Opinion
1D2022-3095
07-24-2024
Derek Martin Griffin, Appellant, v. Angela Mary Griffin (n/k/a Angela Mary Groves), Appellee.
Paul Bailey of Welton Law Firm, LLC, Crestview, for Appellant. Clark H. Henderson of Henderson Law Firm, P.A., Shalimar, for Appellee.
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County. Lacey Powell Clark, Judge.
Paul Bailey of Welton Law Firm, LLC, Crestview, for Appellant.
Clark H. Henderson of Henderson Law Firm, P.A., Shalimar, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, the former husband, challenges the trial court's post judgment order that refused to adjust the value of the marital home and increase the amount of money awarded to former husband as his share of the home. We affirm.
In the final judgment of dissolution of marriage entered in July 2018, the parties' marriage was dissolved, and their assets were equitably divided and distributed. The former wife was awarded the marital home, valued at $138,413. The former wife had sought an unequal distribution of the home because her father had paid off the mortgage on the home, but the trial court declined to do so. The final judgment obligated the former husband to execute a quitclaim deed of his interest in the home. The final judgment also obligated the former wife to make an equalizing payment to the former husband.
The former husband challenged the equitable distribution scheme in the final judgment claiming that the proceeds from a workers' compensation settlement he received were improperly divided. On appeal, we agreed and "reverse[d] the equitable distribution portion of the dissolution judgment and remand[ed] to the trial court for additional findings or reconsideration of the equitable distribution scheme." Griffin v. Griffin, 273 So.3d 282, 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).
On remand from our opinion, in January 2020, the trial court reduced the value of the workers' compensation settlement awarded to the former husband and increased the equalization payment owed by the former wife to former husband. But otherwise the equitable distribution remained unchanged. Neither party appealed the revised equitable distribution scheme in the amended final judgment, which continued to award the former wife the marital home and continued to value it at $138,413.
Post judgment, the parties continued to litigate attorney's fees and costs as well as the former husband's child support arrearage, resulting in the former husband owing money to the wife for both. The trial court applied the money the former husband owed to partially offset the equalization payment the former wife owed him.
In July 2022, the former husband filed a pro se motion claiming that value of the home had changed, so he was entitled to have the value from any sale equally divided. He did not move to set aside either the final judgment or the amended final judgment as inequitable. Rather, he argued that the valuation of the home in both judgments "was put in place to show if the house had been sold at the current market, what it would be worth." Following a hearing, the trial court disagreed and determined that the marital home would not be revalued and that the judgments did not require any of the proceeds from the sale of the home to be equally divided. The former husband then brought this appeal.
"We review the trial court's rulings on equitable distribution for an abuse of discretion." Briggs v. Briggs, 336 So.3d 1286, 1288 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (citing Schroll v. Schroll, 227 So.3d 232, 235 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)). In dissolving a marriage, a trial court is required to equitably divide marital assets and debts considering certain statutory requirements. § 61.075(1)(a)-(j), Fla. Stat.
If the court awards a cash payment for the purpose of equitable distribution of marital assets, to be paid in full or in installments, the full amount ordered shall vest when the judgment is awarded and the award shall not terminate upon remarriage or death of either party, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, but shall be treated as a debt owed from the obligor or the obligor's estate to the obligee or the obligee's estate, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties.§ 61.075(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).
The former husband had 30 days to challenge the equitable distribution of marital assets and debts in the amended final judgment. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b). He failed to do so in early 2020 and cannot do so now. By the explicit terms of section 61.075(2), Florida Statutes, the equalizing payment to the former husband vested when it was awarded in the amended final judgment and cannot be challenged now. "Where a trial court has acquired jurisdiction to adjudicate the respective rights and obligations of the parties, a final judgment of dissolution settles all such matters and bars all subsequent litigation by either party to determine rights and obligations evolving during the marriage." Steinfeld v. Steinfeld, 553 So.2d 774, 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (citing Davis v. Dieujuste, 496 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1986)). "[A] final decree in an equity suit settles all property rights of the parties and bars any action thereafter brought by either party to determine the question of property rights." Finston v. Finston, 37 So.2d 423, 423-24 (Fla. 1948) (citations omitted). When property rights are decided in a dissolution of marriage judgment, res judicata applies to prevent either party from relitigating the issue. Id. at 424.
The former husband argues on appeal that Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540(b)(5) applies to grant him relief since "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." That was not the argument that the former husband made below. Rather, he claimed that various predecessor judges had said that "money from the marital home must be equally divided." But that is not what the final judgment or amended final judgment said. Since the former husband did not raise rule 12.540(b)(5) in the trial court, we cannot reverse on those grounds. See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982) ("Furthermore, in order for an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below.").
Even if the former husband had brought a claim under rule 12.540(b)(5) in the trial court, it would fail. To sustain such a claim there must be "new circumstances" post judgment. Schmidt v. Nipper, 287 So.3d 1289, 1294 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). The fact that the former marital home may have appreciated in value is not a new circumstance. See Reese v. Levin, 123 So. 809, 811 (Fla. 1929) (noting that courts will take judicial notice of the "unstable or fluctuating values of real estate"). The former husband is no more entitled to relief than the former wife would be had the marital home depreciated in value in the intervening years since the amended final judgment was entered.
AFFIRMED.
BILBREY and TANENBAUM, JJ, concur; B.L. THOMAS, J., dissents.
B.L. THOMAS, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The former husband's pro se motion should have been treated as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540(b)(5), which allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment on the basis that "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." The final judgment specifically ordered an equitable distribution concerning the marital home and declined former wife's motion for an unequal distribution of the home. The final judgment also appeared to contemplate that the ancillary matters then pending would be resolved more quickly than they were. It could not have contemplated the significant increase in the home's value due to rising home prices before the matter was finally resolved by payment of the equalization amount. Because of this significant increase in home value, "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.540(b)(5).
The fact that former husband was acting pro se below and therefore did not precisely articulate the legal character of the relief he sought should not make a difference. "All pleadings shall be construed so as to do substantial justice." Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.110(g). Furthermore, equitable distribution in dissolution of marriage proceedings is governed by section 61.075, Florida Statutes, and proceedings under Chapter 61 are in equity. § 61.011, Fla. Stat. ("Proceedings under this chapter are in chancery.").
Accordingly, I would vacate the order on appeal and remand the matter to the lower court for equitable distribution of the home at its actual sale price, with consideration also of any expenses that the former wife paid to maintain the home from the time of entry of the final judgment to the date of sale.