Opinion
No. 1-08-2203
August 27, 2010.
Appeal from the Circuit Court Cook County, 03 CH 06510, Daniel J. Kelley and Charles R. Winkler, Judges, presiding.
Richard T. Greenberg, Donald C. Pasulka, Susan E. Groh, McGuire Woods LLP, 77 W. Wacker Dr, Chicago, IL, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant: PS Illinois Trust.
Jay S. Dobrutsky, Burke, Warren, MacKay Serritella, P.C., Chicago, Illinois, Stuart D. Gordon, Gordon Karr LLP, Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees: Cy Harris Griffith, Maria Griffith.
This case involves the fallout from a seemingly simple and usually harmless consumer transaction: the storage of personal items in a commercial storage facility. Making a long story short, defendant PS Illinois Trust (Public Storage) repeatedly bungled the automatic billing for storage of property, improperly converted and sold the property, while compounding its inexcusable conduct by, among other things, creating an apparently fictitious lien notice to presumably deflect criticism of its handling of the matter. This simple transaction resulted in complex litigation in which the consumers successfully pursued claims for compensatory damages, punitive damages and a recovery of attorney fees. On appeal, Public Storage makes a host of arguments that seek, inter alia, to reduce the verdicts pursuant to an exculpatory clause in the rental agreement or to otherwise reduce or vacate the several verdicts. Specifically, Public Storage contends that: (1) the trial court erred by awarding the Griffiths a double recovery for a single loss; (2) the trial court granted excessive damages; (3) Maria was not a proper plaintiff; (4) the trial court's judgment under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (the Act) ( 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2002)), should be reversed; (5) punitive damages were improperly awarded; and (6) the trial court erred in granting attorney's fees for work performed prior to the addition of the Act claim. For reasons detailed below, we affirm the trial court in all respects and remand solely for the final determination of attorney fees incurred by plaintiffs for this appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
The basic facts of the underlying action are largely undisputed. In December 2001, the Griffiths decided to store certain personal belongings at a storage facility owned by Public Storage in Chicago. Cy went to the facility, where he rented a storage unit and arranged to have the monthly rental charge automatically charged to his credit card. The rental agreement, signed by Cy, provided in pertinent part:
"3. USE OF PREMISES AND PROPERTY AND COMPLIANCE WITH LAW. Occupant shall store only personal property that belongs to Occupant. Because the value of personal property may be difficult or impossible to ascertain, Occupant agrees that under no circumstances will the aggreate value of all personal property stored in the Premises exceed, or be deemed to exceed, $5,000 and may be worth substantially less than $5,000."
Next, paragraph five provided that: "Occupant agrees that Owner's and Owner's Agents' total responsibility for any Loss from any cause whatsoever will not exceed a total of $5,000."
The Griffiths stored a number of items in the facility, including various household items, home furnishings, and Maria's professional papers and materials accumulated throughout her career. By December 2001, Maria had taught for a number of years and was, at the time, employed part-time by the Center for School Improvements at the University of Chicago where she assisted teachers in developing their instruction techniques. Throughout her years in education, Maria accumulated a substantial amount of reading and literacy materials which she used while mentoring teachers and planned to use upon her eventual return to the classroom. Among Maria's materials, which were stored in 25 boxes in the Public Storage unit, were approximately 50 professional texts, 800 children's books consisting of novels, historical texts, and poetry, lesson plans on various subjects, student works, and other educational information.
The Griffiths' account with Public Storage was opened on December 16, 2001. Public Storage charged rent in arrears, with rent being due at the end of the month for the preceding month's use of space. The Griffiths arranged to have their credit card automatically charged, and this was done for the subsequent months of January, February, March, and April. In April 2002, the Griffiths lost their credit card and acquired a replacement. Cy believed that the automatic monthly payments would roll over to the new card; however, they did not. He discovered this problem in June 2002, and he paid the May rent plus a late charge. He also authorized Public Storage to automatically charge the monthly rent to the replacement credit card, believing the previous oversight had now been corrected. Public Storage later automatically charged the June rent.
In early September 2002, the Griffiths received a "notice of denial of access and intended sale to satisfy lien" dated August 31, 2002. The notice indicated that the Griffiths' account was delinquent and that they owed $366 in rent for July, August, and September, with three late charges totaling $45 for the same months. It should be noted that the September rent, which was included in this delinquency notice, was not yet due. Inexplicably, despite the myriad of items actually stored in the unit, the lien notice listed only a Stairmaster, a table, and four chairs as the property subject to a lien. Maria went to Public Storage after receiving the notice and upon confirming that the September rent was actually not yet due, she paid the July and August rent and the associated late charges. While at the facility, Maria asked the employee who was processing her payment to reestablish the automatic credit card payments on the same credit card as previously arranged in June 2002. Three months later in December 2002, the Griffiths noticed that Public Storage had failed to charge their credit card for rent. Maria visited the facility again and spoke to the same employee she had seen previously in September. After a discussion and examination of some paperwork, Maria was told that the contents of their storage unit had been auctioned. This led to an emotional scene at the storage facility and, ultimately, litigation.
On April 9, 2003, the Griffiths initiated an action against defendant for conversion and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The parties engaged in lengthy discovery and some significant motion practice. The complaint was amended on October 5, 2006, to include a count for a violation of the Act and to drop the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The case proceeded to trial where the conversion claim was tried before a jury and the Act claim was contemporaneously tried before a judge. Testimony at trial revealed, among other things, that the August 31, 2002, lien notice contained an improper inclusion of rent (and late payment) not yet due, incomplete accounting of the property contained in the space, an incorrect date for the proposed sale of the property on the original lien notice, and a second notice produced by Public Storage (seen for the first time by the Griffiths at trial) that purportedly contained the correct date of the auction. The second notice was not in the file inspected by Maria when she had earlier examined it, it was not signed, and a Public Storage manager acknowledged that it had never been sent to the Griffiths. On June 22, 2007, the jury found for the Griffiths and awarded $5,000 in compensatory damages and $40,000 in punitive damages. The trial court subsequently found for the Griffiths on their Act claim on July 5, 2007, and awarded them an additional $25,000 in compensatory damages to cover the anticipated cost of recreating Maria's academic materials.
After being granted extra time to do so, Public Storage filed their first posttrial motion on August 30, 2007, which only raised a double recovery argument and was denied on October 26, 2007. The Griffiths then filed a petition for attorney fees and costs on November 16, 2007. Judge Daniel J. Kelley, who presided over the trial and ruled on Public Storage's first posttrial motion, granted approximately $117,000 in fees and costs for work performed after the filing of the Griffiths' Act claim, which served as the vehicle for the recovery of the fees. Judge Kelley retired shortly thereafter and the Griffiths timely filed a motion to reconsider the ruling, which was transferred to Judge Charles R. Winkler, who essentially overruled Judge Kelley and awarded attorney fees for all work performed prior to the Act amendment, on the basis that the earlier work had laid the effective groundwork for the Act claim as well. After Judge Winkler's ruling, Public Storage filed another posttrial motion on August 11, 2008, which reraised its earlier double recovery argument and raised, for the first time, other issues related to the conversion and Act claims and attorney fees. The posttrial motion was denied and the trial court ultimately awarded additional fees and costs in the approximate amount of $297,000, for work performed starting prior to the filing of the Act claim and during posttrial litigation. Public Storage's timely appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Public Storage contends that: (1) the trial court erred by awarding the Griffiths a double recovery for a single loss; (2) the trial court erred in granting damages in excess of $5,000; (3) Maria was not a proper plaintiff; (4) the trial court's judgment under the Act should be reversed; (5) punitive damages were improperly awarded; and (6) the trial court erred in granting attorney's fees for work performed prior to the addition of the Act claim.
A. Double Recovery
Public Storage first contends that the trial court erred by awarding the Griffiths a double recovery for a single loss, i.e., the Griffiths prevailed and were awarded damages on their conversion and Act violation claims based on their single loss of property.
At the close of trial, the Griffiths were awarded $5,000 in compensatory damages on their conversion claim. The trial court subsequently awarded the Griffiths $25,000 in compensatory damages on an Act violation claim. We first note that this argument was raised during Public Storage's posttrial motion and the trial court subsequently rejected it. It stated that the jury award of $5,000 was based on the "conversion count for the property that was, in fact, converted," and that its Act violation award was based on the cost of the re-creation of certain professional documents. The trial court concluded that the awards were distinct from each other and that there was no double recovery issue.
Because this is a question of law, we review it de novo. Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2007). We acknowledge that while a plaintiff may plead and prove multiple causes of action, only one recovery for an injury is permissible. Dowd Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 486 (1998). This court, however, has held that compensatory damages awarded based on claims of conversion and a violation of the Act can both remain intact. See Dubey v. Public Storage, Inc., 395 Ill. App. 3d 342, 349-50 (2009); see also Roche v. Fireside Chrysler-Plymouth, Mazda, Inc., 235 Ill. App. 3d 70, 72-73 (1992) (affirming trial judge's award of compensatory damages on claims of conversion and violation of the Act). Dubey dealt with, inter alia, a contention that compensatory damage awards based on claims of breach of contract, conversion and an Act violation constituted a triple recovery under circumstances strikingly similar to the case at bar. This court vacated the breach of contract award but affirmed the conversion and Act awards, stating that while it reduced the awards based on breach of contract and conversion, "[t]he compensatory damages on the violation of the Act claim can remain." Dubey, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 349. We adopt the reasoning in Dubey and hold that, under these circumstances, both a conversion and Act award can be awarded. Furthermore, like in Dubey, the total compensatory damages awarded pursuant to the claims of common-law conversion and Act violation were approximately equal to the established value of or the cost to replace the lost property at issue. Accordingly, while we acknowledge there were two separate awards stemming from two claims, there was no double recovery since the claims stemmed from a conversion claim and an Act violation, and the cumulative compensatory damage award was merely equivalent to the value of the lost property. See Dubey, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 348-49 (Act and conversion awards affirmed where plaintiff received approximately $75,000 in compensatory damages for items valued at $100,000); Check v. Clifford Chrysler-Plymouth of Buffalo Grove, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 3d 150 (2003) (affirming jury damages award under Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act ( 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (2000)) and trial court damages award under the Act but reducing compensatory damages to reflect actual loss).
B. Forfeiture
Before continuing on to Public Storage's remaining contentions, we must address the Griffiths argument that Public Storage has forfeited any remaining contentions because it filed two posttrial motions below. Supreme Court Rule 274 provides that "[a] party may make only one postjudgment motion directed at a judgment order that is otherwise final." 210 Ill. 2d R. 274. The Griffiths cite to Servio v. Paul Roberts Auto Sales, Inc., 211 Ill App. 3d 751 (1991), in support of their argument that their petition for attorney's fees, filed pursuant to the Act, did not affect the finality of the earlier judgment entered on the conversion and Act claims. They therefore conclude that the timing of filings based on a final judgment was not extended. Public Storage counters, arguing that the claim for attorney's fees in Servio was not made until after a judgment had been entered, whereas here, the claim for attorney's fees was made in the complaint. See Dewan v. Ford Motor Co., 343 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1073 (2003), rev'd on other grounds by Dewan v. Ford Motor Co., 363 Ill. App. 3d 365 (2005). Dewan provided: "Because the plaintiff had raised the claim for attorney fees in his complaint, the *** judgment was nonfinal and nonappealable until after the resolution of the plaintiff's request for attorney fees."Dewan, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 1073. Furthermore, we have held that a request for attorney fees, whether pursuant to a statute, sanction, or contract provision, is a "claim" within meaning of Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) and a trial court's retention of jurisdiction to hear the claim makes any other judgment in the case nonfinal and nonappealable absent a finding that there is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of issues it has decided. Northern Trust Co. v. Upjohn Co., 213 Ill. App. 3d 390, 397 (1991).
Here, the trial court found in favor of the Griffiths on their Act claim on July 5, 2007, and Public Storage filed a motion raising the double recovery issue. The trial court later entered an order on July 11, 2008, granting attorney's fees and costs and Public Storage subsequently filed another motion raising other issues. Despite the apparent filing of multiple posttrial motions, the record indicates that the Griffiths requested attorney's fees in their first amended complaint and that it was also brought pursuant to a statutory provision. Accordingly, it appears that Public Storage's arguments were preserved and will be addressed by this court.
C. Damage Limitations Clause
Moving on to the remaining contentions, Public Storage next asks this court to enforce its damage limitation clause from the rental contract and limit the Griffiths to $5,000 in damages. It is axiomatic that contractual limitations on liability are not favored in this state and are to be strictly construed against the party who would benefit. Chicago Steel Rule Die Fabricators Co. v. ADT Security. Systems, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 3d 642, 645 (2002). For example, we have held that an exculpatory clause cannot protect persons from the results of their wilful and wanton misconduct, and contractual limitations on damages are violative of Illinois public policy as they would limit liability for intentional wrongdoing. See Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 156 Ill. App. 3d 154, 164-65 (1986). In this matter, defendant was found liable for conversion, which is by definition an intentional act, so it cannot rely on a damage limitation waiver to reduce its financial liability. Furthermore, the limitation in question is also contrary to the Landlord and Tenant Act ( 765 ILCS 705/0.01 (West 1998)), which is another way to state that it is contrary to public policy.
Based on the facts of this case and precedent before this court, we find that the damage limitation clause in this contract is unconscionable and contrary to public policy. We made such a ruling in a similar case against the same defendant, which was attempting to benefit from the same provision from the same type of contract just last year in the already discussed Dubey case. In Dubey, after a discussion of the Landlord and Tenant Act and its applicability to the same provisions in the case at bar, we held "the limitation provision of the rental agreement to be an exculpatory clause and void for public policy reasons." Dubey, 395. Ill. App. 3d at 350. Our view of this contract has not changed in the one year since Dubey was decided and we accordingly adopt its reasoning. The Landlord and Tenant Act provides:
"Every covenant, agreement or understanding in or in connection with *** any lease of real property, exempting the lessor from liability for damages for injuries to person or property caused by or resulting from the negligence of the lessor, *** in the operation or maintenance of the demised premises or the real property containing the demised premises shall be deemed to be void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable." 765 ILCS 705/1 (West 1998).
The contract at issue was entered into when the Landlord and Tenant Act was still applicable to nonresidential leases. Accordingly, the above-quoted section is considered part of the rental contract in the instant case and the limitation provisions contained within the contract are accordingly void and unenforceable. See Jewelers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Firstar Bank Illinois, 341 Ill. App. 3d 14, 18-19 (2003).
In the underlying trial in the matter sub judice, as in the trial inDubey, the provision in question was ruled unenforceable by the trial judge. If that were not enough of a basis to torpedo this contractual damage cap, counsel for defendant in the instant case specifically advised the trial judge that he was "not saying [the Griffiths] are limited to $5000 whatsoever." Thus, whether the issue is resolved on the basis of public policy, the Dubey precedent or because of the representation by defendant's attorney, it is our ruling that defendant cannot in any way obtain any legal benefit from the suspect clause in its form contract.
We also find Public Storage's argument revolving around other courts upholding similar limitation provisions to be unpersuasive. The decisions cited by Public Storage originate in district courts or other state courts, none of which hold any precedential authority before this court. See County of Du Page v. Lake Street Spa, Inc., 395 Ill. App. 3d 110, 122 (2009); Fosse v. Pensabene, 362 Ill. App. 3d 172, 186 (2005).
D. Maria Griffith's Standing
Public Storage next contends that Maria had no standing to recover damages. It argues that the trial court improperly denied its motion under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2002)) to dismiss her claims. Trial court rulings on section 2-619 motions to dismiss are reviewed de novo. Valdovinos v. Tomita, 394 Ill. App. 3d 14, 18 (2009).
Public Storage argues that because the relationship between the parties arises from a rental agreement, the Griffiths' complaint is related to an alleged breach of that agreement. It argues that Maria was not a party to any agreement and thus it owed no duty to her. We disagree. Public Storage has misconstrued the basis for the Griffiths' conversion claim. To state a claim for conversion, a plaintiff must establish that: "(1) he has a right to the property; (2) he has an absolute and unconditional right to the immediate possession of the property; (3) he made a demand for possession; and (4) the defendant wrongfully and without authorization assumed control, dominion, or ownership over the property."Cirrincione v. Johnson, 184 Ill. 2d 109, 114 (1998). The Griffiths' conversion claim alleged that Public Storage took possession and disposed of their property without right of law and that it failed to comply with the statutory notice and other requirements under the Self-Service Storage Facility Act (Storage Act) ( 770 ILCS 95/1 et seq. (West 2000)). The Griffiths did not allege, nor were they required to allege, that any conversion constituted a breach of the rental agreement.
Nevertheless, Public Storage points out that when a plaintiff frames an action in tort and the issues concern a duty arising in a contract, the only damages recoverable are those which naturally result from the breach of contract or consequently result from special or unusual circumstances which can be reasonably contemplated by the parties at the time the contract is made. See Hanumadass v. Coffield, Ungaretti Harris, 311 Ill. App. 3d 94 (1999). Hanumadass, however, is readily distinguishable. The plaintiff in Hanumadass was a physician who filed a legal malpractice claim against defendant, a law firm he had employed in a medical malpractice suit that was settled without the plaintiff's knowledge. The issue before the court was whether the plaintiff could recover noneconomic damages for emotional distress in a legal malpractice action. The plaintiff in Hanumdaass, therefore, was attempting to advance a tort action based on a duty created by a contract and thus the action was governed by contract law. See Hanumadass, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 99. The conversion claim in the case at bar, however, does not similarly relate to any duty created by a contract but, as discussed above, was instead based on the common law claim of conversion and a violation of statutory duties imposed by the Storage Act. In short, Hanumadass involved a contractual duty which a tort action was based upon, whereas here the contract only created the situational opportunity for the tortious conduct. Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly denied Public Storage's section 2-619 motion to dismiss.
E. Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act Claim
Public Storage next contends the trial court erred by finding in favor of the Griffiths on their Act claim. We review the trial court's judgment for a violation of the Act under a manifest weight of the evidence standard. Cruthis v. Firstar Bank, N.A., 354 Ill. App. 3d 1122, 1134 (2004). A trial court's judgment is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when its findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 215 (1995). An Act claim requires: "(1) a deceptive act or practice by the defendant, (2) the defendant's intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception, (3) the occurrence of the deception in a course of conduct involving trade or commerce, and (4) actual damage to the plaintiff that is (5) a result of the deception." De Bouse v. Bayer AG, 235 Ill. 2d 544, 550 (2009). However, "[r]ecovery may be had for unfair as well as deceptive conduct." Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 201 Ill. 2d 403, 417 (2002). In determining whether an act or course of conduct is unfair, our supreme court has provided certain indicative factors: "(1) whether the practice offends public policy; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers." Robinson, 201 Ill. 2d at 417-18, citing Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sperry Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n. 5, 31 L. Ed. 2d 170, 179 n. 5, 92 S. Ct. 898, 905 n. 5 (1972). Unfairness can be found even if only one of these three factors is met. Robinson, 201 Ill. 2d at 418.
Public Storage primarily argues that it did not "commit a deceptive act" and that the Griffiths did not rely on any deceptive act. Public Storage's argument, however, is misguided. As stated above, a showing of unfairness is sufficient to satisfy a claim under the Act. The only notice the Griffiths received in relation to the disposal of their property was a "notice of denial of access and intended sale to satisfy lien" dated August 31, 2002. The notice indicated that the Griffiths owed rent and late charges for July, August, and September. The record indicates, however, that the Griffiths were previously advised that rent was to be paid in arrears and therefore any September charge, let alone a late fee, was premature. Upon receiving the notice, the Griffiths promptly paid, in person, the July and August rent (which Public Storage itself should have automatically charged) and related late charges. When those charges were satisfied, arrangements were again made for automatic payment. Despite the payment of the outstanding charges, Public Storage nevertheless disposed of the Griffiths' property. Under the Storage Act, customers must be sent a lien notice after a payment is missed and allowed an opportunity to settle any debt. See 770 ILCS 95/4 (West 2000). This did not occur in violation of the Storage Act's notice requirement and we have held that such a situation is sufficient to state a cause of action under the Act. See Hill v. PS Illinois Trust, 368 Ill. App. 3d 310, 320 (2006).
Public Storage appears to argue that the aforementioned August lien notice constitutes notice that a September 2002 payment was missed, an argument that we find to be disingenuous and temporally illogical. Suffice it to say that if such a practice were allowed to stand, it would be unethical, oppressive and unscrupulous. Even the "second" lien notice produced at trial (and apparently prepared after the property had been sold) would be insufficient even if the Griffiths had actually received it because it, too, was dated in August. It is also apparent that substantial injury occurred in the loss of approximately $5,000 in personal property as well as the near total loss of professional educational materials accumulated over many years. Furthermore, any argument that the Griffiths did not satisfy any reliance requirement is misplaced. Simply put, the Griffiths' lack of action was based on reliance that Public Storage would do what it said it would do and a lack of notice of an any intent otherwise, which we find to be adequate to satisfy any reliance requirement here.
In applying the facts within the record to the unfairness factors outlined above, we find clear support that Public Storage's conduct was unfair and even baleful in its remorseless attempt to deceive its customers. Dubey, previously cited above and dealing with similar circumstances, also held that it was an unfair practice where a customer "was never served with a notice of lien or notice as to the auction sale of her property" and such a situation was sufficient to constitute a violation of the Act. Dubey, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 354. Accordingly, we find that the trial court's determination that Public Storage violated the Act was eminently proper and therefore not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
F. Punitive Damages
Public Storage next contends that the trial court erred in awarding punitive damages. Specifically, it argues that the evidence in the instant case did not support an award of punitive damages and thus the jury should not have been instructed on such damages. In determining whether punitive damages were properly awarded, this court considers: "`(1) whether punitive damages are available for the particular cause of action, using a de novo standard; (2) whether, under a manifest weight of the evidence standard, the defendant acted fraudulently, maliciously[,] or in a manner that warrants such damages; and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing punitive damages.'" Bell Leasing Brokerage, LLC v. Roger Auto Service, Inc., 372 Ill. App. 3d 461, 474 (2007), quoting Caparos v. Morton, 364 Ill. App. 3d 159, 178 (2006). In this case the jury awarded the Griffiths $40,000 in punitive damages pursuant to the conversion claim.
As to the first consideration outlined above, it is well-settled that punitive damages are available for conversion. Cirrincione, 184 Ill. 2d at 114. As to the second consideration, Public Storage argues that punitive damages were against the manifest weight of the evidence because its conduct was not willful or wanton. A review of the record, however, indicates the following: Public Storage, at the time of its relationship with the Griffiths, billed its renters in arrears. The Griffiths arranged for a credit card to be automatically charged when rent was due. Despite this, Public Storage issued a denial of access and lien notice to the Griffiths for rent past due (only because Public Storage failed to do its job) and for rent not yet due. The Griffiths, upon receiving the August dated notice, paid what rent was due as well as associated late payments, even though it was defendant that failed to properly charge the Griffiths' credit card as previously arranged. At this point, the Griffiths had properly settled their account balance. Although Public Storage was directed once again to charge the Griffiths' credit card to pay the upcoming rent, Public Storage failed to do so and proceeded to auction off and dispose of the Griffiths' property weeks later without any proper notice provided to the Griffiths as required by the Storage Act. Short of standing guard over their rented storage space, it is difficult to decipher what plaintiffs could have done in an effort to get defendant to protect their property.
It also appears that the original lien notice the Griffiths received (and promptly responded to) contained the incorrect auction sale date and a second lien notice was later created. This document was of dubious provenance, to say the least, since it miraculously had the same certified mail receipt number attached to it as the original lien notice, and the notice itself was unsigned and never actually sent to the Griffiths. But even if this presumably fraudulent second notice had been sent, it would have been defective and insufficient for the stated notice requirements in the same way the original notice was. Furthermore, despite having a policy of attempting to make two phone calls to contact renters regarding lien sales, defendant admittedly made only one phone call to a number that it knew was not in service. We have held that punitive damages for the tort of conversion properly lie where the defendant acts willfully or with such gross negligence to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others. Dubey, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 356-57; Bell Leasing Brokerage, LLC, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 474. Upon a careful review of the record, ample evidence was available to support the conclusion that Public Storage acted willfully or with such gross negligence to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others, and accordingly, the jury's determination awarding punitive damages is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
As to the third consideration, we see no abuse in discretion in the trial court assessing punitive damages against Public Storage. A trial court abuses its discretion where no reasonable person could adopt its view. Favia v. Ford Motor Co., 381 Ill. App. 3d 809, 815 (2008). Under the facts and circumstances elucidated above, we find that a reasonable person could indeed find that the Griffiths deserved a punitive damage award on the conversion claim and accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
G. Attorney's Fees
Finally, Public Storage contends the trial court erred in granting attorney's fees for work performed prior to the time the Act count was added to the Griffiths' complaint.
As an initial matter, Public Storage urges us that the appropriate standard of review here is de novo. As a general matter, this court reviews a trial court's award of attorney's fees under an abuse of discretion standard. Peleton, Inc. v. McGivern's Inc., 375 Ill. App. 3d 222, 225 (2007). Public Storage, however, argues that because the issue involves the interpretation of the Act's attorney's fees provision, the issue involves a question of law which is reviewed de novo. We partially agree, only to the extent that interpreting the Act itself is subject to de novo review. The Act provides that reasonable attorney's fees and costs may be awarded to the prevailing party on an Act claim. See 815 ILCS 505/10a(c) (West 2002). Our research reveals case law that has interpreted that provision to include fees incurred for work on "non-Act claims when the Act claim is so inextricably intertwined with the non-Act claims that it cannot be distinguished." Dubey, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 361, citing Ardt v. State, 292 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1067 (1997). We see no reason to depart from this interpretation and adopt it. Accepting that legal interpretation, we now turn to the question of whether the work performed on non-Act claims prior to the addition of the Griffiths' Act claim is so inextricably intertwined such that it cannot be distinguished. This question does not involve an interpretation of a statute or a question of law. Instead, it is an attorney's fees award issue based on factual circumstances subject to the discretion of the trial court. See Dubey, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 361;Ardt, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 1067-68. The case cited by Public Storage in support of its argument that review here should be de novo, Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100 (2005), does not discuss the relevant standard of review applicable to circumstances similar to this case or for that matter, attorney's fees in any fashion or form.
We are unconvinced that the trial court abused its discretion here. A review of related hearings indicates the trial court's understanding that the "nexus" of the underlying case and claims involved the conduct and interactions between the Griffiths and Public Storage. All the work performed in discovery and other pretrial litigation relevant to the Act claim had, for the most part, been performed by the time the Act claim was added. In fact, defense counsel stated at one point during the attorney's fees hearings that, as to the conversion claim and Act claim, it would "accept the proposition that they were inextricably intertwined." The trial court then indicated it would require some time to review the fee petition and related materials, and spend some time "fine tuning" its attorney's fees order. Our own review of the record indicates that the conversion and Act claims were highly related and there was indeed a significant amount of work performed in furtherance of the Act claim prior to its addition to the Griffiths' complaint. Under these facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot find that there was any abuse of discretion here by the trial court in awarding attorney's fees for work done on non-Act claims that were inextricably intertwined with the Act claim.
The Griffiths request that they should be awarded attorney's fees and costs for posttrial work performed in litigating the above issues on appeal. After a review of the Act and relevant case law, we hold that the Act allows the imposition of attorney's fees incurred on appeal, at least for issues relating to an underlying Act claim. See Chesrow v. Du Page Auto Brokers, Inc., 200 Ill. App. 3d 72, 76 (1990) (holding that "[a]llowing plaintiffs to recover fees and costs incurred on appeal is consistent with our statutory mandate to provide appropriate remedies to defrauded consumers" under the Act); see also Melton v. Frigidaire, 346 Ill. App. 3d 331, 340-41 (2004) (citing the principles relied upon in Chesrow in holding that attorney's fees incurred on appeal from a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim can be awarded). Therefore we hold that the Griffiths' are allowed to petition for attorney's fees incurred on appeal and remand solely on this issue to the trial court for its determination of all fees due and owing.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County. We also remand the matter to the circuit court for the limited purpose of determining the amount of attorney fees due for work performed on this appeal.
Affirmed; cause remanded.
TOOMIN, P.J., and FITZGERALD SMITH, J., concur.