Opinion
NO. 2016-CA-000192-MR
01-13-2017
RODNEY GRIMES APPELLANT v. RANDY WHITE APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Rodney Grimes, Pro Se Eddyville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Stafford Easterling Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CLARENCE A. WOODALL, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 15-CI-00039 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON, DIXON, AND D. LAMBERT, JUDGES. CLAYTON, JUDGE: Rodney Grimes filed a pro se complaint seeking damages, injunctive relief and a declaration that the policies of the Department of Corrections violate his federal and state rights. He argues that his disciplinary segregation violates the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. After a careful review of the record and the law, the judgment of the Lyon Circuit Court dismissing this action is affirmed.
Grimes is currently an inmate at the Kentucky State Penitentiary. Grimes claims that he suffers from a variety of mental health problems that were caused or exacerbated by his assignment to disciplinary segregation, including problems related to anxiety and depression. After Grimes filed a complaint in Lyon Circuit Court, White moved to dismiss, arguing that Grimes had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Though the trial court found that Grimes had "substantially complied" with the requirement that he exhaust his administrative remedies, it dismissed on the basis that Grimes failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This appeal follows.
White argues that Grimes failed to exhaust his administrative remedies below. The trial court allowed Grimes to attach proof that he had exhausted all administrative avenues for a series of grievances because Grimes had not challenged any particular grievance. Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 454.415 provides in pertinent part that:
(1) No action shall be brought by or on behalf of an inmate, with respect to:
(a) An inmate disciplinary proceeding;
(b) Challenges to a sentence calculation;
(c) Challenges to custody credit; or
(d) A conditions-of-confinement issue; until administrative remedies as set forth in the policies and procedures of the Department of Corrections, county jail, or other local or regional correctional facility are exhausted.
. . .
(3) The inmate shall attach to any complaint filed documents verifying that administrative remedies have been exhausted.
(4) A court shall dismiss a civil action brought by an inmate for any of the reasons set out in subsection (1) of this section if the inmate has not exhausted administrative remedies[.]
Compliance with the prison administrative appeals process in CPP 15.6(II)(F) is mandatory under KRS 454.415(1)(d), and the failure to comply with KRS 454.415(1)(d) must result in dismissal in the circuit court. See Thrasher v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.3d 132, 134 (Ky. App. 2012) (affirming the trial court's dismissal of an inmate's declaration of rights petition for the failure to exhaust administrative remedies under KRS 454.415(1)). Having reviewed the record, we agree with the trial court that Grimes did exhaust his administrative remedies prior to the filing this complaint. It is clear that Grimes undertook each stage of the administrative review process; the mere fact that Grimes included additional documents relating to other administrative appeals is of no consequence.
Corrections Policies and Procedures. --------
Grimes asserts that his disciplinary segregation violated the Due Process Clause. In Sandin v. Conner, the United States Supreme Court held that a term of disciplinary segregation alone is insufficient to constitute a protected liberty interest necessary to sustain a due process action. 515 U.S. 472, 485-88, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2301-02, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995). This Court has repeatedly applied Sandin in holding that there is no protected liberty interest in being free from disciplinary segregation. We engaged in our most in-depth analysis of this issue in Marksberry v. Chandler, 126 S.W.3d 747 (Ky. App. 2003):
In the case sub judice, Marksberry received a penalty of 15 days disciplinary segregation with no loss of good-time credits. CPP 10.2 addresses the restrictions associated with the various categories of special management or special housing of inmates, including administrative control status, administrative segregation, disciplinary segregation, protective custody, special security, and temporary holding. Restrictions imposed under special management include reduced canteen and telephone privileges, opportunities to shower and shave of not less than three times weekly, and opportunities to exercise outside the cell of one hour per day for five days a week. Special management inmates retain the same opportunities as the general population to meal service, access to barber and hair care, and receipt and sending of mail. They also retain some access to legal materials, reading and writing materials, and visitation. Importantly, as in Sandin, there does not appear to be differences in the conditions between the various special housing types. Furthermore, Marksberry has not alleged that the conditions he experienced were more onerous, harsh or restrictive than those applicable to inmates normally assigned to disciplinary segregation. With respect to the duration of the segregation, numerous cases have held that segregation for periods exceeding the 15 days served by Marksberry with harsher conditions than those imposed under the Kentucky CPP did not rise to the level of atypical and significant hardship.Id. at 750-53. The amount of time that Grimes spent in disciplinary segregation is not explicitly provided in the present case, and it seems likely that Grimes was subjected to disciplinary segregation on several different occasions. At one point in his brief, however, Grimes asserts that he was in disciplinary segregation for 60 days. In McMillen v. Kentucky Dep't of Corr., 233 S.W.3d 203 (Ky. App. 2007), this Court stated that "[s]imply because disciplinary segregation involves different physical conditions and limited privileges does not mean that a prisoner maintains a liberty interest in freedom from that form of segregation[,]" and subsequently stated that although the appellant "was placed in disciplinary segregation for a total of 135 days[,] [h]e did not suffer any injury or deprivation that was abhorrent to the Constitution." Id. at 205 (citation omitted). Similarly, in Stanford v. Parker, 949 S.W.2d 616, 617 (Ky. App. 1996) the appellant was sentenced to 180 days of disciplinary segregation. Id. at 616-17. We held that "the punishment served by appellant did not deprive him of a significant liberty interest[,]" noting that that appellant was ineligible for good time credits and early release. Id. at 617. Similarly, we hold that Grimes did not have a liberty interest in the present case, and so his procedural due process claim must fail.
...
Thus, Marksberry has not shown a protected liberty interest in meritorious good-time in that the disciplinary action caused atypical and significant hardship by inevitably affecting the duration of his original sentence.
Next, Grimes also alleges that his disciplinary segregation violates the Equal Protection Clause. "Courts have consistently held that the difference in treatment of incarcerated persons does not constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws, in the absence of a showing of suspect classification." Mahoney v. Carter, 938 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Ky. 1997). In Mahoney, our Supreme Court stated as follows:
Appellant has not asserted that he is a member of a suspect class, nor has it been claimed that a fundamental right is involved. Therefore, the Court need apply only the lowest level of scrutiny, or rational basis, when considering the actions of the State.Id. at 578. This rationale is plainly applicable to the present case. Grimes has not alleged that he was a member of any protected class, and so we review Grimes' claim utilizing the rational basis test. Because disciplinary segregation is undertaken "in furtherance of [the prison officials'] duty to protect the safety and security of the prison, the public, and appellant himself[,]" disciplinary segregation does not fail on equal protection grounds.
The actions of the prison official were taken in furtherance of their duty to protect the safety and security of the prison, the public, and appellant himself. This meets the modest judicial scrutiny standard whereby state action must be rationally related to a state interest. It does not fail on equal protection grounds.
Finally, Grimes argues that his disciplinary segregation violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. "Confinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685, 98 S. Ct. 2565, 2571, 57 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1978). Furthermore,
every decision to remove a particular inmate from the general prison population for an indeterminate period could not be characterized as cruel and unusual. If new conditions of confinement are not materially different
from those affecting other prisoners, a transfer for the duration of a prisoner's sentence might be completely unobjectionable and well within the authority of the prison administrator. It is equally plain, however, that the length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional standards. A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of "grue" might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.Id., 437 U.S. at 686-87, 98 S. Ct. at 2571 (citation omitted). An inmate must meet two requirements in order to bring a claim that the conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994). Grimes must show that the violation was objectively, sufficiently serious so that the violation resulted in a denial of "life's necessities." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). Second, Grimes must show that prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S. Ct. at 1977. "Nothing so amorphous as 'overall conditions' can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2327, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991).
This is not the first time that Grimes has raised this issue to this Court. Grimes previously raised this issue in Grimes v. Haeberlin, No. 2005-CA-001359-MR, 2006 WL 1046925, (Ky. App. 2006), in which this Court stated as follows:
Grimes contends that the conditions of his cell, particularly the facts that it is poorly ventilated and that its sink is rusted and is not supplied with hot water,
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the federal Eighth Amendment. To succeed on an Eighth-Amendment claim, Grimes must demonstrate that with deliberate indifference to Grimes's welfare, the appellee has deprived him of the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," such as adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, or medical care. Grimes has not alleged that he is being exposed to dangerous extremes of temperature or that he is being denied adequate opportunities to bathe. To satisfy the Constitution, cells need not be comfortable, they need only be reasonably safe and minimally decent. There is no constitutional requirement that they be supplied with modern sinks or hot water. Because Grimes has failed to allege that he is being deprived of a necessity under current standards of minimal civilized existence, his Eighth-Amendment claim was properly dismissed.Id. at *2 (footnotes omitted). Grimes has also raised Eighth Amendment claims several times in federal courts in Kentucky, each having been dismissed for the failure to state a claim. Grimes v. Hiland, No. 5:10CV-P70-R, 2011 WL 1042344, at *3 (W.D. Ky. 2011); Grimes v. Simpson, No. 5:10CV-P109-R, 2010 WL 3397359, at *1 (W.D. Ky. 2010); Grimes v. Aramark Corr. Servs. Co., No. 5:10CV-P43-R, 2010 WL 4638780, at *3 (W.D. Ky. 2010). This Court has reviewed the entirety of the record in this case, and we find that Grimes has failed to show that the prison officials in this case acted with the "deliberate indifference" necessary to sustain such an action. "Knowledge of the asserted serious needs or of circumstances clearly indicating the existence of such needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate indifference." Miller v. Calhoun Cty., 408 F.3d 803, 813 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Horn v. Madison Cty. Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994)). "Absent an express allegation of intentional wrongdoing or allegations which provide a factual basis for inferring the kind of gross recklessness necessary to satisfy the Eight Amendment's requirement of deliberate indifference, [a claim alleging cruel and unusual punishment] fails as a matter of law." Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 683 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original) (quoting Love v. Growse, No. 5:08-303-KSF, 2008 WL 4534091, at *2 (E.D.Ky. 2008)). See also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2328, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991) (stating in dicta that negligence is not sufficient to satisfy the deliberate indifference standard). Grimes has provided no proof that the prison officials possessed "[k]nowledge of the asserted serious needs or of circumstances clearly indicating the existence of such needs," and therefore summary judgment on this issue was proper. Miller, 408 F.3d at 813.
In sum, Grimes has not shown that he is a member of a protected class to establish an Equal Protection Clause claim. Grimes has also not shown that his disciplinary segregation created a liberty interest to support a due process violation. His Eighth Amendment claim fails because he failed to show that prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference."
The Lyon Circuit Court's order granting summary judgment and dismissing the complaint is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Rodney Grimes, Pro Se
Eddyville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Stafford Easterling
Frankfort, Kentucky