Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-2316 (JBS)
July 13, 2000
Domingo Guzman, Petitioner Pro Se.
Robert J. Cleary, United States Attorney, By: Dorothy Donnelly, Assistant United States Attorney.
One John F. Gerry Plaza, for Respondent.
OPINION
This matter is before the court on application of petitioner, Domingo Guzman, for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner claims that the Bureau of Prisons (Bureau or BOP) discriminated against him on the basis of his alien status by depriving him of the same opportunity for sentence reduction as is made available to U.S. citizens. Specifically, Petitioner contends that the BOP abused its discretion in the operation of the drug treatment program created pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), which provides for early release of inmates upon successful completion of the program and BOP approval, by disqualifying prisoners with Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) detainers from the program's opportunity for sentence reduction. As relief, Petitioner requests an immediate release. This Court will first determine whether Petitioner has succeeded in exhausting his available administrative remedies, a prerequisite to granting habeas relief pursuant to § 2241. For reasons discussed below, the Court will deem the petition exhausted.
Reaching the merits, the principal issue is whether excluding prisoners with detainers from successful completion of the drug treatment program is a permissible construction of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e). The next issue is whether the BOP's exclusion of Petitioner, based upon his detainer, from the drug treatment program is a violation of equal protection or whether it is a categorization for which there is a rational basis. For reasons explained below, the Court finds that Petitioner's claims lack merit and his petition for habeas relief will be denied in its entirety upon the merits.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Petitioner is a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic. (Resp't's Br. at 1.) He came to the United States in 1982 and resided in New York City, New York until 1990, when he and his common-law wife moved to Houston, Texas. (Resp't's Ex. 2 at 12.)
Three years following his arrival in Houston, on January 6, 1993, Petitioner was named as a defendant in a two count indictment filed in the Houston Division of the Southern District of Texas. (Resp't's Ex.2 at 3.) Counts one and two charged Petitioner with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute in excess of 5 kilograms of cocaine, contrary to 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 846, and aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine, contrary to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Id.) Petitioner appeared with counsel before United States Magistrate Judge Calvin Botley on January 15, 1993 and entered a plea of not guilty to both counts. (Id.) A jury trial began shortly thereafter on March 9, 1993 before United States District Judge David Hittner. (Id.) The trial concluded on March 16, 1993 with Petitioner being found guilty on both counts of his indictment, (Id.) On May 24, 1993, Petitioner was sentenced to 135 months imprisonment with a five year term of supervised release to follow and a $100 fine. (Id.)
Shortly thereafter, Petitioner appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on the grounds that the prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence. (Pet. at 2.) On October 12, 1994, the Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner's appeal and affirmed the District Court's conviction. (Id.)
On August 6, 1993, the Immigration and Naturalization Service lodged a detainer against Petitioner, requesting that upon release from Bureau of Prisons custody, he be transferred to the Federal Correctional Institution, Oakdale, Louisiana, for INS processing.
II. Discussion
A. Challenges to Conditions of Imprisonment Pursuant to § 2241
Petitioner claims that the BOP abused its discretion in the operation of the drug treatment program created pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), which provides for early release of inmates upon successful completion of the program and BOP approval, by disqualifying prisoners with detainers from sentence reduction eligibility. Petitioner further contends that such disqualification of inmates with detainers is a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection. (Pet. at 4.)
It is well-settled that claims attacking Petitioner's sentence are properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 while claims attacking the imposition of a sentence are properly brought under § 2255. United States v. Ferri, 686 F.2d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211 (1983). A petition brought under § 2241 is appropriate where Petitioner challenges the effect of events "subsequent to his sentence." Gomori v. Arnold, 533 F.2d 871, 874 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 851 (1976). Thus, where a prisoner is challenging the programs and opportunities afforded to him while confined, § 2241 is the appropriate means of challenging the action. See Roussous v. Menifee, 122 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 1997) (court rejected Petitioner's claim under § 2241, finding that he was ineligible for a reduction in his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) because the Bureau of Prisons determined that his conviction was a Crime of Violence.)
B. Exhaustion Requirement Under § 2241
A threshold question in this case is whether Guzman has failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies with respect to the following: (1) his claim that the BOP abused its discretion when it enacted regulation 28 C.F.R. § 550.58, disqualifying aliens with detainers from successful completion of the drug-treatment program created via 18 U.S.C. § 3621 and the opportunity for early release upon completion (Resp't's Br. at 18); and (2) his claim that the BOP's policy excluding prisoners with detainers from community-based programs is a violation of Petitioner's constitutional right to equal protection (id.)
A federal prisoner ordinarily may not seek habeas relief until he has exhausted all available administrative remedies. 682 F.2d 1050, 1052;Arias v. United States Parole Commission, 648 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1981);United States ex rel. Sanders v. Arnold, 535 F.2d 848, 850 (3d Cir. 1976); Soyka v. Aldredge, 481 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1973). The Third Circuit has adhered to the exhaustion doctrine for several reasons: (1) judicial review may be facilitated by allowing the appropriate agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise, (2) judicial time may be conserved because the agency might grant the relief sought, and (3) administrative autonomy requires that an agency be given an opportunity to correct its own errors. Bradshaw v. Carlton, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting United States ex rel. Marrero v. Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary, 483 F.2d 656, 659 (3d Cir. 1973)).
The exhaustion doctrine will not be applied, however, if administrative exhaustion, "would be futile, if the actions of the agency clearly and unambiguously violate statutory or constitutional rights, or if the administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable harm." Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Goldberg v. Beeler, 82 F. Supp.2d 302 (D.N.J. 1999) (district court has discretion to decide whether to excuse the failure to exhaust remedies and to reach the merits, or to require a Petitioner to perfect the exhaustion of administrative remedies before proceeding in court). Thus, when none of the above mentioned basic goals of the doctrine would be served, the exhaustion doctrine is not applied. See Marrero, 483 F.2d at 659.
In the present case, Petitioner does not claim that he has exhausted the administrative remedies made available to him through the Bureau of Prisons. Rather, Petitioner claims that he has presented the issue to the unit manager upon his six month program review and that further efforts would be futile because it is BOP policy that inmates with detainers are ineligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e). (Pet'r's Traverse at 1, 2.) Conversely, the State raises the exhaustion doctrine as a defense, claiming that Petitioner's motion for habeas relief should be dismissed until the appropriate administrative agencies have been given the opportunity to grant or deny him relief. (Resp't's Br. at 19.)
After review of the record, it is the finding of this Court that ordering Petitioner to pursue administrative remedies would be futile and that Petitioner's failure to exhaust such remedies does not preclude this Court from ruling on the merits of his claim for habeas relief. Petitioner's claim that the Bureau of Prison's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e), excluding aliens with detainers from successful completion of the drug treatment program, is a claim of abuse of discretion that need not be exhausted. According to the Third Circuit inMarrero, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required when the issue involves only statutory construction because there is no need for the administrative agency to develop a factual record or apply its expertise. 483 F.2d at 659. The statute at issue in the present case, 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) provides:
The period a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense remains in custody after successfully completing a treatment program may be reduced by the Bureau of Prisons, but such reduction may not be more than one year from the term the prisoner must otherwise serve.18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B).
Shortly after 18 U.S.C. § 3621 was enacted, the Bureau of Prisons promulgated regulations to implement the statute. The first of these, 28 C.F.R. § 550.58, limits early release eligibility to certain inmates and provides in relevant part:
[A]n inmate who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment [for a nonviolent offense] and who completes a residential drug abuse treatment program including subsequent transitional services in a community based program (i.e., in a Community Corrections Center or on home confinement) . . . may be eligible . . . for early release by a period not to exceed 12 months.28 C.F.R. § 550.58 (1997).
In addition to these regulations, the BOP issued Program Statement 5330.01, Drug Abuse Programs Manual-Inmate, to establish the specific guidelines of its drug abuse treatment program, providing:
For early consideration under § 3621(e) and in accordance with the opening paragraph of this section, an inmate must be able to participate in community based programs so as to complete the transitional services component in a Community Corrections Center or on home confinement.
(Resp't's Ex 3.)
Thus, successful completion of the Bureau's Drug Treatment Program requires that an inmate complete the following: (1) the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program at a BOP correctional facility; (2) the institution transition phase; and (3) the community transitional services in a community corrections center or on home confinement. 28 C.F.R. § 550.58. (Id.)
Although the Code of Federal Regulations does not expressly exclude prisoners with detainers from sentence reduction eligiblity, the BOP considers prisoners with detainers "[I]nmates who will not be able to complete the community-based portion of treatment . . . due to custodial considerations." 61 Fed.Reg. 25121 (1996).
Because Petitioner's claim revolves around whether or not the BOP's regulation excluding prisoners with detainers from completing the drug treatment program is an abuse of discretion under the statute, the court finds that requiring the Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies would prove futile. Resolution of the issue is not fact specific or dependant and, therefore, little if any information would be gained by requiring Petitioner to develop a factual record. Likewise, because Petitioner's claim attacks official BOP policy, it is highly likely that each level of review will cite the official policy and accordingly deny relief. Thus, this is not a case where the BOP, if given the opportunity, would grant the relief Petitioner seeks. It is clear that the basic goals of the exhaustion doctrine, set forth in Bradshaw v. Carlton, supra., would not be served by requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, the Court will evaluate Petitioner's claim for habeas relief on the merits.
In Fraley v. United States Bureau of Prisons , the Ninth Circuit court found that Petitioner did not have to exhaust his administrative remedies beyond his initial request for early release when the BOP denied such request by citing official BOP policy. 1 F.3d 924, 925 (1993). The court held that under those circumstances, further exhaustion would have been futile because any subsequent reviews "certainly would have been denied under the same official policy." Camper v. Benov , 966 F. Supp. 951, 954 (C.D.Cal. 1997) (quoting Fraley , 1 F.3d at 925).
C. Analysis
1. Petitioner Claims BOP Policy Excluding Prisoners Subject to Detainers from Participation in the Drug Treatment Program is an Abuse of Discretion Under 18 U.S.C. § 3621 .
Petitioner first claims that the Bureau lacks the statutory authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) to promulgate regulation 28 C.F.R. § 550.58 which effectively denies prisoners with detainers the opportunity to complete the drug treatment program and become eligible for early release.
a. Standard of Review
When examining an agency's construction of a statute it administers, we must first inquire "whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue." Stiver v. Meko, 130 F.3d 574, 576 (3d Cir. 1997) (quotingChevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)). If Congress has directly addressed the issue and the legislative intent is unambiguous, our inquiry must cease. Id. However, if a statute expressly leaves a gap for an agency to fill with its rule making authority, the agency's regulations must receive "`controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute'" Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). If, however, the gap is merely implicit, "we nonetheless must uphold the agency's construction if it has chosen `a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute.'" Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.).
If it is determined that the BOP was given the authority to promulgate a regulation excluding prisoners with detainers from successful completion of the drug treatment program, the Court must then decide whether the decision to enact such a regulation was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." See Paydon v. Hawk, 960 F. Supp. 867, 870 (D.N.J. 1997) (noting, "This Court does not review BOP decisions de novo, but rather, "is limited to whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.")
b. Application of Standard
Petitioner contends that the detainer exclusion promulgated by the BOP pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) exceeds the BOP's statutory authority. After careful review of the language, it is clear that section 3621(e)(2)(B) is silent with respect to prisoners with detainers. Therefore, we must consider whether the detainer exclusion is a reasonable construction of § 3621(e)(2)(B). See Stiver, 130 F.3d at 577. Furthermore, it is important to note that in a recent case involving the BOP's statutory interpretation of the language "crime of violence," as it is contained in § 3621(e)(2)(B), the Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez of this District focused on the provision of the statute which provides that a reduction in a prisoner's term of incarceration is left to the discretion of the BOP. Snisky v. Pugh, 974 F. Supp. 817, 820 (M.D.Pa. 1997) (quoting Litman v. Morris, No. 96-1207, slip op. 5-6 (D.N.J. 1997), aff'd, 107 F.3d 7 (3d Cir. 1997). In Litman, Judge Rodriguez stated that "so long as it is a permissible construction of the statute, a regulatory interpretation of a statute by the agency responsible for its administration is entitled to great deference by the courts." Id. Thus, consistent with recent Third Circuit case law in this area, this Court will review the BOP's regulations promulgated pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) with great deference.
Such deference is not limitless, however, as this court determined when reviewing the BOP's policy statement concerning the definition of "nonviolent offense" under § 3621(e), supra . See Treglia v. Beeler , 82 F. Supp.2d 297, 300 (D.N.J. 1999). Where the BOP made a categorical exclusion of persons whose sentences for non-violent crimes included an enhancement involving possession of a weapon, the court required the BOP to reconsider Petitioner's case to give individual consideration to his application before determining whether such exclusion is appropriate.
According to the BOP interim rule, 61 Fed.Reg. 25121, the basis for the drug treatment program's detainer exclusion is the BOP's conclusion that custodial considerations preclude prisoners with detainers from participating in the community-based portion of the program. See id. Specifically, the BOP reasoned that prisoners with detainers pose a flight risk during the community-based treatment phase because they are subject to possible deportation upon release from custody, and therefore have reason to flee a halfway house. McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1999). The Bureau concluded that prisoners without detainers have more incentive to complete the community requirement because upon its completion they will likely qualify for sentence reduction and be permitted to rejoin their communities. Id. Based upon the above reasoning, the BOP policy excluding prisoners with detainers from participation in the community-based phase is a reasonable means for addressing the flight risk. Accordingly, this Court concludes that the detainer exclusion is a permissible exercise of the BOP's broad discretion in administering the drug treatment program.
Since the Court has determined that the detainer exclusion is a permissible construction of the statute, it will defer to this construction of section 3621(e)(2)(B). As stated previously, this Court's review of BOP classification decisions is limited to whether the decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." Paydon, 960 F. Supp. at 870. Because we have already found that the detainer exclusion is a permissible construction of the statute and not an abuse of discretion, we must defer to the BOP's decision to exclude prisoners with detainers from the drug treatment program.
Accordingly, the Court will deny Petitioner relief on this aspect of his habeas corpus petition, finding that the BOP's construction of the statute is permissible and entitled to deference.
2. Petitioner Claims that the Detainer Exclusion Violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
a. Standard of Review Petitioner next argues that the detainer exclusion of the community-based phase of the treatment program violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause applies to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.McLean, 173 F.3d at 1184. See also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The equal protection doctrine of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments does not constitute an absolute ban on a legislature's drawing of statutory lines which treat one class of individuals different from another class. Lindquist v. Xerox Corporation, 571 F. Supp. 470, 471 (D.V.I. 1983). As long as the disputed classification does not affect a fundamental right (e.g. voting, free speech, interstate travel) and is not an inherently suspicious classification, (e.g. sex, race, alienage) the legislative classification will be upheld "`so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.'" Paydon, 960 F. Supp. at 872.
Petitioner's contention that the BOP's policy excluding prisoners with detainers from participation in the community-based phase of the drug treatment program is a violation of his right to equal protection is not supported by the facts of the case. The Bureau's policy distinguishes between those prisoners who have detainers lodged against them and those who do not. This policy does not apply differently to aliens than to citizens. Although an alien's detainer may be for an INS violation leading to deportation, such detainers are treated the same as other law enforcement detainers. In either case, the prisoner — alien and citizen alike — is wanted by a law enforcement agency after service of the federal sentence is complete. All detainers — whether from INS or other sources — are likely to cause adverse consequences to the person's custodial status, see Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 50 (1993). There is no extra impact of the detainer upon the alien.
Likewise, if Petitioner's argument regarding alienage was recognized, the prisoner with an INS detainer (whose deportation may be imminent) would be eligible to shorten his sentence under section 3621(e) while the citizen with a law enforcement detainer (who may or may not ever face further incarceration) could not be eligible. This would make no sense, as it would grant the benefit to the alien that is denied to the similarly situated citizen. This policy therefore does not implicate a suspect class or involve the curtailment of a fundamental right. Thus, to be constitutionally sound, the BOP policy excluding prisoners "must merely bear some rational relation to some legitimate end." See Paydon, 960 F. Supp. at 872 (noting, "[T]he treatment of prisoners is not subject to strict judicial scrutiny"). As previously discussed, the Bureau's policy excluding prisoners with detainers from the drug treatment program was based on the concern that prisoners with detainers pose a flight risk during the community-based treatment phase of the program. Excluding prisoners with detainers (including aliens with INS detainers) from participating in the community based treatment phase is a reasonable means for eliminating this risk. Thus, the BOP's policy excluding prisoners with detainers is rationally related to the Bureau's legitimate interest in preventing prisoners from escaping detainers while taking part in the community programs. Accordingly, the detainer exclusion does not violate Petitioner's constitutional right to equal protection, and the court must deny relief.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Petitioner's request for habeas corpus relief pursuant to § 2241. The accompanying order is entered.
ORDER
THIS MATTER having come before the court on the application of petitioner, Domingo Guzman, for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and the court having considered the submissions of the parties, and for the reasons expressed in the accompanying opinion;
IT IS on this ___ day of July, 2000 hereby
ORDERED that petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.