Opinion
No. 2211 C.D. 2013
10-16-2014
Nadine A. Guerassimoff, Petitioner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COVEY
Nadine A. Guerassimoff (Claimant) petitions this Court, pro se, for review of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review's (UCBR) October 18, 2013 order affirming the Referee's decision denying unemployment compensation (UC) benefits. The sole issue before the Court is whether the service Claimant performed for St. Paul's Child Development Center (Employer) is excluded from the definition of "employment" under the UC Law (Law). After review, we vacate and remand.
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex.Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 751-914.
Employer is a non-profit childcare center housed in St. Paul's Lutheran Church. Claimant was employed full-time as an assistant group supervisor for Employer from February 2006 until January 24, 2013, her last day of work. Employer's director reports to the childcare board which is comprised of church members and the church pastor. Claimant's W-2 tax forms listed her employer as St. Paul's Lutheran Church. St. Paul's Lutheran Church issued Claimant's paychecks. Claimant filed an application for UC benefits with an effective date of January 20, 2013, thereby, establishing a base year period of the fourth quarter of 2011 and first through third quarters of 2012. Claimant's only wages during this time period were from Employer.
On January 29, 2013, the Erie UC Service Center determined that Claimant was ineligible for UC benefits because no wages were reported by any employer(s) under Claimant's social security number during her base year. Claimant appealed and a Referee held a hearing. On June 7, 2013, the Referee mailed her decision affirming the UC Service Center's determination. Claimant appealed to the UCBR which affirmed the Referee's decision. Claimant appealed to this Court.
"Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether the findings of fact were unsupported by substantial evidence." Miller v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 83 A.3d 484, 486 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
Claimant argues that the UCBR's determination that the service she performed for Employer was not "employment" under the Law is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Claimant contends that she received "w-2s and paystubs for said base year[,]" Employer is an "independent business under a separate financial account in the same building" as St. Paul's Lutheran Church, Employer does not offer "religious instruction to participants[,]" and Employer does not have "any entanglement with the religious mission of St. Paul's [Lutheran] Church." Claimant Br. at 10, 11.
Initially, we note that
[u]nder . . . Section (4)( l )(1) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 753(4) ( l )(1), the term 'employment' is defined as 'all personal service performed for remuneration by an individual under any contract of hire, express or implied, written or oral, including service in interstate commerce, and service as an
officer of a corporation.' . . . Section (4)( l )(4)(8)(a) [of the Law] excludes from the definition of 'employment' '[s]ervice performed in the employ of (i) a church or convention or association of churches or (ii) an organization which is operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches.' At the outset, we must note, however, that courts do not employ the second prong of Section (4)( l )(4)(8)(a)(ii), requiring the organization to be 'operated, supervised, controlled or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches,' to disqualify from the exemption organizations operated primarily for a religious purpose that would otherwise be entitled to the exemption. To do so would impermissibly differentiate between organizations operated primarily for religious purpose that are 'operated, supervised, controlled or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches' and those that are not.Imani Christian Acad. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 42 A.3d 1171, 1174 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (citation omitted; emphasis added). Here, the Referee specifically concluded that "[C]laimant's wages with the [E]mployer [were] exempt for unemployment purposes" because "the child development center is operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches." Referee Dec. at 2 (emphasis added). This determination constituted legal error.
[T]he second prong of [S]ection 4( l )(4)(8)(a)(ii) [of the Law], requiring the organization to be operated or controlled by a church, was declared unconstitutional in Christian School Association of Greater Harrisburg v. Department of Labor and Industry, . . . 423 A.2d 1340, 1347 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1980) ( en banc ). As a result, we must limit our inquiry under [S]ection 4( l )(4)(8)(a)(ii) [of the Law] to the first prong, i.e., whether Employer is operated primarily for religious purposes.Livny v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 60 A.3d 594, 596 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (emphasis added). The UCBR did not specifically address this issue.
The UCBR adopted and incorporated the Referee's findings and conclusions.
The UCBR argues that this Court should affirm on "other grounds" as Claimant is an employee of the church, and thus her employment is exempt under Section 4(l)(4)(8)(a)(i) of the Law. The UCBR cites St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981) to support its position. The St. Martin Court held that the statute at issue therein, which is identical to Section 4(l)(4)(8)(a) of the Law, "was meant to apply to schools . . . that have no separate legal existence from a church[.]" Id. at 784. However, the UCBR never made such a factual finding in the instant case. The UCBR did, nevertheless, specifically find that "[C]laimant was employed with St. Paul's Child Development Center." Referee Dec. at 1, Finding of Fact 1.
"We may affirm a [lower tribunal's] order based on a different rationale if the basis for our decision is clear on the record." Commonwealth v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 52 A.3d 498, 512 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). --------
Because the UCBR based its determination on the second prong of Section 4(l)(4)(8)(a)(ii) of the Law which has been declared unconstitutional, we vacate the UCBR's order and remand the matter for consideration of whether Claimant was an employee of St. Paul's Lutheran Church and/or whether St. Paul's Child Development Center was operated primarily for religious purposes. See 43 P.S. § 753(4)(l)(4)(8)(a).
For the above-stated reasons, the UCBR's order is vacated, and this matter is remanded to the UCBR for further disposition in accordance with this opinion.
/s/_________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 16th day of October, 2014, the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review's (UCBR) October 18, 2013 order is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the UCBR for further disposition in accordance with this opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
/s/_________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge