit 45 when flashing[, ]" and the lights on the signs were flashing. Transcript, Volume 2 at 11. While driving, Officer Clennon was passed by a truck going fifty miles per hour. The truck then made a right-hand turn without using a turn signal, so Officer Clennon initiated a traffic stop. The driver of the truck was Hadden. Officer Clennon issued a traffic citation to Hadden for speeding in a worksite while workers were not present pursuant to Indiana Code section 9-21-5-11(c)(2). Officer Clennon testified that workers were present in the area; however, he had decided "to cut [Hadden] a break because there weren't workers present exactly where he passed [him]." Id. at 15.
[¶3] At Hadden's bench trial, Hadden made an oral motion to dismiss which the trial court denied. Following a hearing, the trial court entered judgment against Hadden, concluding that Hadden committed the offense of "Workzone Speeding - Workers Not Present" and imposed a fine of $635.50. Appealed Order at 1. No attorney from the Hamilton County Prosecutor's Office entered an appearance in the case. Subsequently, Hadden filed a motion to correct error which was denied. Hadden now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[¶4] The trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion to dismiss or motion to correct error, and we reverse the trial court's decision only for an abuse of discretion. Alvarez v. State, 147 N.E.3d 374, 377 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020), trans. denied; State v. Durrett, 923 N.E.2d 449, 453 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law. Alvarez, 147 N.E.3d at 377. However, where the issues raised in a motion are questions of law, such as the interpretation of a statute, the standard of review is de novo. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Watson, 70 N.E.3d 380, 384 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017).
II. Traffic Citation
[¶5] Hadden was issued a traffic citation for speeding in a worksite while workers were not present. However, he argues that "Fishers' Ordinance fails to adhere to the requirements for enforcement of [temporary speed limits under] Indiana's Work Zone Act when workers are not present." Appellant's Brief at 10.
[¶6] Pursuant to Indiana Code section 9-21-5-11(a), a local authority may establish temporary maximum speed limits in its jurisdiction and in the vicinity of a worksite. However, a worksite speed limit may be enforced only if:
(1) workers are present in the immediate vicinity of the worksite; or
(2) if workers are not present in the immediate vicinity of the worksite, the establishing authority determines that the safety of the traveling public requires enforcement of the worksite speed limit.Ind. Code § 9-21-5-11(c).
[¶7] Fishers Resolution No. R050420H instituted a worksite speed limit in the area Hadden was driving when he was issued his citation and states, in relevant part:
Hadden turned onto 126th Street prior to the traffic stop. See Tr., Vol. 2 at 12. Officer Clennon testified that there were workers around 146th Street, 135th Street and potentially one near 131st Street. See id. The City of Fishers ("Fishers") implemented the worksite speed limit from the I-69 ramp 2, 300 feet south of 126th Street to approximately 2, 300 feet north of 146th Street.
The temporary maximum speed limit [of 45 mph] is to be enforced due to workers being present in the immediate vicinity of the worksite and for the safety of the traveling public[.]
A Resolution of the City of Fishers Board of Public Words & Safety Amending the City of Fishers' Traffic Schedule (SR 37) (May 4, 2020), https://www.fishers.in.us/DocumentCenter/View/22401/Signed-Adoption---Request-to-approve-Resolution-for-Speed-Limit-Reduction-for-SR-37---R050420H?bidId= (last visited May 19, 2022), [https://perma.cc/H78G-GY5M].
[¶8] Ordinances are treated as if they stand on the same footing as an act of the legislature; therefore, the rules of statutory construction apply equally to ordinances. Lutz v. City of Indianapolis, 820 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005). The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the drafters, and the language of the statute (or ordinance) is the best evidence of the drafters' intent. City of Indianapolis v. Campbell, 792 N.E.2d 620, 624 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003). All words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise indicated. Id.
[¶9] Hadden argues that the ordinance "is silent as to enforcing the temporary maximum speed limit when workers are not present." Appellant's Br. at 9. However, Indiana Code section 9-21-5-11(c)(2) does not state that an establishing authority must state that a temporary speed limit is enforceable when workers are not present. Instead, it states "if workers are not present[, ]" the temporary speed limit is enforceable when "the establishing authority determines that the safety of the traveling public requires enforcement[.]" Ind. Code § 9-21-5-11(c)(2) (emphasis added). The Fishers ordinance states that the temporary speed limit is to be enforced "due to workers being present . . . and for the safety of the traveling public." Fishers Resolution No. R050420H (emphasis added). Thus, the ordinance satisfies Indiana Code section 9-21-5-11(c)(2). Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Hadden's motion to dismiss or motion to correct error because the traffic citation was enforceable as a matter of law.
III. Attorney Appearance
[¶10] Hadden argues that he was prejudiced by the State's attorney's failure to file an appearance. "At the time an action is commenced, the attorney representing the party initiating the proceeding . . . shall file with the clerk of the court an appearance[.]" Ind. Trial Rule 3.1(A). Further, Hamilton County Courts Local Trial Rule 201.30 states, "All attorneys and pro se litigants shall file appearances complying with Trial Rule 3.1 and Trial Rule 86."
Indiana Code section 34-28-5-1(c)(1) states that actions to enforce an ordinance shall be conducted in accordance with the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure.
[¶11] Here, Hadden failed to raise an objection regarding the deputy prosecutor's failure to file an appearance. As a general rule, the failure to object at trial results in a waiver of the issue on appeal. Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind. 2002). Hadden argues the fact that no appearance had been filed did not become apparent to him until after trial. However, wavier notwithstanding, Hadden fails to show that the deputy prosecutor's failure to file an appearance prejudiced him. Errors and defects in the proceedings that do not affect the substantial rights of the parties are deemed harmless. Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 228 (Ind. 2009); see T.R. 61 ("The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.").
[¶12] Hadden contends that he had "negotiated with one deputy prosecutor prior to trial (during which time [he] was led to believe the matter had been resolved), then was surprised at trial by the participation of another deputy prosecutor[.]" Appellant's Br. at 12. However, Hadden never raised this as an issue to the trial court and although a resolution to the matter prior to trial would have potentially benefitted Hadden, it does not equate to a showing of prejudice during the trial due to the deputy prosecutor's failure to file an appearance. Had the deputy prosecutor filed an appearance the morning of trial, Hadden would have been in the same position regarding his alleged negotiations. Therefore, we conclude Hadden was not prejudiced and there was no reversible error.
Conclusion
[¶13] We conclude that Hadden's traffic citation was enforceable and that he was not prejudiced by the deputy prosecutor's failure to file an appearance. Accordingly, we affirm.
[¶14] Affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.