Opinion
56426
02-16-2018
Melvina GROVENBURG, Plaintiff, v. The COUNTY OF WARREN, a Municipal Corporation, the Warren County Sheriff's Department, the County of Washington, a Municipal Corporation, and the Washington County Sheriff's Department, Defendants.
Brennan & White Law Firm, LLP, Queensbury (William J. White of counsel), for plaintiff. Burke Scolamiero Mortati & Hurd, LLP, Albany (Heather L. Pollock of counsel), for defendants County of Washington and Washington County Sheriff's Department.
Brennan & White Law Firm, LLP, Queensbury (William J. White of counsel), for plaintiff.
Burke Scolamiero Mortati & Hurd, LLP, Albany (Heather L. Pollock of counsel), for defendants County of Washington and Washington County Sheriff's Department.
Robert J. Muller, J.
Defendants County of Washington and Washington County Sheriff's Department (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Washington County") seek an order granting summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212. Discovery is now complete and the Note of Issue and Certificate of Readiness have been filed.
The underlying factual allegations are that, following plaintiff's transport from the Warren County Jail to the Washington County Courthouse for a Family Court proceeding, she suffered a seizure and fell to the floor in the courtroom—while restrained in handcuffs—and sustained personal injuries as a result. The complaint asserts four causes of action. The first and second causes of action against defendants Warren County and Warren County Sheriff's Department (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Warren County") have been discontinued.
The third and fourth causes of action against Washington County essentially claim that it failed to safeguard, protect and provide for plaintiff's safety and well-being by not providing her with Phenobarbital and Lamotrigine, longstanding previously prescribed anti-seizure medications which were distributed to her while in Warren County's custody, and also by not having properly trained personnel located in sufficient proximity to prevent the injuries she sustained as a result of collapsing in the course of her seizure. More specifically, the third cause of action alleges negligent supervision of plaintiff while transporting her and failing to provide her with the prescribed medications. The fourth cause of action alleges that Washington County's representatives and employees were improperly trained to transport and supervise inmates in its custody.
Examining the third cause of action at the outset, the record on the motion reflects that plaintiff was inconsistent in her use of the prescribed medications and that—regardless of their use—the onset of seizures was unpredictable for her. She did not receive her medications while in the custody of Warren County on the morning of her transport, nor did she tell the Washington County officers who transported her to the Washington County Courthouse of her seizure disorder or need of medications. Warren County Corrections personnel have also testified that medical information that an inmate has seizures would not be shared with an officer from another county in the course of picking up an inmate for transport—and none was provided in this case.
As is oft stated, the proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact ( Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp. , 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986] ). Once the moving party has made the requisite showing, the burden shifts to the opponent of the motion to "demonstrate by admissible evidence the existence of a factual issue requiring a trial of the action or tender an acceptable excuse for [failing] so to do" ( Zuckerman v. City of New York , 49 NY2d 557, 560 [1980] ). "Mere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient" to defeat a motion for summary judgment ( Zuckerman v. City of New York , 49 NY2d at 562 ). Summary judgment will not be granted when there is a doubt as to the existence of such issues or where the issue is arguable and the Court may not weigh the credibility of the affiants unless it clearly appears the issues are not genuine, but feigned (see Glick & Dolleck v. Tri–Pac Export Corp., 22 NY2d 439, 441 [1968] ).
It is by now well understood that correctional facilities have a duty to use reasonable care to protect their inmates from foreseeable risks of harm (see Kemp v. Waldron , 115 AD2d 869, 870 [1985] ). They are not, however, an insurer of inmate safety and negligence will not be inferred solely from the happening of an incident (see Sanchez v. State of New York , 99 NY2d 247, 256 [2002] ; Iannelli v. County of Nassau , ––– AD3d ––––, ––––, 2017 NY Slip Op 08815, * 1 [2d Dept 2017]; Smith v. County of Albany , 12 AD3d 912, 913 [ 3d Dept 2014] ; Barnette v. City of New York , 96 AD3d 700, 701 [2012] ; Wilson v. Sponable , 81 AD2d 1, 7 [1981], appeal dismissed 54 NY2d 834 [1981] ). Washington County's duty is limited to providing reasonable care to protect prisoners from risks of harm that are reasonably foreseeable, i.e., those of which the County knew or should have known. (see Matter of Bezio v. Dorsey, 21 NY3d 93, 104–105 [2013] ; Sanchez v. State of New York , 99 NY2d at 255 ). As observed by the Court of Appeals in Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R. Co. (248 NY 339 [1928] ):
"One who seeks redress at law does not make out a cause of action by showing without more that there has been damage to his person. If the harm was not willful, he must show that the act as to him had possibilities of danger so many and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against the doing of it though the harm was unintended" ( id. at 345 ).
The Court finds that Washington County has, by competent and admissible evidence, demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law dismissing the third cause of action. There was no reason for Washington County to be aware of plaintiff's medical condition, nor any means by which it could have been made aware of the condition—short of the plaintiff having simply taken it upon herself to alert those in whose custody she found herself that morning. The Court further finds that plaintiff's opposition raises no discernable question of fact to withstand the granting of summary judgment on the third cause of action.
Turning next to an analysis of the fourth cause of action, Washington County initially argues that plaintiff has advanced theories exceeding the contents of the notice of claim. It is therefore necessary to compare the notice of claim with plaintiff's bill of particulars. To that end, the notice of claim asserted that
"[w]hile within the Washington County Court while restrained in handcuffs, the claimant suffered a seizure, collapsed and fell to the floor, sustaining significant personal injuries. At such date and time the County of Washington failed to safeguard, protect and provide for the safety and well-being of the claimant."
The bill of particulars then described failures
"to supervise, control, and monitor ... plaintiff; failing to secure ... plaintiff while handcuffed or otherwise in custody; failing to watch, stabilize, or otherwise hold ... plaintiff while in custody[,] handcuffing ... plaintiff in a manner which did not allow her to brace herself while falling; and failing to timely and reasonably react, or to otherwise remain in close proximity to ... plaintiff while she was being transported."
The Court determines that the General Municipal Law § 50–e (2) specificity requirements for the notice of claim were met and the claims made therein have not been impermissibly expanded. General Municipal Law § 50–e (2) does not require claims "to be stated with literal nicety or exactness" ( Purdy v. City of New York, 193 NY 521, 523 [1908] ; see Schwartz v. City of New York , 250 NY 332, 334 [1929] ). The test of the sufficiency of a notice of claim is merely whether it includes information "sufficient ... to enable the [municipality] to investigate" ( Schwartz v. City of New York , 250 NY at 335 ; see O'Brien v. City of Syracuse , 54 NY2d 353, 358 [1981] ). "Nothing more may be required" ( Schwartz v. City of New York , 250 NY at 335 ). Thus, in determining compliance with the requirements of General Municipal Law § 50–e (2), courts focus on the purpose served by a notice of claim: Whether, based on the claimant's description, municipal authorities can locate the place, fix the time, and understand the nature of the accident (see Widger v. Central School Dist. No. 1 , 18 NY2d 646, 648 [1966] ; Purdy v. City of New York, 193 NY at 523–524 ). All of that is possible within the content of this notice of claim. The teachings of Brown v. City of New York (95 NY2d 389 [2000] ) leave this Court disinclined to grant summary judgment on the premise that the theories advanced by plaintiff have impermissibly exceeded the content of her notice of claim.
Lastly, Washington County posits that summary judgment is warranted because, by testimony and affidavit, the custom and practice for escorting inmates was to be within an arm's reach of the inmate for an officer's own safety and that, in this instance, the officer was behind plaintiff within that arm's length. Tellingly, plaintiff indicates in her testimony that she cannot say what distance separated her from the transporting officer behind her. There is also no indication that with her hands cuffed in front of her and unconnected to any other shackles or a waist harness, that this was a violation of any County protocol. The Court therefore finds that Washington County has, by competent and admissible evidence, demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law on the fourth cause of action.
With this showing having been made the burden has, again, shifted to plaintiff to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action (see Zuckerman v. City of New York , 49 NY2d at 562 ). In this regard, plaintiff's opposition can best be characterized as little more than an expression of mere hope, which cannot defeat this application.
Based upon the foregoing, Washington County's motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety and the complaint dismissed as against it.
Therefore, having considered the Affirmation of Heather L. Pollock Esq. with Exhibits "A" through "M" attached thereto, dated September 14, 2017, submitted in support of the motion; Memorandum of Law of Heather L. Pollack, Esq., dated September 14, 2017, submitted in support of the motion; Affidavit of William J. White, Esq. with Exhibits "A" and "B" attached thereto, sworn to October 13, 2017, submitted in opposition to the motion; Reply Affirmation of Heather L. Pollock, Esq. with Exhibit "N" attached thereto, dated December 6, 2017; Supplemental Affidavit of William J. White, Esq. with Exhibit "A" attached thereto, sworn to January 4, 2018; and oral argument having been heard on February 2, 2018 with William J. White, Esq. appearing on behalf of plaintiff and Heather L. Pollock, Esq. appearing on behalf of Washington County, it is hereby
Exhibit "N" is the Affidavit of Fenton Sabo, sworn to December 5, 2017.
ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment of defendants County of Washington and Washington County Sheriff's Department is granted in its entirety and the complaint dismissed as against them; and it is further
ORDERED that any relief not specifically addressed has nonetheless been considered and is hereby expressly denied.
The above constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.
The original of this Decision and Order has been filed by the Court together with the Notice of Motion dated September 14, 2017. Counsel for Washington County is hereby directed to promptly obtain a filed copy of the Decision and Order for service with notice of entry in accordance with CPLR 5513.