Opinion
No. 05-16-00468-CR
01-12-2017
NITIN GUPTA, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 001-84525-2015
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Evans, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Bridges
After the trial court denied appellant Nitin Gupta's motion to suppress based on a warrantless search, he pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated. The trial court set punishment at five days' confinement in county jail. On appeal, Gupta argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because neither the community caretaking function exception nor reasonable suspicion justified a warrantless stop. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
The following facts are based on the trial court's findings and testimony from the motion to suppress hearing. At approximately 12:50 a.m. on April 30, 2015, a security guard for the Frisco Independent School District called 9-1-1 to report a vehicle that had been parked on the side of the road for about fifteen minutes with its lights on. The security guard told the dispatcher, "Don't know if anything is wrong with the person or what."
Officer Matthew Poe responded to the call. The dispatch notes he received said the vehicle had its lights on and had been there for quite some time. He did not receive any other information about suspicious circumstances.
Officer Poe arrived at the scene at approximately 1:06 a.m. No other traffic was present at the time he arrived. Officer Poe did not talk to the security guard who called 9-1-1, but the security guard gestured towards the suspiciously parked vehicle.
Officer Poe first drove past the vehicle and noticed the headlights were on. As he made a U-turn and approached the back of the car, he noticed the tail lights were also on. He observed the driver's side door wide open and liquid on the ground immediately outside the driver's side "that you can associate with vomit at that time of night in my training and experience." Although he could not say with certainty the liquid was vomit, he believed it was based on "the consistency." When he came to a complete stop behind the vehicle and was calling out the license plate to dispatch, which took five to ten seconds, the driver's side door closed. Officer Poe then activated his overhead lights.
Officer Poe explained the area did not have any open businesses that time of night. If he did not assist Gupta, he believed Gupta would have presented a danger to himself or others. Based on his experience, a defendant closing a car door with a car running raised concerns of the person being medically ill or intoxicated. When asked if he thought Gupta needed help, Officer Poe answered, "Viewing the puddle by the car, that's what led me to believe he was mentally ill or possibly intoxicated." Officer Poe eventually arrested Gupta for driving while intoxicated.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, Gupta argued the State failed to prove reasonable suspicion for the warrantless arrest and also failed to prove Officer Poe responded to the call as part of his community caretaking function. The trial court disagreed and denied his motion to suppress. The trial court found Officer Poe credible and his testimony believable. In its conclusions of law, the trial court determined Officer Poe "was initially and primarily motivated by community caretaking." The court did not make any findings or conclusions as to reasonable suspicion.
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Lujan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (per curiam). In conducting this review, appellate courts employ a bifurcated standard. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give almost total deference to a trial court's rulings on questions of historical fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, but we review de novo application-of-law-to-fact questions that do not turn on credibility and demeanor. Id.
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, regardless of whether the trial court granted or denied the motion to suppress. State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Therefore, we afford the prevailing party the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Id. When, as in this case, the trial court makes findings of fact, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the court's ruling, supports those findings. Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We will uphold the judgment if it is correct on some theory of law applicable to the case, even if the trial judge made the judgment for a wrong reason. State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
It is well-settled that even without reasonable suspicion, a police officer may reasonably seize an individual through the exercise of his community caretaking function. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973); Gonzalez v. State, 369 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). As part of an officer's duty to serve and protect, an officer may stop and assist an individual whom a reasonable person, given the totality of the circumstances, would believe is in need of help. Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 276. The community caretaking function, however, is "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." Cady, 413 U.S. at 441. As a result, a police officer may not properly invoke his community caretaking function if he is primarily motivated by a non-community caretaking purpose. Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 277.
Determining whether an officer properly invoked the community caretaking function is a two-step process. Id. First, the reviewing court must determine whether the officer was primarily motivated by a community caretaking purpose. Id. Second, the court must determine whether the officer's belief that assistance was required was reasonable. Id. In evaluating whether an officer reasonably believes that a person needs help, courts may look to a list of four non-exclusive factors: (1) the nature and level of the distress exhibited by the individual; (2) the location of the individual; (3) whether or not the individual was alone and/or had access to assistance other than that offered by the officer; and (4) to what extent the individual, if not assisted, presented a danger to himself or others. Id.
Gupta argues Officer Poe's primary motivation for stopping him was not totally divorced from his investigation for suspected DWI because Officer Poe was originally dispatched to a "suspicious vehicle." Officer Poe, however, did not receive any further specific information about the "suspicious" vehicle other than that it had been parked by the street for approximately fifteen minutes with its lights on, and the condition of the person inside was unknown. He was not given any information that the person inside might be intoxicated. Rather, when he arrived at the scene, he saw what he believed to be vomit on the ground outside of the opened driver's side door. He testified based on his training and experience, the person could have been medically ill or intoxicated. The trial court found Officer Poe to be credible and based on his testimony, concluded he was initially and primarily motived by community caretaking. "We see no reason to second-guess the trial court's determination of an issue that is supported by the record and depends so much on credibility and demeanor." Gonzales, 369 S.W.3d at 855.
We now consider whether Officer Poe's belief Gupta needed assistance was reasonable. Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 277. First, Gupta argues he did not exhibit the nature and level of distress warranting Officer Poe's help. He asserts (1) he was healthy enough to close the car door; (2) there was no evidence he was bent over in pain inside the vehicle; and (3) Officer Poe acknowledged the liquid on the ground could have been soda.
We disagree with Gupta that he did not exhibit a level of distress for Officer Poe to reasonably believe he needed assistance. "Courts have never required an officer to know, with any degree of certainty, the specific distress an individual may be suffering." Gonzales, 369 at 856. Rather, the proper analysis is an objective focus on what the officer observed and whether the inference that the individual was in need of help was reasonable. Id. Officer Poe arrived to find a car parked on the side of the road with its lights on for what he knew was approximately twenty minutes. Only the driver was in the vehicle. The driver's door was open. Although Officer Poe could not say with certainty the liquid was vomit, he explained it had a consistency of vomit. Based on his training and experience, it was reasonable for him to believe the substance was vomit rather than soda. Affording the State the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, the first factor weighs in favor of the community caretaking exception. See, e.g., Rodgers v. State, No. 07-14-00054-CR, 2014 WL 3647786, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 22, 2014, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (reasonable for officer to believe driver needed help when officer observed a vehicle in an empty parking lot with its lights on and the driver, who appeared to be alone, slumped over the steering wheel at 2 am. in the morning as "these observations are the earmark of a need for assistance").
The location of the car and the lack of other nearby assistance also supports the community caretaking exception. The car was parked on the side of a road, and no other cars had passed by during that time. There was no evidence Gupta had access to a cell phone or other means to call for assistance. Although Gupta argues the security guard was present and could have offered assistance because he "would be trained in basic first aid," there is no evidence regarding the security guard's training. In fact, he did not even testify at the hearing. Accordingly, the second and third factors weigh in favor of the community caretaking exception.
Lastly, we consider the extent to which Gupta, if not assisted, presented a danger to himself or others. Gupta emphasizes the trial court's conclusion, "The extent to which the Defendant, if not assisted, presented a danger to himself or others is less clear." However, he ignores the rest of the sentence in which the trial court acknowledged "courts have never required officers to know with any degree of certainty, the specific distress the individual may be suffering," citing Gonzales v. State, 369 S.W.3d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Officer Poe testified based on his training and experience Gupta could have been mentally ill or intoxicated and presented a danger to himself or others if not assisted. He again based this belief on observing a car parked on the side of the road with the driver's side door open and vomit on the ground. The trial court found Officer Poe credible and his testimony believable. See Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673 (reviewing court gives almost total deference to trial court's rulings on questions of historical fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor). Affording the State the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, the final factor weighs in favor of the community caretaking exception.
We conclude Officer Poe reasonably exercised his community caretaking function because, under the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for him to believe Gupta needed help. See Gonzales, 369 S.W.3d at 857. The trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. We overrule Gupta's sole issue and affirm the trial court's judgment.
/David L. Bridges/
DAVID L. BRIDGES
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
160468F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 001-84525-2015.
Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges. Justices Evans and Schenck participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered January 12, 2017.