Opinion
No. CV 08-5007307
March 18, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#112)
Facts and Procedural History
The plaintiff, Eneida Guzman, filed a single-count complaint against the defendant, Exit Eighty Eight Hotel, LLC, on March 25, 2008. The defendant owns the Mystic Marriott Hotel and the Red Door Spa, which is located within the hotel. The hotel and spa are located in Groton, Connecticut. The plaintiff was an employee of the Red Door Spa on March 2, 2006, when she alleges that, as she was exiting the spa at approximately 6:15 p.m., she fell on an accumulation of snow and ice. The plaintiff alleges negligence on the part of the defendant for failing to timely and properly remove the snow and ice that caused her to fall and sustain injuries.
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and memorandum in support on October 1, 2009. The plaintiff filed its memorandum in opposition to summary judgment on November 9, 2009. The parties appeared for oral argument at short calendar on February 7, 2011.
Discussion
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sherman v. Ronco, 294 Conn. 548, 553-54, 985 A.2d 1042 (2010). "[T]he issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appropriate matter for summary judgment because the question is one of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn.App. 287, 290, 818 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 904, 823 A.2d 1221 (2003). "The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neuhaus v. Decholnoky, 280 Conn. 190, 217, 905 A.2d 1135 (2006).
The defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff's fall occurred during an ongoing storm and as a result, it had no duty to remove snow and ice from its premises. Further, the defendant argues that there were no unusual circumstances that would have required the defendant to remove snow and ice from its premises during an ongoing storm.
The plaintiff counters that there exist genuine issues of material fact as to the defendant's liability. First, the plaintiff argues that it was not snowing as she exited the Red Door Spa. Additionally, she contends that because there were no other appreciable means of egress for its employees, there is a material issue of fact as to whether there were unusual circumstances so as to require the defendant to remove the snow and ice from the area adjacent to the spa's entrance.
In Kraus v. Newton, 211 Conn. 191, 198, 558 A.2d 240 (1989), the Supreme Court affirmed a verdict in favor of the defendant homeowner in an action brought against it by a meter reader, who fell and was injured while descending the defendant's stairs that were covered with ice. The court reasoned: "[I]n the absence of unusual circumstances, a property owner, in fulfilling the duty owed to invitees upon his property to exercise reasonable diligence in removing dangerous accumulations of snow and ice, may await the end of a storm and a reasonable time thereafter before removing ice and snow from outside walks and steps. To require a landlord or other inviter to keep walks and steps clear of dangerous accumulations of ice, sleet or snow or to spread sand or ashes while a storm continues is inexpedient and impractical. Our decision, however, does not foreclose submission to the jury, on a proper evidentiary foundation, of the factual determinations of whether a storm has ended or whether a plaintiff's injury has resulted from new ice or old ice when the effects of separate storms begin to converge." Id., 197-98.
In Cooks v. O'Brien Properties, Inc., 48 Conn.App. 339, 340, 710 A.2d 788 (1998), the Appellate Court affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff tenant, who sought damages against her landlord after she fell on a flight of apartment steps, covered by snow and ice, and sustained injuries. In affirming the jury's verdict, the court noted that: "[T]he trial court properly instructed the jury on the law of Kraus including the unusual circumstances exception that would permit the jury to consider the evidence presented with respect to the changeover in precipitation and the availability of alternative means of egress from the defendant's property in determining whether such unusual circumstances existed on the day of the plaintiff's accident so as to impose on the defendant the duty to remove the snow and ice from the steps . . ." (Emphasis added.) Id., 346-47.
Subsequently, in Cafarelli v. First National Supermarkets, Inc., 46 Conn.Sup. 179, 185-88, 741 A.2d 1010 [ 25 Conn. L. Rptr. 207] (1999), a decision of the Superior Court clarified the Appellate Court's decision in Cooks v. O'Brien Properties, supra, 48 Conn.App. 346-47. The court stated: "[T]he jury could consider the lack of availability of alternative means of egress in this situation where there had been a changeover in precipitation. As in statutory construction, this court must interpret the actual wording of the Cooks decision by its actual language. The word is `and' and not `or' . . . [Therefore] whether there is an alternative means of entrance and egress alone cannot be an unusual circumstance under the ruling in Kraus. If the snow storm is continuous, the duty to clear the snow, regardless of the number of entrances and exits, has not arisen. If the snow had stopped, not just lightened up, then the issue of whether there was an alternative means of ingress and egress might become relevant as to whether the defendants would have a reasonable time after the snow stopped to get rid of the snow or clear the area. The question then arises as to what is a reasonable time and that would depend, perhaps, on whether there are one or more entrances/exits. Presumably, if there were more than one, the defendants would need more time to clean the snow and ice therefrom than if there were only one entrance and exit . . . Interpreting Kraus by its plain language, the only time that the issue of alternative means of ingress and egress arises is when it is clear that the snow has stopped." (Emphasis added.) Id., 185-87. In light of this principle, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because there was no dispute that the storm was continuing when the plaintiff was injured. See id., 188.
In the present case, the court has been presented with the following evidence. The defendant provides the court with the May 13, 2008 affidavit of John Bagioni, a meteorologist who reviewed data, including climatic summaries, from the National Weather Service about the weather conditions existing in the Groton, Connecticut area on March 2, 2006, the date of the plaintiff's fall. Bagioni attached a report to his affidavit, which states that "[a] significant winter storm occurred across the entire Groton, CT area on March 2, 2006. Snow developed in the Groton area shortly before 10 AM. The snow fell steadily from the onset through 7 PM. The snow may have briefly stopped from approximately 7:30 PM to about 8:30 PM before redeveloping around 8:30 PM and continuing until about 9:30 PM. No snowfall was reported in the Groton area after 10 PM. Reports indicate that 4.5 to 5.1 inches of snow fell in Groton, CT during this event. Temperatures were at or below freezing during this entire snow event and significant melting of the falling snow did not occur." The report goes on to state that specifically, at approximately 6:45 p.m. in Groton, there was "light to moderate snow," the temperature was twenty-seven to thirty degrees, and the snow depth was approximately three and a half inches. The report concludes by stating: "Steady snow was falling at the time of the incident, approximately 6:45 PM, and approximately 3.5 inches had accumulated by 6:45 PM."
The plaintiff submits her own affidavit, dated October 22, 2009. She attests: "Employees of the Red Door Spa are required to park in a designated area of the Mystic Marriott parking lot and employees use only the main entrance to the Red Door Spa, which is a separate entrance from that of the main hotel . . . On March 2, 2006, I arrived at work at 11:00 a.m. and ended my shift at approximately 6:15 p.m. . . . During my shift, I was able to observe the conditions outside as there were large windows on the Red Door Spa exterior wall and my station approximately faced those windows . . . I observed little to no snow falling after 4:00 p.m. and it was not snowing when I exited the Red Door Spa main entrance to go back to my vehicle following my shift . . . I slipped and fell approximately 7 feet from the Red Door Spa entrance."
In light of this evidence, the court finds that the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment. There exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the snow had ceased falling at approximately 6:15 p.m., when the plaintiff exited the Red Door Spa. While the meteorologist's report indicates that, at approximately 6:45 p.m. in Groton, there was "light to moderate snow," and that "[s]teady snow was falling at the time of the incident, approximately 6:45 PM, and approximately 3.5 inches had accumulated by 6:45 PM," the plaintiff attests that she "observed little to no snow falling after 4:00 p.m. and it was not snowing when I exited the Red Door Spa main entrance to go back to my vehicle . . ." There further are issues of fact as to whether unusual circumstances existed given the employer's restriction of the route of egress.
Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby denied.