Opinion
2015-04-02
In re Travis D. GRIFFIN, Petitioner–Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Respondents–Respondents.
Travis D. Griffin, appellant pro se. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Drake A. Colley of counsel), for respondents.
Travis D. Griffin, appellant pro se. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Drake A. Colley of counsel), for respondents.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Lucy Billings, J.), entered October 30, 2013, which denied the petition to annul the determination of respondent New York City Civil Service Commission, dated December 8, 2011, affirming petitioner's disqualification by the New York City Department of Correction for the position of probation officer on the ground that he was not psychologically suited for the position, and dismissed the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
The determination that petitioner is not psychologically qualified for the position of probation officer has a rational basis in the record and is not arbitrary and capricious ( see Matter of Talamo v. Murphy, 38 N.Y.2d 637, 382 N.Y.S.2d 3, 345 N.E.2d 546 [1976]; Civil Service Law § 50[4][b] ). Petitioner underwent written and in-person psychological evaluations for the Department of Probation (DOP) by a psychologist who found that petitioner was “not qualified psychologically” for the position of probation officer. Although on the administrative appeal petitioner produced a report from his own psychologist opining that he was mentally competent and a suitable candidate for the position, “[i]t is not for the courts to choose between ... diverse professional opinions. That is the function of the proper department heads and as long as they act reasonably and responsibly, the courts will not interfere” ( Matter of Palozzolo v. Nadel, 83 A.D.2d 539, 539, 441 N.Y.S.2d 673 [1st Dept.1981] [internal quotation marks omitted], affd.55 N.Y.2d 984, 449 N.Y.S.2d 200, 434 N.E.2d 269 [1982] ). We note moreover that both reports were reviewed by a third psychologist, who concurred in the DOP psychologist's finding of psychological disqualification.
Petitioner has been given procedural due process ( see Pinder v. City of New York, 49 A.D.3d 280, 853 N.Y.S.2d 312 [1st Dept.2008]; Matter of Tully Constr. Co. v. Hevesi, 214 A.D.2d 465, 466, 625 N.Y.S.2d 531 [1st Dept.1995] ). He was afforded an administrative appeal, at which he availed himself of the opportunity to make submissions, including the report of his own psychologist, and the administrative determinationhas undergone judicial review for rationality. No hearing was provided for by statute or otherwise procedurally required ( see Talamo, 38 N.Y.2d at 639, 382 N.Y.S.2d 3, 345 N.E.2d 546; Matter of Albury v. New York City Civ. Serv. Commn., 32 A.D.2d 895, 302 N.Y.S.2d 3 [1st Dept.1969], affd.27 N.Y.2d 694, 314 N.Y.S.2d 13, 262 N.E.2d 219 [1970] ).
We have considered petitioner's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.