Opinion
A-13620
11-02-2022
RONALD GUTHRIE, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Michael L. Barber, Barber Legal Services, Anchorage, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, for the Appellant. Elizabeth T. Burke, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Palmer, Vanessa H. White, Judge. Trial Court No. 3PA-14-03409 CR
Appearances:
Michael L. Barber, Barber Legal Services, Anchorage, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, for the Appellant.
Elizabeth T. Burke, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Ronald Guthrie was convicted, following a jury trial, of three counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor and two counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor. His convictions were based on conduct involving two different minors, T.I. and M.L.
AS 11.41.434(a)(1) and AS 11.41.436(a)(2), respectively.
On appeal, Guthrie challenges the superior court's decision to admit, under Alaska Evidence Rule 404(b)(2), evidence that he previously sexually abused another minor, T.G. Guthrie challenges the admission of this evidence on three separate grounds.
The parties disagree as to whether Guthrie preserved his objection to admission of this evidence - in particular, T.G.'s testimony. We need not decide whether the claim was preserved because we conclude that the superior court did not err in admitting the evidence in any event.
First, Guthrie notes that, in its written decision on the prior acts evidence, the superior court mistakenly stated that Guthrie had pleaded no contest to one count of lewd and lascivious acts for his prior conduct involving T.G. (In fact, Guthrie was not convicted in connection with the conduct involving T.G.) Guthrie argues that this mistake tainted the superior court's ruling on the admissibility of the evidence.
But this misstatement appeared only in the facts section of the court's order; the analysis section of the order did not repeat this misstatement or rely in any way on the purported no-contest plea. And during the pretrial evidentiary hearing, the court acknowledged on the record that Guthrie had not been previously convicted of any conduct involving T.G. We therefore reject this claim.
Second, Guthrie argues that the prior acts evidence did not satisfy the requirements of Evidence Rule 404(b)(2). This rule authorizes a court, in a prosecution for sexual abuse of a minor, to admit evidence of other acts by the defendant toward the same or another child if "admission of the evidence is not precluded by another rule of evidence" and if the prior offenses are "similar to the offense charged" and "committed upon persons similar" to the complaining witness. Guthrie argues that the conduct involving T.G. was not sufficiently similar to the offenses charged and that T.G. was not similar to the complaining witnesses in this case, T.I. or M.L.
Having reviewed the record, however, we conclude that the superior court could reasonably find that the prior acts involving T.G. were similar to the offenses charged in this case, and that T.G. was similar to T.I. and M.L. T.G. testified that Guthrie performed oral sex on her and rubbed her vagina - acts that mirror the abuse alleged by M.L. T.G. further testified that the abuse always started in the bathtub, which is where T.I.'s alleged abuse occurred. T.G. was abused from a young age until she was about nine or ten years old. T.I. and M.L. likewise testified that they were around nine years old when they were abused. T.G., like T.I., had a familial relationship with Guthrie, and although M.L. was not related to Guthrie, she similarly experienced abuse while she was in his home and under his care. We therefore conclude that the superior court reasonably found that the foundational requirements of Evidence Rule 404(b)(2) were met.
Finally, Guthrie argues that the evidence involving T.G. was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative under Bingaman v. State and Alaska Evidence Rules 402 and 403. But the superior court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to introduce the evidence under Bingaman. Guthrie had previously admitted in recorded conversations that he had sexually abused T.G., which is strong evidence that he actually committed those acts - an important factor that supports admission of this evidence under Bingaman. Additionally, Guthrie denied having sexually abused T.I. and M.L., and evidence that he had previously sexually abused another young member of his family in similar ways was relevant to evaluating this material issue. Furthermore, the superior court reasonably found that presentation of the evidence would not take an inordinate amount of time and would not result in the jury deciding the case on improper grounds.
Bingaman v. State, 76 P.3d 398, 415 (Alaska App. 2003); see also Shedlosky v. State, 472 P.3d 1094, 1097 n.5 (Alaska App. 2020) (noting that the Bingaman balancing test applies to situations where the legislature has authorized the use of propensity evidence, including under Evidence Rule 404(b)(2)).
See Kowalski v. State, 426 P.3d 1148, 1154 (Alaska App. 2018) (reviewing for abuse of discretion the trial court's admission of prior acts evidence under Bingaman).
For these reasons, we uphold the superior court's decision to admit evidence of Guthrie's sexual abuse of T.G.
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.