Opinion
Case No. 99-4140-DES
June 29, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the court on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 31) brought pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff appears pro se. Plaintiff claims defendants discriminated against him because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2003, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by suspending and transferring him following defendants' investigation into complaints of sexual harassment made against plaintiff. Defendants seek summary judgment on these claims. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants summary judgment.
I. INTRODUCTION
All of the facts stated below are either uncontroverted or, if controverted, are construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff Jimmy Franklin Guinn ("Guinn"), a black man, is currently employed at defendant Cessna Aircraft Company ("Cessna") as a pin router operator. On or about August 27, 1998, Cessna became aware of sexual harassment complaints made against Guinn by a female employee. Cessna immediately suspended Guinn pending a complete investigation. Cessna often suspends individuals pending an investigation into such complaints. Defendant Dennis Coffey ("Coffey"), manager of labor relations, and Cindy Poulson ("Poulson"), administrator of equal employment opportunity programs, conducted the investigation. Four witnesses corroborated the allegations made against Guinn. Cessna received no information to cause them to believe the allegations were false, and Guinn did not provide Cessna with the names of any witnesses to corroborate his story that he did not engage in sexual harassment.
For the purposes of this order, when the court refers to an action by Cessna, it includes those actions and decisions by defendant Dennis Coffey in his capacity as manager of Cessna.
After the investigation, Cessna suspended Guinn for two days and moved him to a new area within the same department. Three of the complaining witnesses were in positions that required continued contact with Guinn if he remained in that area. Therefore, Cessna assigned Guinn to the new area so he would no longer have contact with the witnesses. At the time of the allegations, Guinn was in a lead position. Guinn was not transferred into a lead position. Guinn's grade level changed from a Grade 5 to Grade 7, however, this did not result in a change in pay or benefits.
Defendants claim all four witnesses were in Guinn's work area. However, Poulson's notes from the investigation reveal that one witness had transferred from the department one month prior to the investigation.
At the same time an allegation of sexual harassment was made against Guinn, an allegation was made against another Cessna employee, referred to as "Doe." Plaintiff claims he is similarly situated with Doe, a white man who held the position of crew chief. There were no witnesses who corroborated the allegations against Doe. After the investigation, Cessna suspended Doe for three days. Cessna did not move Doe to a new position because the complaining witness requested and was given a transfer to a position that did not require contact with Doe.
The identity of the employee is subject to a protective order.
During that same time period, Coffey and Poulson investigated complaints against other non-minority employees. As a result of one investigation, Cessna suspended the employee for five days, transferred him to a new position on a different shift, and removed him from the crew chief position. The second investigation resulted in a foreman being demoted to the position of sheet metal worker.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Plaintiff brings this action pro se. The court construes a pro se plaintiff's pleadings liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, "[t]his does not excuse plaintiff . . . from the burden of coming forward with evidence to support his claims as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules of this court." Fillmore v. Eichkorn, 891 F. Supp. 1482, 1486 (D.Kan. 1995).
A court shall render summary judgment upon a showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). The rule provides that "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. at 248. The movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 (10th Cir. 1993). The movant may discharge its burden "by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
Once the movant makes a properly supported motion, the nonmovant must do more than merely show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and, by affidavits or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (interpreting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Rule 56(c) requires the court to enter summary judgment against a nonmovant who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof. Id. at 322. Such a complete failure of proof on an essential element of the nonmovant's case renders all other facts immaterial. Id. at 323.
A court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and allow the nonmovant the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Byers v. City of Albuquerque, 150 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 1998). The court's function is not to weigh the evidence or determine whether the claims have merit, but merely to determine whether there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmovant for a finder of fact to return a verdict in that party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Essentially, the court performs the threshold inquiry of determining whether a trial is necessary. Id. at 250.
III. DISCUSSION
Guinn claims defendants discriminated against him because of his race in violation of Title VII and Section 1981 by disciplining him more severely than a white employee. Defendants argue plaintiff can not establish a prima facie case of discrimination or that defendants' proffered reason for the discipline was pretextual. Defendant Coffey further argues that he can not be held liable as an individual under Title VII.
A. Title VII and Section 1981 Claims
Guinn's claims under Title VII and Section 1981 are premised on the same conduct: the suspension and transfer of Guinn for sexual harassment. "[I]n racial discrimination suits, the elements of a plaintiff's case are the same, based on the disparate treatment elements outlined in McDonnell Douglass, whether that case is brought under §§ 1981 or 1983 or Title VII." Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Gairola v. Virginia Dep't of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285-86 (4th Cir. 1985)). See also Loum v. Houston's Restaurants, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 (D.Kan. 1997). Under Title VII and Section 1981, a plaintiff must prove that he or she was the victim of intentional discrimination. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wiltel, Inc., 81 F.3d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)). Guinn may carry this burden in one of two ways: "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Guinn has not presented any direct evidence of discrimination, i.e., "`evidence, which if believed, proves [the] existence of [a] fact in issue without inference or presumption.'" Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 460 (6th ed. 1990)) (alterations in original). Therefore, the court must analyze his indirect evidence of discrimination under the burden shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden of satisfying the prima facie requirements of a Title VII discrimination case. See Reynolds v. School Dist. No. 1, 69 F.3d 1523, 1533 (10th Cir. 1995). If the plaintiff can meet this burden, the defendant must offer a "facially nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action." Shorter, 188 F.3d at 1208 (citation omitted). Finally, if the defendant can offer a nondiscriminatory reason, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that defendant's proffered reason is merely pretextual. Id.
Guinn claims he was subjected to race discrimination in the form of disparate discipline, in that he received more severe discipline than a white employee who was also accused of sexual harassment. To establish a prima facie case of disparate discipline, Guinn must show (1) he is within a protected class; (2) he was disciplined by the employer; and (3) the employer imposed the discipline under circumstances giving rise to an inference of racial discrimination. Jones v. Denver Post Corp., 203 F.3d 748, 753 (10th Cir. 2000). Defendants do not contest that Guinn is within a protected class or that Guinn was disciplined. Defendants argue Guinn has not established that he was disciplined under circumstances giving rise to an inference of racial discrimination.
Defendants contend plaintiff's claim is for disparate treatment, which requires the plaintiff to show that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that similarly situated non-minority employees were treated differently. Trujillo v. University of Colo. Health Sciences Ctr., 157 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying these elements in the context of discriminatory discharge). Defendants argue plaintiff can not show that he suffered adverse employment action or that similarly situated individuals were treated differently. The court has reviewed the pretrial order, which provides: "Plaintiff's claim rests on the allegations that he received more severe discipline than a white employee." The court agrees and finds plaintiff's claim is properly classified as disparate discipline.
The third prong may be met by showing that the employer treated similarly situated non-minority employees differently. Id. Factors to be considered when determining whether employees are similarly situated include whether the employees deal with the same supervisor, are subject to the same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline, engaged in similar violations of company policy, engaged in violations of comparable seriousness, and whether there are any differentiating mitigating circumstances. See Aramburu v. The Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Flasher Co., Inc., 986 F.2d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff has not established that similarly situated non-minority employees were treated differently. As a result of the sexual harassment complaint, Guinn was suspended for two days and transferred to a new area within the same department. Guinn lost his position as lead. Plaintiff claims he is similarly situated with Cessna employee Doe, a white man who held the position of crew chief. As the result of a sexual harassment complaint, Doe was suspended for three days but was not moved to a new position. Cessna assigned Guinn to the new area so he would not longer have contact with the three complaining witnesses. The three employees were all in positions that required continued contact with Guinn if he remained in that area. Cessna did not move Doe to a new position because the complaining witness requested and was given a transfer to a position that did not require contact with Doe. Cessna did not demote Doe, however, there were no witnesses who corroborated the allegations against Doe. Four witnesses corroborated the sexual harassment allegation against Guinn. Plaintiff has not established that he is similarly situated with Doe. Likewise, plaintiff presents no evidence that he was disciplined under circumstances that give rise to an inference of racial discrimination. Accordingly, the court finds plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of disparate discipline.
Guinn claims he was suspended for five days. However, plaintiff does not offer any evidence to support this allegation. Therefore, the court accepts defendants' statement of fact as uncontroverted.
Even if Guinn established a prima facie case, he must show that Cessna's stated reason for his discipline was pretextual. Pretext may be established by showing either "that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or . . . that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1450, 1455 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).
Cessna claims it disciplined Guinn because of sexual harassment complaints against Guinn. Cessna investigated the woman's complaints and found them to be credible. Four witnesses corroborated the allegations made against Guinn. Cessna received no information to cause it to believe the allegations were false, and Guinn did not provide Cessna with the names of any witnesses to corroborate his story that he did not engage in sexual harassment. If Cessna believed the woman's complaints and disciplined Guinn because of the complaints, such belief is not pretextual, even if Cessna's belief later turned out to be erroneous. See McKnight v. Kimberly Clark, Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 1998). "An articulated motivating reason is not converted into pretext merely because, with the benefit of hindsight, it turned out to be poor business judgment." Id. There is no evidence in the record that Cessna did not believe the woman's complaints.
There is no evidence to suggest that Cessna's stated reason for discipline was pretextual. During the same time period plaintiff was disciplined, Coffey and Poulson investigated complaints against two other non-minority employees, which they determined to be credible. The first investigation resulted in the employee being suspended for five days, transferred to a new position on a different shift, and removed him from his crew chief position. This discipline is more severe than the discipline received by Guinn. The second investigation resulted in a foreman being demoted to the position of sheet metal worker. Plaintiff has not established that he was treated differently than non-minority employees facing sexual harassment complaints. "Mere conjecture that the employer's explanation is a pretext for intentional discrimination is not enough to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Branson v. Price River Coal, Co., 853 F.2d 768, 772 (10th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff has not shown pretext, nor has plaintiff established a prima facie case of disparate discipline. Therefore, summary judgment is granted as to plaintiff's race discrimination claims brought under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
B. Title VII Claim Against Defendant Dennis Coffey
As an additional ground for summary judgment, defendant Coffey argues that he is not individually liable under Title VII. "Personal capacity suits against individual supervisors or managers are inappropriate under Title VII." Land v. Midwest Office Tech., Inc., 979 F. Supp. 1344, 1347 (D.Kan. 1997) (citing Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 901 (10th Cir. 1996)). If plaintiff wishes to recover for a Title VII violation, he must sue his employer, "either by naming the supervisory employees as agents of the employer or by naming the employer directly." Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, summary judgment is granted as to plaintiff's Title VII claim against defendant Coffey.
IT IS THEREFORE BY THE COURT ORDERED that defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 31) is granted.