Opinion
NO. 2014-CA-001639-MR
04-28-2017
G & S TRUCKING, AND GRAY & SONS TRUCKING, INC. APPELLANTS v. KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS: Bradley Gutherie Harrodsburg, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: James C. Maxson Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 14-CI-00350 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE, JONES, AND NICKELL, JUDGES. ACREE, JUDGE: G&S Trucking and Gray & Sons Trucking, Inc. (collectively, Gray) appeal from an order of the Franklin Circuit Court dismissing on jurisdictional grounds its complaint seeking review of a decision of the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission. We affirm.
In May 2011, the Kentucky Division of Unemployment Insurance issued a Notice of Subjectivity against Gray finding that truck drivers dispatched by Gray were employees and not independent contractors. Gray challenged the Notice of Subjectivity. The Division responded with a Notice of Covered Employment and Wage Determination upholding its initial finding.
Gray appealed the Notice of Covered Employment and Wage Determination to the Commission. The Commission largely affirmed. Its order unmistakably identifies the Division as a party to the administrative proceeding.
Gray then filed a complaint in Franklin Circuit Court requesting judicial review of the Commission's decision. The complaint did not name the Division as a party defendant as required by KRS 341.450(1). Based upon this defect, the Commission moved to dismiss the case on grounds that the complaint failed to strictly satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites of KRS 341.450.
Kentucky Revised Statute
The circuit court granted the Commission's motion. Relying upon Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Providian Agency Grp., Inc., 981 S.W.2d 138 (Ky. App. 1998) and the plain language of the statute, the circuit court concluded Gray did not strictly comply with KRS 341.450(1) and, therefore, its complaint failed to lawfully invoke circuit court jurisdiction under the statute. Gray requested CR 59.05 post-judgment reconsideration, arguing the circuit court's decision was at odds with recent Kentucky Supreme Court precedent. The circuit court denied Gray's motion. Gray appealed.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. --------
A party aggrieved by a decision of the Commission may obtain judicial review by way of KRS 341.450. That statute requires, in part:
[W]ithin twenty (20) days after the date of the decision of the commission, any party aggrieved thereby may, after exhausting his remedies before the commission, secure judicial review thereof by filing a complaint against the commission in the Circuit Court of the county in which the claimant was last employed by a subject employer whose reserve account or reimbursing employer account is affected by such claims. Any other party to the proceeding before the commission shall be made a defendant in such action.KRS 341.450(1) (emphasis added).
Strict compliance with the statutory requirements for appealing the decision of an administrative agency is necessary to invoke the reviewing court's jurisdiction. Bd. Of Adjustments of City of Richmond v. Flood, 581 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1978). KRS 341.450(1) plainly requires that all parties to a proceeding before the Commission be named in any subsequent appeal of that decision. Providian, 981 S.W.2d at 140. We have held that this aspect of KRS 341.450(1) is both compulsory and jurisdictional. Id. (dismissing an appeal for failure to comply with KRS 341.450(1) when the appellant named the Commission as an appellee, but failed to name the Division). It is undisputed that the complaint in this case did not name the Division, a party to the administrative proceeding before the Commission, as a defendant. We agree with the circuit court's decision to dismiss this action.
Gray acknowledges that Providian holds that the failure to name a party below in a complaint for judicial review of a decision of the Commission is jurisdictional and strict compliance with the statute is required. Nevertheless, it contends that the Division has no justifiable interest as a party to the appeal because all of its actions are determined solely by the Commission. Therefore, Gray argues, the Division is not an indispensable party and its inclusion in an appeal is unnecessary, and Providian "did nothing more than create a purely procedural requirement not otherwise supported under KRS 341.450(1) or applicable law." (Appellant's Brief at 4).
In short, Gray asks us to revisit and overturn Providian. We decline its invitation. Providian is grounded in the plain language of the statute and well-worn rules common to administrative appeals. See Flood, 581 S.W.2d at 2 ("There is no appeal to the courts from an action of an administrative agency as a matter of right. When grace to appeal is granted by statute, a strict compliance with its terms is required."); Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Carter, 689 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Ky. 1985) (statutes "which establish judicial review of decisions of administrative bodies and which require certain parties to be joined, in effect transform such parties into indispensable ones").
Gray further claims that the Kentucky Supreme Court's recent decision in Taylor v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 382 S.W.3d 826, 828 (Ky. 2012), lends support to its argument. It does not. In fact, it weighs in favor of the Commission.
In Taylor, our Supreme Court, in addressing whether the verification requirement of KRS 341.450(1) requires strict compliance, made the following comment: "in order to secure judicial review, a claimant must file a verified complaint against the [Commission] and the employer in the appropriate circuit court within twenty days after the [Commission's] decision." 382 S.W.3d at 831. Gray makes much of the fact that the Court made no mention of the Division in this sentence. Gray misses the point.
We have found no Kentucky case that has held that the Division must be named in every appeal involving unemployment insurance and the Commission. That is certainly not the holding of Providian. Our decision today, and that in Providian, is much narrower: if the Division is a party to the administrative proceeding before the Commission, then it must also be made a defendant in any action in circuit court seeking judicial review of the Commission's decision. KRS 341.450(1). Taylor re-affirms that the statute is unyielding and aggrieved parties must strictly comply with its terms. 382 S.W.3d at 832 ("we see no sound reason to depart from [the] well-settled principle of law" requiring strict compliance with the mandates of KRS 341.450(1)).
"It is a firmly rooted concept of law in this state that the courts have no jurisdiction over an appeal from an administrative agency action unless every statutory precondition is satisfied." Id. at 831. Again, KRS 341.450(1) requires any "party to the proceeding before the commission" be named a defendant in an appeal of the Commission's decision. Here, the Division was a party to the proceeding before the Commission. Gray's complaint for judicial review did not name the Division as a defendant. Because Gray's complaint "failed to comply with a specific provision required by KRS 341.450(1) it did not confer upon the circuit court jurisdiction over the controversy." Id. at 832.
We affirm the Franklin Circuit Court's August 21, 2014 order dismissing the underlying action for want of jurisdiction.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS: Bradley Gutherie
Harrodsburg, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: James C. Maxson
Frankfort, Kentucky