Opinion
# 2020-040-024 Motion No. M-95241
05-04-2020
DANNY GRIFFIN, #17A4506 v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Danny Griffin, Pro Se LETITIA JAMES Attorney General of the State of New York By: Charles Lim, Esq., AAG
Synopsis
Pro se Motion to file a Claim late denied based upon a lack of appearance of merit.
Case information
| UID: | 2020-040-024 |
| Claimant(s): | DANNY GRIFFIN, #17A4506 | GRIFFIN |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | NONE |
| Motion number(s): | M-95241 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | CHRISTOPHER J. McCARTHY |
| Claimant's attorney: | Danny Griffin, Pro Se |
|---|---|
| Defendant's attorney: | LETITIA JAMES Attorney General of the State of New York By: Charles Lim, Esq., AAG |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | May 4, 2020 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
For the reasons set forth below, the application of pro se Movant, Danny Griffin, to serve and file a late claim pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10(6), is denied.
The proposed Claim, attached to the Motion papers, asserts that Movant, an inmate, was wrongfully confined to keeplock from July 17, 2019 through August 17, 2019, after testing positive on a drug test at Franklin Correctional Facility. Movant was charged with violating prison rules prohibiting drug use. Following a disciplinary hearing, Movant was found guilty and, inter alia, he was sentenced to 30 days keeplock. Movant asserts that the urinalysis test result was erroneous and that Defendant was aware the urinalysis machine was not working properly.
Pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10(6), it is within the Court's discretion to allow the filing of a late claim if the applicable statute of limitations set forth in Article 2 of the CPLR has not expired. Thus, the first issue for determination upon any late claim motion is whether the application is timely. As stated by the Appellate Division, Third Department in Kairis v State of New York (113 AD3d 942 [2014]):
The applicable statute of limitations for a claim of excessive confinement in the prison disciplinary context depends on whether the claim is predicated on intentional or negligent conduct (see Court of Claims Act § 10[3], [3-b]; Ramirez v State of New York, 171 Misc 2d 677, 680-682 [Ct Cl] [1997]; cf. Vasquez v State of New York, 23 Misc 3d 1101[A] [Ct Cl] [2009], affd 77 AD3d 1229 [2010]). Such a claim accrues "upon a claimant's release from confinement" (Davis v State of New York, 89 AD3d 1287, 1287 [3d Dept] [2011]).
An intentional tort has a one-year statute of limitations (CPLR 215[3]), while negligence has a three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214[5]). As the cause of action accrued on the date Movant was released from keeplock, August 17, 2019, this Motion was timely filed, whether the cause of action is an intentional tort, or is a negligence cause of action. Here, Movant asserts that Defendant failed to prevent errors in testing and failed to properly maintain the testing equipment.
Next, in determining whether to grant a motion to file a late claim, Court of Claims Act § 10(6) sets forth six factors that should be considered, although other factors deemed relevant also may be taken into account (Plate v State of New York, 92 Misc 2d 1033, 1036 [Ct Cl 1978]). Movant need not satisfy every statutory element (see Bay Terrace Coop. Section IV v New York State Employees' Retirement Sys. Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Sys., 55 NY2d 979, 981 [1982]). However, the burden rests with Movant to persuade the Court to grant his or her late claim motion (see Matter of Flannery v State of New York, 91 Misc 2d 797 [Ct Cl 1977]; Matter of Santana v New York State Thruway Auth., 92 Misc 2d 1 [Ct Cl 1977]).
Perhaps the most important factor to be considered is whether the proposed Claim has the appearance of merit, for it would be futile to permit a defective claim to be filed, subject to dismissal, even if other factors tended to favor the request (Ortiz v State of New York, 78 AD3d 1314, 1314 [3d Dept 2010], lv granted 16 NY3d 703 [2011], affd sub nom. Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389 [2011], quoting Savino v State of New York, 199 AD2d 254, 255 [2d Dept 1993]). It is Movant's burden to show that the claim is not patently groundless, frivolous or legally defective, and, based upon the entire record, including the proposed claim and any affidavits, that there is reasonable cause to believe that a valid cause of action exists. While this standard clearly places a heavier burden upon a party who has filed late than upon one whose claim is timely, it does not, and should not, require Movant to establish definitively the merit of the claim, or overcome all legal objections thereto, before the Court will permit Movant to file a late claim (Matter of Santana v New York State Thruway Auth., supra at 11-12).
In Arteaga v State of New York (72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]), the Court of Appeals held that the State had absolute immunity from liability in the area of prison discipline when its employees act under the authority of and in full compliance with the statutes and regulations (Correction Law §§ 112, 137; 7 NYCRR; parts 250-254), and their actions constitute discretionary conduct of a quasi-judicial nature (see also Shannon v State of New York, 111 AD3d 1077, 1077 [3d Dept 2013]; Loret v State of New York, 106 AD3d 1159, 1159-1160 [3d Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 852 [2013]; Davis v State of New York, 262 AD2d 887, 888 [3d Dept 1999]). Such immunity attaches even if the determination is later reversed administratively or as the result of a successful article 78 proceeding (see Arteaga v State of New York, supra at 215). The Arteaga Court stated, however, that actions of correction employees confining an inmate "without granting a hearing or other due process safeguards (see 7 NYCRR 251-5.1; parts 252-254) would not receive immunity" (Arteaga v State of New York, supra at 221; see also Moustakos v State of New York, 133 AD3d 1268, 1269 [4th Dept 2015] [where "the actions of correction personnel have violated the due process safeguards contained in 7 NYCRR parts 252 through 254, those actions will not receive immunity" [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).
In Ramirez v State of New York (175 AD3d 1635, 1638 [3d Dept 2019]) the Appellate Division, Third Department stated that "a wrongful confinement action cannot be based on the mishandling of a urine sample because the violation of drug testing directives does not constitute a due process violation" (see Miller v State of New York, (156 AD3d 1067 [3d Dept 2017]). In Miller, the Court rejected an inmate's claim that the State lost its veil of absolute immunity when drug testing directives were violated, stating that those directives "do not relate to the due process concerns of the hearing and do not serve as a basis for the wrongful confinement cause of action" (id. at 1068). Thus, not all rule or regulation violations implicate due process protections, and, in turn, where there has been no due process violation, the State retains its absolute immunity (see, e.g., Bethune v State of New York, 50 Misc 3d 1216 [A] [Ct Cl, 2015], *3-4; Ramos v State, UID No. 2018-032-093 [Ct Cl, Hard, J., Dec. 28, 2018]; Claudio v State, UID No. 2018-054-016 [Ct Cl, Rivera, J., March 22, 2018]).
Thus, the Court finds and concludes that the proposed Claim asserting wrongful confinement based upon the alleged improper result of a urinalysis test lacks the appearance of merit. Accordingly, the Motion is denied.
May 4, 2020
Albany, New York
CHRISTOPHER J. McCARTHY
Judge of the Court of Claims The following papers were read and considered on Movant's application for permission to file a late claim: Papers Numbered Notice of Motion, Affidavit, & Exhibit Attached 1 Affirmation in Opposition & Exhibit Attached 2