Opinion
June 17, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Doyle, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
We agree with the Supreme Court that the plaintiffs in Action No. 1 stated a valid cause of action to recover damages for malicious prosecution (see, Chappelle v. Gross, 26 A.D.2d 340). We also agree with the dismissal of the cause of action sounding in malicious prosecution in Action No. 2 because there was no interference with the person or property of the plaintiffs, or the limited partnership of which the plaintiffs were members, in that action (see, Realty by Frank Kay v. Majestic Farms Supply, 160 A.D.2d 789; Belsky v. Lowenthal, 62 A.D.2d 319, 321).
Further, in both Actions No. 1 and 2, the causes of action to recover damages for abuse of process were properly dismissed because the notice of pendency filed in a prior action commenced by Kenneth J. Tedaldi was not used in a perverted manner (see, Andesco, Inc. v. Page, 137 A.D.2d 349; Berman v. Silver, Forrester Schisano, 156 A.D.2d 624; Raved v. Raved, 105 A.D.2d 735), and the causes of action alleging prima facie tort were also properly dismissed because Tedaldi was not solely motivated by disinterested malevolence in the prior action (see, Burns Jackson Miller Summit Spitzer v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 332; Molinoff v. Sassower, 99 A.D.2d 528, 529; see also, Curiano v Suozzi, 63 N.Y.2d 113, 117).
Finally, the causes of action alleging tortious interference with contractual relations in Action No. 2 were properly dismissed (see, NBT Bancorp v. Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, 87 N.Y.2d 614).
We have reviewed all of the parties' remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Mangano, P.J., Sullivan, Altman and Hart, JJ., concur.