Opinion
23A-CR-656
09-05-2023
William R. Grimes, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Attorney for Appellant Cara Schaefer Wieneke Wieneke Law Office, LLC Brooklyn, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Daylon L. Welliver Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Sullivan Superior Court The Honorable Hugh R. Hunt, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 77D01-2212-F2-741
Attorney for Appellant Cara Schaefer Wieneke Wieneke Law Office, LLC Brooklyn, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Daylon L. Welliver Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
TAVITAS, JUDGE
Case Summary
[¶1] William Grimes was charged with several offenses and moved for a speedy trial. The trial court scheduled a jury trial within the requisite seventy-day period under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B); however, the trial court later continued the trial due to congestion. After the seventy-day speedy trial period expired, Grimes moved for dismissal of the charges and argued that the trial court's congestion finding was clearly erroneous. The trial court denied the motion, which Grimes now appeals. We find Grimes's arguments without merit and, accordingly, affirm.
Issue
[¶2] Grimes raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the trial court's congestion finding was clearly erroneous.
Facts
[¶3] After several amendments to the charging information, the State ultimately charged Grimes with: robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Level 2 felony; battery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Level 5 felony; theft, a Level 5 felony; and unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony. The State also alleged that Grimes was an habitual offender. Grimes was arrested and taken to the Sullivan County Jail on October 9, 2022.
[¶4] Grimes's initial hearing was held on October 13, 2022, and Grimes invoked his right to be tried within seventy days pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B). The trial court set the jury trial for December 13, 2022.
[¶5] On November 23, 2022, Grimes and the State mutually agreed to continue the jury trial because an Indiana Prosecuting Attorneys Council conference was scheduled for the week prior to Grimes's December 13, 2022 trial date. The parties agreed to continue the trial to December 19, 2022, which was still within the seventy-day speedy trial period.
[¶6] On December 2, 2022, the trial court issued an order stating that the trial court judge had served as the prosecuting attorney in one of the underlying felony cases alleged against Grimes in the habitual offender allegation. Based on this conflict of interest, the trial court recused itself and transferred the case to the Sullivan Superior Court.
[¶7] On December 6, 2022, the Sullivan Superior Court accepted jurisdiction of the case and continued the December 19, 2022 jury trial due to court congestion. The trial court set a new trial date for January 25, 2023, which was beyond the seventy-day speedy trial period. On December 7, 2022, Grimes filed an objection to the setting of the new trial date, which the trial court overruled.
[¶8] On December 21, 2022, Grimes moved for dismissal of the charges pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B). Grimes argued that he was entitled to dismissal because the trial court continued his trial beyond the seventy-day speedy trial period and the trial court's congestion finding was erroneous. Grimes argued that the congestion finding was erroneous because: 1) "no jury trials were set on December 19 or 20 . . ., nor were jurors summoned"; 2) "[i]n speaking with Court staff on December 15, [the staff] indicated that no jurors had been summoned for a trial for the week of December 19"; and 3) Grimes had priority over the lone bench trial scheduled during that period because the defendant in the bench trial case was not in custody and had not invoked her speedy trial rights. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 32. Grimes appended to his motion copies of the trial court's docket for December 19 through 21, 2022, which were certified as of December 15, 2022. The trial court denied the motion.
[¶9] The jury trial commenced on January 25, 2023, and Grimes renewed his objection to the new trial date, which the trial court again overruled. The jury found Grimes not guilty of robbery resulting in serious bodily injury but guilty of the remaining charges. The jury also found Grimes to be an habitual offender. The trial court entered judgments of conviction and sentenced Grimes to a total of forty years in the Department of Correction. Grimes now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶10] Grimes argues that he is entitled to dismissal of the charges because he was tried outside of the seventy-day speedy trial period under Criminal Rule 4(B). He contends that the trial court's congestion finding is clearly erroneous. We disagree.
[¶11] Criminal Rule 4(B) provides, in relevant part:
(B) Defendant in Jail-Motion for Early Trial. A defendant held in jail on a pending charge may move for an early trial. If such motion is filed, a trial must be commenced no later than
seventy calendar days from the date of such motion except as follows:
(1) delays due to congestion of the court calendar or emergency are excluded from the seventy-day calculation[.]
If a defendant is held beyond the time limit of this section and moves for dismissal, the criminal charge against the defendant must be dismissed.
[¶12] This rule "places an affirmative duty on the State to bring the defendant to trial, but at the same time is not intended to be a mechanism for providing defendants a technical means to escape prosecution." Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1037 (Ind. 2013). Where, as here, the trial court continues the defendant's trial beyond the seventy-day speedy trial period due to congestion, and the defendant challenges the trial court's congestion finding, the standard of review is as follows:
Upon appellate review, a trial court's finding of congestion will be presumed valid and need not be contemporaneously explained or documented by the trial court. However, a defendant may challenge that finding, by filing a Motion for Discharge and demonstrating that, at the time the trial court made its decision to postpone trial, the finding of congestion was factually or legally inaccurate. Such proof would be prima facie adequate for discharge, absent further trial court findings explaining the congestion and justifying the continuance. In the appellate review of such a case, the trial court's explanations will be accorded reasonable deference, and a defendant must establish
his entitlement to relief by showing that the trial court was clearly erroneous.Id. at 1039 (quoting Clark v. State, 659 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ind. 1995)).
[¶13] Grimes argues that the trial court's congestion finding was clearly erroneous because, on December 15, 2022, certified copies of the trial court's docket revealed that no jury trials were scheduled on Grimes's December trial date and because he had priority over the lone scheduled bench trial. The trial court, however, continued Grimes's trial on December 6, 2022, and Grimes provides no evidence that the trial court's congestion finding was clearly erroneous at that time.
Grimes does not identify the date on which trial court staff indicated that no jurors were summoned during the week of his December trial date, and he does not raise this point in his brief.
[¶14] In Truax v. State, 856 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006), the defendant, Truax, moved for a speedy trial under Criminal Rule 4(B), and his trial was set for February 9, 2005. On January 27, 2005, the trial court continued the trial to March 30, 2005, due to congestion. Id. Truax moved for dismissal and challenged the trial court's congestion finding. Id. He submitted chronological case summaries from other cases, which were "printed" on October 17, 2005, and which showed that the trial court had no other trials scheduled on the date Truax was originally scheduled to be tried. Id. The trial court denied the motion. Id. at 121. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court's ruling because Truax failed to present evidence that, "based on the trial court's January 27, 2005, calendar, . . . the trial court's calendar was not prospectively congested on February 9, 2005." Id.
[¶15] Grimes argues that Truax is distinguishable because Truax "did not provide a court docket printout until seven months after the trial took place." Appellant's Reply p. 5. That, however, is not the point; as in Truax, Grimes fails to show that the trial court's congestion finding was clearly erroneous "on the date that the court granted the trial continuance." Truax, 856 N.E.2d at 121; see also Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1039 (defendant must demonstrate that congestion finding was inaccurate "at the time the trial court made its decision to postpone the trial").
[¶16] Grimes also argues that "it would have been nearly impossible for Grimes to print out the court's docket on the day of the congestion finding." Appellant's Reply Br. p. 5. Grimes, however, offers no evidence that he even attempted to obtain this information. Cf. Truax, 856 N.E.2d at 121 n.2 ("[T]ruax makes the bare assertion that he attempted to obtain the court's calendar as it appeared on January 27, 2005, but that the Putnam Circuit Court clerk informed him that the desired calendar could not be obtained because 'it is not archived and kept electronically.' However, Truax presents no evidence to support this assertion.") (record citations omitted). Moreover, the trial court continued Grimes's trial on December 6, 2022, and although Grimes objected the next day, he did not review the trial court's docket until December 15, 2022. This suggests that gathering the trial court records contemporaneously with the congestion finding would not have been as impossible as Grimes claims.
We nonetheless encourage trial courts to contemporaneously document the reasons supporting a finding of congestion. See Clark, 659 N.E.2d at 551 (encouraging trial courts to document the reasons supporting a congestion finding in the spirit of honoring defendants' speedy trial rights).
[¶17] We cannot say that the trial court's congestion finding was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, Grimes was not entitled to dismissal.
Conclusion
[¶18] The trial court's congestion finding was not clearly erroneous, and Grimes was not entitled to dismissal. Accordingly, we affirm.
[¶19] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.