Opinion
21-36023
10-28-2022
SCOTT GUTHRIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Argued and Submitted October 18, 2022 Portland, Oregon
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon D.C. No. 3:19-cv-00890-HL Andrew D. Hallman, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Before: PAEZ and BADE, Circuit Judges, and R. COLLINS, [**] District Judge.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Scott Guthrie appeals the district court's order affirming the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision denying Guthrie's application for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court's order de novo and the agency's decision for substantial evidence and legal error. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2014). "If the evidence can support either affirming or reversing the ALJ's conclusion, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ." Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm.
1. Guthrie asserts that the ALJ legally erred by failing to clearly identify which portions of his symptom testimony she rejected and failing to link her rejection of that testimony to the record evidence. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 2015) ("[W]e require the ALJ to specify which testimony she finds not credible, and then provide clear and convincing reasons, supported by evidence in the record, to support that credibility determination."). We find no error. The ALJ in Brown-Hunter "simply stated her non-credibility conclusion" and failed to provide "any reviewable reasons why she found [the claimant's] testimony to be not credible." Id. at 493-94. Unlike Brown-Hunter, the ALJ sufficiently explained her reasons for discounting Guthrie's symptom testimony, and we can easily follow her reasoning and meaningfully review those reasons. See id. at 489; see also Kaufman v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 843, 851 (9th Cir. 2022) (stating that the court considers "the ALJ's full explanation" and the "entire record").
2. The ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for discounting Guthrie's symptom testimony. See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth the standard). The ALJ reasonably relied on evidence of Guthrie's improvement with treatment and evidence that he took college classes for a business accounting degree and looked for work to find his symptom allegations not entirely credible. These are specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting his symptom testimony. See Warre v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling ...."); see also Odle v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir.1983) ("'fair response'" to medication, including "satisfactory" pain control); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (completing high school and obtaining a college degree and other professional training); Bray v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1221, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (recent "part-time" work and subsequent search for "other employment").
While some of the ALJ's reasons do not support her adverse credibility finding, any error is harmless because the "ultimate credibility determination" is supported. Carmickle v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis removed).
While the evidence could have supported contrary findings, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusions. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that while a different judge, considering the same evidence, might have found the claimant's allegations credible, this court is not a "trier[] of fact" and "[c]rediblity determinations are the province of the ALJ").
3. The ALJ gave germane reasons for discounting the lay witness statement. See Bayliss, 427 F.3d at1218 ("Inconsistency with medical evidence" is a "germane reason[] for discrediting the testimony of lay witnesses" (citation omitted)).
4. Finally, the ALJ did not err at step five because the hypothetical question she posed to the vocational expert accounted for all the limitations that she reasonably found supported by substantial record evidence. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a proper hypothetical need only include those restrictions that are supported by substantial evidence). Thus, the ALJ properly relied on the vocational expert's testimony in response to that hypothetical.
AFFIRMED.
Paez, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") legally erred because she neither "identified which [of Guthrie's] testimony" was not credible nor "explained which evidence contradicted the testimony" in violation of this Court's precedent in Brown-Hunter v. Calvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015).
An ALJ may not discredit a claimant's testimony based on "general findings." Id. at 493 (quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Rather, an ALJ must "specifically identity" which components of the testimony "she or he finds not credible." Id. (quoting Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The ALJ then needs to "link that testimony to particular parts of the record supporting [his or] her non-credibility determination;" merely "summariz[ing]" the evidence "supporting [the ALJ's] RFC determination" will not suffice. Id. at 494; see Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277-78 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that providing a "detailed overview of the [claimant's] medical history" is not the same as offering clear and convincing reasons to discredit testimony). The "credibility determination is exclusively the ALJ's to make, and ours only to review." Id. Thus, we must refrain from "comb[ing] through the administrative record to find specific conflicts," id. (quoting Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014), and may not draw "reasonable inferences" from the "ALJ's summary of the evidence." Id.
Here, the ALJ failed to "specifically identify" any inconsistences to support her adverse credibility finding. See id. The ALJ only paraphrased Guthrie's testimony and summarized the evidence supporting her RFC determination. See id. at 491, 493-94. Because the ALJ neither identified which specific testimony she found not credible nor "linked" such testimony to contradictory evidence, we cannot evaluate the ALJ's non-credibility determination without "speculat[ing] as to the grounds for the ALJ's conclusions." See id. at 492; Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1277 (holding that the ALJ's reasoning was not reviewable as he only briefly discussed the "four high-level reasons" that the claimant's testimony was inconsistent with the evidence); see also Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2021) (reasoning that the ALJ erred by "wholesale" rejecting the claimant's testimony when she only identified evidence that undermined a portion of the claimant's testimony). The ALJ's legal error was not harmless as "it precludes us from conducting a meaningful review" of her reasoning. See id. at 489. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The Honorable Raner C. Collins, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.