Opinion
No. 3D19-1115
02-19-2020
Manuel Guillen and Claudia Mora, in proper persons. McGlinchey Stafford PLLC, and William L. Grimsley (Jacksonville) and Kimberly Held Israel (Jacksonville), for appellee.
Manuel Guillen and Claudia Mora, in proper persons.
McGlinchey Stafford PLLC, and William L. Grimsley (Jacksonville) and Kimberly Held Israel (Jacksonville), for appellee.
Before EMAS, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and HENDON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) ; Linares v. Bank of Am., N.A., 278 So. 3d 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for relief from final judgment under rule 1.540(b) where the motion was filed more than one year after the judgment was entered). See also Rusniaczek v. Tableau Fine Art Grp., Inc., 139 So. 3d 355, 357 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (holding: "In order to warrant an evidentiary hearing, a rule 1.540(b)(3) motion must specify the essential facts of the purported fraud and not merely assert legal conclusions. The purpose of this specificity requirement is to permit the court ‘to determine whether the movant has made a prima facie showing which would justify relief from judgment’ ") (quoting Flemenbaum v. Flemenbaum, 636 So. 2d 579, 580 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) ); Freeman v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 46 So. 3d 1202, 1204 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (holding: "If a motion does not set forth a basis for relief on its face, then an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary") (quoting Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 20 So. 3d 952, 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ).