Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-1619-G
June 26, 2002
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is the motion of the defendants, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") (collectively, "the government") to dismiss the claims of the pro se plaintiffs Jeffrey Dean Groceman and Bradley William Groceman (collectively, "the plaintiffs") for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted and, with respect to the claims asserted by plaintiff Bradley Groceman, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons discussed below, the government's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is granted, and its motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts in this case are undisputed. On December 19, 2000, Congress enacted the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (the "Act"), which is codified in pertinent part at 42 U.S.C. § 14135 to 14135e (2001 Supp.). Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support ("Motion") at 8-9. The statute provides in part that "[t]he director of the [BOP] shall collect a DNA sample from each individual in the custody of the [BOP] who is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying Federal offense." 42 U.S.C. § 14315a(a)(1). This process applies to inmates as well as individuals who are on probation or parole for a conviction of a qualifying offense. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(2). Qualifying federal offenses include felony offenses relating to burglary or robbery and any conspiracy to commit such felonies. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d)(1)(E), (G). The BOP may use any means that are reasonably necessary to compel an individual who refuses to cooperate with this process, and an individual who fails to cooperate may be subject to criminal penalty. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(4)-(5).
DNA refers to deoxyribonucleic acid. See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(c)(2).
Once the sample has been taken, the BOP will furnish the sample to the FBI, "who shall carry out a DNA analysis on each such DNA sample and include the results in CODIS." 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(b). CODIS is the Combined DNA Index System maintained by the FBI, 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(3), which contains: (1) DNA records of convicted persons, (2) DNA samples from crime scenes, (3) DNA samples recovered from unidentified human remains, and (4) DNA samples of missing persons. Motion at 9; 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a). The purpose of this database is to help law enforcement agencies, both state and federal, to link DNA evidence found at a crime scene with a sample already on record. Motion at 9-10.
The plaintiffs were convicted of armed bank robbery and conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, a qualifying offense under 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d). Amended Complaint and Application for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ("Complaint") at 3. The plaintiffs were incarcerated at the time that Congress passed the Act and were notified by their prison warden that they were to provide DNA samples pursuant to the Act. Id. In their complaint, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to prevent the government from taking samples from them. Id. at 1. The court denied the plaintiffs' request for such relief and the DNA collection took place. Motion at 4. The plaintiffs also assert, however, that the Act violates their rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and they request an injunction requiring removal of their samples from the CODIS database. Complaint at 1, 20.
The government filed this motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' remaining claims for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)"), Motion at 8-23, and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction with regard to the claim filed by Bradley Groceman, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) ("Rule 12(b)(1)"), Motion at 4-7, because he failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided to him by the BOP.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard for Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." However, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District, 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing WRIGHT MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil § 1357 at 598 (1969), for the proposition that "the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983). In determining whether dismissal should be granted, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Capital Parks, Inc. v. Southeastern Advertising and Sales System, Inc., 30 F.3d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1994); Norman v. Apache Corporation, 19 F.3d 1017, 102 (5th Cir. 1994); Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1991). As the facts of this case are undisputed, the court must determine the validity of the plaintiffs' claims under established constitutional law.
The constitutionality of the Act has not been addressed by the Supreme Court, any of the Courts of Appeal, or a significant number of district courts. Although the Fifth Circuit has not had an opportunity to address the issues at hand, several Courts of Appeal and district courts have addressed the constitutionality of similar DNA collection and storage procedures implemented by state governments. These decisions have consistently upheld state DNA collecting procedures when they have been challenged on Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, or other constitutional grounds.
B. The Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment Claims
The plaintiffs rely most heavily on their argument that the Act violates their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Complaint at 8. The parties agree that the taking of a blood sample is a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Motion at 12; Complaint at 7. The Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), recognized that the "compulsory administration of a blood test . . . plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 767. However, the Fourth Amendment does not preclude every search, but only those searches that are not justified or reasonable. Id. at 768. The issue before the court is whether the DNA collection procedures pursuant to the Act constitute a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that although prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement, their rights are still be subject to restrictions and limitations. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). In determining the appropriateness of a Virginia DNA collection statute, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that "when a suspect is arrested . . ., his identification becomes a matter of legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim privacy in it. We accept this proposition because the identification of suspects is relevant not only to solving the crime for which the suspect is arrested, but also for maintaining a permanent record to solve other past and future crimes." Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992). In Jones, the court weighed the governmental interest of resolving past and future crimes against the minor intrusion of mandatory blood collection in determining whether the Virginia statute, which is quite similar to the Act, violated an inmate's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 307 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989) (stating that "the intrusion occasioned by a blood test is not significant")). The court pointed to the advantage that DNA testing has over other forms of identification, and held that "the utility of more exact identification in all cases still justifies the minor intrusion" of DNA collection. Id. at 308.
A similar balancing technique was used by the Ninth Circuit in determining whether an Oregon statute requiring certain felons to submit blood samples for a DNA database violated the felons' Fourth Amendment rights. Rise v. State of Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1160 (1996). In Rise, the court cited Jones in determining that the DNA collection procedure served a legitimate governmental and public interest, and the intrusion into the felons' privacy was reasonable in light of that interest. Id. at 1561 (citing Jones, 962 F.2d 302). The court stated "[t]he creation of a DNA data bank also advances the overwhelming public interest in prosecuting crimes accurately — DNA evidence can exculpate an accused just as effectively as it can inculpate him." Id. at 1561 (emphasis in original). The court in Rise concluded that the interest in preventing recidivism outweighs the relatively minimal intrusion into personal privacy caused by blood extraction. Id. at 1562. The Tenth Circuit has upheld similar state provisions in Colorado and Oklahoma, holding that the searches are reasonable in light of the convicted felons' diminished rights, the minimal intrusion caused by the blood collection, and the states' interest in the investigation and prosecution of unsolved and future criminal acts. Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1005 (1998);Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 1996).
The Second Circuit has used a "special needs" test in determining that the collection of blood pursuant to a Connecticut statute, for purposes of indexing sex-offenders in a DNA database, was reasonable. Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79 (2nd Cir. 1999). There, however, the database in question focused specifically on sex-offenders and the court referenced the "special need" to identify recidivist suspects by DNA, which is commonly found at the scene of sex offenses. Id. The court finds that, in determining the reasonableness of the search under the Act, the balancing approach taken in the cases above is more appropriate because the Act more closely resembles the procedures in those states.
The plaintiffs allege that the only governmental interest which allows the rights of inmates to be limited or restricted is the goal of institutional needs and objectives. Complaint at 5-6. They direct the court's attention to Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, and conclude that because the Court in that case referred to institutional needs and objectives as a legitimate governmental interest, that interest is the only one which may be weighed against the intrusion caused by blood collection. Id. (citing Bell, 441 U.S. 520). However, the Court in Bell does not refer to the interest of institutional efficiency as the sole interest which creates restrictions on prisoners' rights, but instead uses it as the basis for its opinion in that case. Bell, 441 U.S. at 544-48. In Bell, the court was concerned with prison policies which called for room "shake-downs" and body-cavity searches to find contraband in the prison. Id. at 530. The interest asserted by the government was that such tactics were necessary to further prison security and safety. Id. at 547. The Court upheld the policies on the ground that they were needed to further these interests, which outweighed the diminished rights of the inmates. Id. at 546. In the instant case, the government has asserted that the interest the Act is intended to further is the ability of the government to solve past and future crimes, and to do so accurately. Motion at 20.
The court finds that the procedures prescribed by the Act are similar to those in the state laws mentioned above, and further finds that the Act serves legitimate federal interests of indexing individuals guilty of federal felonies and providing identification that will enable federal law enforcement agencies to accurately solve past and future crimes. Just as in the cases above, the minor intrusion of collecting blood from inmates, parolees, and those on probation is insignificant when compared to the procedure's service to these governmental interests. Therefore, the collection of blood pursuant to the Act is a reasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
C. The Plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment Claims
The plaintiffs additionally claim that the Act violates their rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Complaint at 14. However, the Supreme Court has held that the extraction of blood by a medical professional in an acceptable environment does not offend the ordinary sense of justice provided by the Due Process Clause. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759-760 (citing Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1957) (the taking of blood by a skilled physician does not "shock the conscience" or "offend a 'sense of justice'")). Additionally, in Rise, the Ninth Circuit held that "[t]he extraction of blood from an individual in a simple, medically acceptable manner, despite the individual's lack of an opportunity to object to the procedure, does not implicate the Due Process Clause." 59 F.3d at 1562-63. Under the authority of these cases, the extraction of blood for purposes of the Act, whether voluntary or compelled by the BOP, does not violate the plaintiffs' right to Due Process.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the governments' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory judgment is GRANTED for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. In view of this ruling, the governments' motion to dismiss plaintiff Bradley Groceman's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is DENIED as moot.