Summary
holding that a 35 to 40 degree limitation of movement in the lumbosacral spine is prima facie proof of serious injury
Summary of this case from Scotto v. MoraldoOpinion
June 2, 1997
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rappaport, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The defendants contend that the court erred in vacating the order dated October 15, 1996, entered upon the plaintiff's default in personally appearing on the adjourned return date of the defendants' motion for summary judgment because she failed to establish the threshold requirement of demonstrating she sustained a serious injury as defined by Insurance Law § 5102 (d). We disagree. The plaintiff presented an affidavit from a physician who concluded, based upon his examinations of the plaintiff and a review of her medical records, that she had restricted motion of her lumbosacral spine of 35 to 40 degrees and that such limitation of movement was significant and permanent. This evidence was sufficient to establish prima facie that the plaintiff suffered a serious injury (see, Lopez v Senatore, 65 N.Y.2d 1017; Huggins v. Daniels, 237 A.D.2d 491; Puma v. Player, 233 A.D.2d 308). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff's motion and vacated the order dated October 15, 1996.
Bracken, J.P., O'Brien, Santucci, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.