Opinion
Civil Action No. 17 - 1560
11-05-2018
TODD GRIFFIN, Plaintiff, v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY PRISON, SUPERINTENDENT ORLANDO HARPER, and DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR JOHN WILLIAMS., Defendants.
District Judge Arthur J. Schwab
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Orlando Harper and the Allegheny County Jail (ECF No. 15) be granted as to Allegheny County Jail and denied as to Orlando Harper. It is also recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant John Williams (ECF No. 23) be denied.
II. REPORT
A. Procedural Background
Todd Griffin ("Plaintiff") is a former inmate of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and proceeding in this action pro se. He initiated this action by the filing of a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1), which was granted on December 4, 2017 (ECF No. 2). His Complaint, which was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was docketed by the Clerk the same day. (ECF No. 3.)
Defendants Orlando Harper and the Allegheny County Prison filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on April 5, 2018 (ECF No. 15), and Defendant Williams filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 10, 2018 (ECF No. 23). Plaintiff filed responses in opposition to the Motions on May 11, 2018 (ECF No. 26) and June 1, 2018 (ECF No. 30), respectively. They are now ripe for review.
B. Standard of Review
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized the standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
Under the "notice pleading" standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward with "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a "plausible" claim for relief, and "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Although "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff "need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117-18 (3d Cir.2013).Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. Apr. 3, 2014).
When considering pro se pleadings, a court must employ less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a § 1983 action, the court must "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.") (quoting Higgins, 293 F.3d at 688). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 2102 (10th Cir. 1996).
C. Discussion
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully held in custody at the Allegheny County Jail ("ACJ") after he was sentenced to time served on June 21, 2016. He states that he spoke and wrote to both Defendant Orlando Harper, Warden of the ACJ, and Defendant John Williams, the ACJ Administrator, but that neither of them took action after they were informed of the situation. (ECF No. 3, generally.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 3, p.2.)
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiff was lawfully detained pursuant to a valid criminal case; (2) Plaintiff's claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); (3) they are entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) Plaintiff's only remedy is to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 24, generally.)
First, the Court notes that Plaintiff claims that his rights were violated under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution (ECF No. 3, p.2), but, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently stated that, unlike some other courts, it "has always analyzed over-detention claims under the Eighth Amendment. . . ." Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 247 (3d Cir. 2017); Compare, Barnes v. District of Columbia, 242 F.R.D. 113, 118 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2007) (stating that most courts that have considered over-detention claims have agreed that they are properly channeled through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). However, the Third Circuit has acknowledged that it has always applied the Eighth Amendment because each of their over-detention cases involved convicted and sentenced inmates. Wharton, 854 F.3d at 247 (citing cases). In addressing over-detention claims made by pretrial detainees, the Third Circuit has said that there is no applicable provision more specific than the Due Process Clause, and, while acknowledging that the protections of the Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clauses are sometimes the same, it declined to examine the differences between those two analyses in the context of over-detention. Id.
Plaintiff's custody status at the time of the alleged over-detention is unknown. Nevertheless, in the context of a convicted and sentenced inmate, the Third Circuit has stated that
[a]n inmate's detention after his term of imprisonment can, under certain circumstances, constitute cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 250 (3d Cir. 2010). Continued incarceration beyond that point is clearly punitive, and in many cases will serve no penological justification at all. Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1108 (3d Cir. 1989). That said, we also recognize that "[t]he administration of a system of punishment entails an unavoidable risk of error" and that "[e]limitation of the risk of error in many instances would be either literally impossible or unfeasible because prohibitively costly." Id. The Eighth Amendment does not, and could not, require the elimination of all such risk of error.Wharton, 854 F.3d at 241.
The Third Circuit has established a three-part test for over-detention claims. Specifically, a plaintiff must show:
(1) a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner's problem and thus of the risk that unwarranted punishment was being, or would be, inflicted; (2) the official either failed to act or took only ineffectual action under the circumstances, indicating that his response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner's plight; and (3) a causal connection between the official's response to the problem and the unjustified detention.Montanez, 603 F.3d at 252.
In the present matter, Defendants aver that even accepting his allegations as true Plaintiff has failed to set forth a prima facie case of over-detention. In support of their position, they argue that another criminal case was initiated against Plaintiff on June 26, 2016, which was less than a week after Plaintiff was sentenced to time served for the criminal case on June 21, 2016. They state that Plaintiff remained in custody for the pendency of the criminal case that was initiated against him on June 26, 2016 because he was unable to post his $50,000 bail but that Plaintiff was given credit for the 164 days that he served in the ACJ while waiting for the adjudication of that case. Defendants' argument, however, is misplaced as it fails to address Plaintiff's actual claim - that he was over-detained after he was sentenced to time served on June 21, 2016.
Plaintiff has indeed stated a claim for over-detention under the aforementioned three-part test. Even though Plaintiff does not specify for how long he remained in custody after he was sentenced to time served on June 21, 2016, he does state that he made repeated attempts to remedy the situation through contact with Defendants Harper and Williams. Whether or not he was lawfully in custody for another criminal matter on June 26, 2016 is of little importance to answering the question presented. Having said this, the undersigned is of the opinion that a brief period of discovery will reveal whether Plaintiff was in fact over-detained and whether Defendants were aware of, but deliberately indifferent to the situation.
According to public records, Plaintiff was in and out of the ACJ on numerous occasions in 2016, and it may very well be that he is mistaken on the exact days he was detained and under what charges. --------
However, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Defendant Allegheny County Jail. In the Third Circuit, it is well-settled that a jail or prison is not a "person" that is subject to suit under § 1983. See Amaro v. Montgomery County, No. 06-3131, 2008 WL 4148610, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2008) (noting that the Montgomery County Correctional Facility was not a "person" for purposes of § 1983); Ramalho v. Montgomery County Corr. Facility, No. 06-2036, 2007 WL 1810700, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2007) (dismissing county jail since "for purposes of the § 1983 claim" it was "not a 'person' amenable to suit"); Meyers v. Schuylkill County Prison, No. 04-1123, 2006 WL 559467, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2006) (holding that a county prison is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983); Jackson v. Pennsylvania, No. 08-1297, 2008 WL 4279544, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008) (holding same); Kelly v. York County Prison, No. 08-1813, 2008 WL 4601797, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2008) (noting that a "prison or correctional facility is not a person within the meaning of § 1983" and "the York County Prison is clearly not a person and may not be sued under § 1983); Sponsler v. Berks County Prison, No. 95-1136, 1995 WL 92370, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb.28, 1995) ("A prison is not a 'person' subject to suit under the civil rights laws.") (citation omitted); Dixon v. Montgomery County Corr. Facility, No. 89-0972,1989 WL 14073, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 1989) (dismissing complaint against correctional facility since "[a] prison is not a 'person' for the purposes of § 1983"); Wiggins v. Montgomery County Corr. Fac., No. 87-6992, 1987 WL 14721, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov.16, 1987) ("[T]he Montgomery County Correctional Facility is not a person under § 1983."); Mitchell v. Chester County Farms Prison, 426 F.Supp. 271, 274 (E.D. Pa.1976) ("Defendants assert that Chester County Farms Prison is not a 'person' subject to suit under the federal civil rights law. I agree."); see also Adams v. Hunsberger, 262 F. App'x 478, 481 (3d Cir. 2008) (unpublished opinion) ("The District Court properly concluded that [the plaintiffs'] claims against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections were barred, as it is not a 'person' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983."); Phippen v. Nish, 223 F. App'x 191, 192 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished opinion) (noting same with respect to state correctional institution); Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 264 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming on other grounds and observing that "[t]he District Court dismissed Clarion County Jail as a defendant in this case, stating 'it is well established in the Third Circuit that a prison is not a "person" subject to suit under federal civil rights laws'"); Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1973) (New Jersey prison medical department held not a "person" under § 1983). Accordingly, the ACJ should be dismissed from this action.
Defendants Harper and Williams next argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they acted in a reasonable and appropriate manner - Defendant Harper by holding Plaintiff for failing to post his $50,000 bail bond for the criminal case initiated against him on June 26, 2016, and Defendant Williams because it is not clear that he had the discretion to release Plaintiff. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Both Defendants, however, fail to recognize that Plaintiff's claim is for his over-detention after June 21, 2016, not after June 26, 2016, and there is a substantial body of law in support of the proposition that a plaintiff who alleges over-detention, sometimes even for a very short period of time, states a claim for a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2004); Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1989); Lewis v. O'Grady, 853 F.2d 1366 (7th Cir. 1988); Barnes v. District of Columbia, 242 F.R.D. 113 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2007). There is also clearly established law that a prison official who had "access to all of the relevant inmate records and . . . [the] training in how to decipher them . . . was in the best position either to solve the problem himself or know who could[,]" and, as a result had "the duty expeditiously to unravel sentencing problems." Sample, 885 F.2d at 1112. Given that inmates/detainees had a clearly established right against over-detention at the time of the alleged conduct in this case and prison officials with the ability to access and address an inmate/detainee's complaint of over-detention had a duty to do so, Defendants Harper and Williams are not entitled to qualified immunity.
Defendants Harper and Williams also argue that Plaintiff's claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which provides:
[T]o recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. However, this rule only applies when "a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence." Id. at 487. In this case, Plaintiff does not dispute the validity of his conviction or corresponding sentence at all. Instead, the conflict centers on the amount of time he was held in excess of his valid conviction or sentence. A finding for Plaintiff based on the period he was held beyond his original sentence would not imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence, and therefore does not trigger the application of Heck's favorable termination rule. For this same reason, Defendants' final argument, that Plaintiff is attempting to challenge his present incarceration and must do so through a petition for writ of habeas corpus, is also without merit. It is clear that Plaintiff is challenging his detention after he was sentenced to time-served. Therefore, the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Harper and Williams should be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Orlando Harper and the Allegheny County Jail (ECF No. 15) be granted as to Allegheny County Jail and denied as to Orlando Harper. It is also recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant John Williams (ECF No. 23) be denied.
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) & (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this report and recommendation to file written objections thereto. Plaintiff's failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of his appellate rights.
Dated: November 5, 2018.
/s/ Lisa Pupo Lenihan
Lisa Pupo Lenihan
United States Magistrate Judge cc: Todd Griffin
Millvale CRR
405 North Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15209
Counsel for Defendants
(Via CM/ECF electronic mail)