Opinion
3:22-cv-425-MMH-PDB
05-16-2022
FRANKLIN R. GWYN, JR., Plaintiff, v. BRIAN S. KRAMER, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
MARCIA MORALES HOWARD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Franklin R. Gwyn, Jr., a detainee at the Baker County Detention Center in Macclenny, Florida, initiated this action on April 18, 2022, by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Complaint; Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, he requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). In the Complaint, Gwyn names the following individuals as Defendants: (1) Brian S. Kramer, state attorney, Eighth Circuit; and (2) Lorelie P. Brannan, an assistant state attorney, Eighth Circuit. He contends he did not proceed to a trial within 180 days of the State filing charges against him. Complaint at 4. Gwyn also alleges that although he entered into a plea agreement with the State, the trial judge 1 did not accept the agreement and the State did not object to the trial judge's rejection of the agreement. Id. He contends the Defendants violated his right to a speedy trial, as well as his rights under the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. at 3. As relief, he requests the Court discharge him. Id. at 5.
For all pleadings and documents filed in this case, the Court cites to the document and page numbers as assigned by the Court's Electronic Case Filing System.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires the Court to dismiss this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless, ” id. at 327, or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims ‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district judges are 2 all too familiar.'” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” the language of the Prison Litigation Reform Act mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that amount to “naked assertions” will not suffice. Id. (quotations, alteration, and citation omitted). Moreover, a complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotations and citations omitted).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) 3 (citations omitted). Moreover, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show “an affirmative causal connection between the official's acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007). More than conclusory and vague allegations are required to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See L.S.T., Inc., v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 684 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 55657 (11th Cir. 1984). As such, “‘conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts, or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.'” Rehberger v. Henry Cnty., Ga., 577 Fed.Appx. 937, 938 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted). In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.
To the extent Gwyn requests that the Court intervene in his pending state court criminal case, such a request is barred by the abstention doctrine and the principles of exhaustion and comity. Absent some exceptional circumstances meriting equitable relief, a federal court should refrain from 4 interfering with a pending state criminal proceeding. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 245 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Younger and its progeny reflect the longstanding national public policy, based on principles of comity and federalism, of allowing state courts to try cases already pending in state court free from federal court interference.”) (citation omitted); Chambersel v. Florida, 816 Fed.Appx. 424, 426 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). “In Younger, the Supreme Court set out three exceptions to the abstention doctrine: (1) there is evidence of state proceedings motivated by bad faith, (2) irreparable injury would occur, or (3) there is no adequate alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can be raised.” Hughes v. Attorney Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1263 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 45). Gwyn has not shown that any of these three exceptions to the abstention doctrine apply in his case.
Franklin R. Gwyn, Jr. v. State of Florida, 1D22-1207 (Fla. 1st DCA).
Moreover, Gwyn's attempt to use a § 1983 action to challenge an ongoing criminal proceeding is not permitted. “[A] prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or duration of his confinement.'” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)). In his Complaint, Gwyn challenges the very fact of his confinement by contesting the state court's application of Florida's speedy trial rule. See 5 generally Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191. Accordingly, his claim is more appropriately brought in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2006). (“[I]f the relief sought by the inmate would either invalidate his conviction or sentence or change the nature or duration of his sentence, the inmate's claim must be raised in a § 2254 habeas petition, not a § 1983 civil rights action.”). In light of the foregoing, this case is due to be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. This case is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without prejudice, terminating any pending motions, and closing the case.
DONE AND ORDERED. 6