Opinion
Civil Action 23-2958
08-21-2023
DWAYNE P. GUIDRY, JR., #582255 v. TERREBONNE PARISH CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMPLEX, ET AL.
SECTION: “J” (1)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JANIS VAN MEERVELD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Dwayne P. Guidry, Jr., a state prisoner, filed this pro se federal civil rights action against two defendants: the Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex and Warden Rhonda Ledet. In his complaint, plaintiff stated his claim as follows: “There is Black mold in shower & serving treys we eat off of this was told to Lt. S. Schwaush in Grev. # 16,219,957 on Dated: 07/24/23 at 11:22 AM.”
The Clerk of Court issued a Notice of Deficient Filing, Rec. Doc. 3, instructing plaintiff that his complaint was deficient because the defendant named in the caption (the Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex) differed from the defendant listed in the section of the complaint identifying the parties (Warden Rhonda Ledet). Plaintiff responded to that notice, but he failed to correct that defect. Rec. Doc. 4. Nevertheless, rather than further pursuing that deficiency, the undersigned has elected simply to assume that plaintiff intended to name both the Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex and Warden Rhonda Ledet as defendants in this case.
Rec. Doc. 1, p. 5.
Federal law requires that this matter be screened. For example, with respect to actions, such as this one, which are filed in forma pauperis, federal law mandates:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action ..
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In addition, because plaintiff is incarcerated, screening is also required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. That statute mandates that federal courts “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Regarding such lawsuits, the statute similarly provides:
On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint -
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A complaint is frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994). In determining whether a claim is frivolous, the Court has “not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown), Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).
A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when the plaintiff does not “plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (footnote, citation, and quotation marks omitted). The United States Supreme Court has held:
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, even when plaintiff's complaint is liberally construed, it is clear that it is frivolous and/or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
The Court must liberally construe a pro se civil rights complaint. See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In pertinent part, that statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ...
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, “[t]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff's allegations fail on one or both of those prongs for the following reasons.
First, as noted, plaintiff named the Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex as a defendant. However, “[t]he Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex simply is not a proper defendant under any circumstances. A jail is merely a building, not a ‘person' subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Coleman v. Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex, Civ. Action No. 134325, 2013 WL 6004051, at *5 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 2013) (quotation marks and brackets omitted); accord Authement v. Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office, Civ. Action No. 09-5837, 2009 WL 4782368, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 3, 2009); Bland v. Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex, Civ. Action No. 09-4407, 2009 WL 3486449, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 23, 2009).
Second, although plaintiff also named Warden Rhonda Ledet as a defendant, he made no allegations against her. However, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held: “Plaintiffs suing governmental officials in their individual capacities ... must allege specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional violation. This standard requires more than conclusional assertions: The plaintiff must allege specific facts giving rise to the constitutional claims.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[p]ersonal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action,” Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983), and such involvement must be specifically alleged. As a result, plaintiff's mere listing of Warden Ledet as a defendant without making any factual allegations connecting her to his claim does not suffice to state a claim against her. See Tuley v. Heyd, 482 F.2d 590, 594 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that the mere inclusion of names and notations of office in the caption does not suffice to state a claim); Jones v. Ledet, Civ. Action No. 19-10969, 2019 WL 6040091, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 22, 2019) (“Where ... a plaintiff has merely listed individuals as defendants in the complaint but made no factual allegations against them, no cognizable individual-capacity claim has been stated against those defendants.”), adopted, 2019 WL 6036706 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2019).
Third, because plaintiff has not alleged that Warden Ledet was personally involved in plaintiff's claim, the fact that she holds a supervisory position at the jail is not alone sufficient to make her a proper defendant. Although a supervisor may be held liable under § 1983 for her own failures, she cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of her subordinate staff. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (“In a § 1983 suit ... - where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants - the term ‘supervisory liability' is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Sanchez v. Young County, 866 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Supervisors cannot be held liable for constitutional violations .. if they had no personal involvement.”); Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Under section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.”).
Fourth, it is unnecessary to allow plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint either to allege the personal involvement of Warden Ledet or to name another defendant (such as the Lt. S. Schwaush mentioned in plaintiff's statement of his claim), because, in any event, his underlying claim is frivolous and/or fails to state a claim for the following reasons.
For example, although plaintiff alleges that black mold is present in the showers, it has long been held that such allegations fall short of stating a constitutional violation. As United States Magistrate Judge Donna Phillips Currault explained in a Report and Recommendation subsequently adopted by United States District Judge Susie Morgan:
The federal courts have repeatedly held “that the Constitution does not mandate prisons with comfortable surroundings or commodious conditions.” The courts recognize that serving time in prison “is not a guarantee that one will be safe from life's occasional inconveniences.” Thus, certain institutional problems such as dust, mold, and stale air do not amount to a constitutional violation. [Plaintiff] has not stated a constitutional violation based on the allegation of the mere presence of mold in his unit.
... [Plaintiff] has not asserted that the prison officials knew of a potential risk of serious harm to his person or intentionally ignored that risk. Thus, even with the presence of mold or black mold in the area to which he was assigned, he has not stated a constitutional violation.Jones v. Martin, Civ. Action No. 22-1163, 2022 WL 2336091, at *5-6 (E.D. La. May 11, 2022) (footnotes omitted), adopted, 2022 WL 2315886 (E.D. La. June 28, 2022); accord Heaton v. Normand, Civ. Action No. 17-405, 2017 WL 3268341, at *4 (E.D. La. June 22, 2017) (“[T]he jurisprudence has repeatedly held that the mere fact that mold is present in a jail does not render an inmate's confinement unconstitutional.”), adopted, 2017 WL 3252813 (E.D. La. July 31,2017); Simmons v. Gusman, Civ. Action No. 14-1907, 2015 WL 151113, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2015) (“[T]he mere fact that fungus, mold, mildew, and rust are present [in a jail] does not warrant relief.”); Eaton v. Magee, Civ. Action No. 2:10-cv-112, 2012 WL 2459398, at *5 (S.D.Miss. June 27, 2012) (“Plaintiff's claim that the bathroom and shower area are unsanitary and contain black mold fails to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”); Barnett v. Shaw, No. 3:11-CV-0399, 2011 WL 2200610, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 18, 2011) (holding that allegation of “excessive amount of black mold in the showers and sinks” was insufficient to raise a claim for constitutional violation), adopted, 2011 WL 2214383 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2011); Reynolds v. Newcomer, Civ. Action No. 09-1077, 2010 WL 234896, at *10 (W.D. La. Jan. 19, 2010) (finding that plaintiff's complaints of “the presence of black mold in living areas, eating areas, and shower areas” were nothing more than “a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned” (quotation marks omitted)); McCarty v. McGee, No. 2:06cv113, 2008 WL 341643, at *3 (S.D.Miss. Feb. 5, 2008) (“Plaintiff's claim that the shower he was forced to share with other inmates is polluted and covered in mold and fungus, causing him to catch athlete's foot and ringworm, fails to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”).
The same is true of his allegation of mold on the food service trays. “Constitutional standards likewise are not violated simply because food service practices fall short of optimal standards.” Courteaux v. Larpenter, Civ. Action No. 19-13173, 2020 WL 2771755, at *8 (E.D. La. Apr. 27, 2020) (finding inmate's claim that “the food trays are being served with old food and mold on the trays” was frivolous and/or failed to state a claim), adopted, 2020 WL 2769877 (E.D. La. May 28, 2020); accord Marshall v. Pohlman, Civ. Action No. 16-15907, 2017 WL 2691166, at *2-3 (E.D. La. June 22, 2017) (denying as frivolous inmate's claim that “food [was] being served on dirty and stained plastic plates”); Davis v. Allen Correctional Center, Civ. Action Nos. 2:13-CV-01040 and 2:13-CV1267, 2014 WL 4744668, at *2-4 (W.D. La. Sept. 23, 2014) (dismissing inmate's claim that “food service trays have mold in the corners and have a sour smell” as frivolous and for failure to state a claim).
RECOMMENDATION
It is therefore RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation in a magistrate judge's report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).