Opinion
November 20, 1952.
November 25, 1952.
Attorney — Disbarment — Grounds — Conviction of crime — Conspiracy to defraud.
In a disbarment proceeding, in which it appeared that the respondent, an attorney, who had been a United States Commissioner, had been convicted, with others, of conspiracy to defraud the United States in the issuance of passports, the order of the court below disbarring respondent from practice was affirmed.
Before STERN, C. J., STEARNE, JONES, BELL, CHIDSEY and MUSMANNO, JJ.
Appeal, No. 176, Jan. T., 1952, from decree of Court of Common Pleas No. 7 of Philadelphia County, March T., 1950, No. 6,718, in re Norman J. Griffin. Decree affirmed.
Proceeding upon petition and rule to show cause why respondent should not be disbarred.
The facts are stated in the opinion by PARRY, J., GORDON, P. J., dissenting, GORDON, P. J., PARRY and MAWHINNEY, JJ., of the court below, as follows:
The Committee of Censors of the Philadelphia Bar Association entered a rule on Norman J. Griffin to show cause why he should not be disbarred from practicing in the Courts of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in pursuance of Section 56 of the by-laws of the Association which provides that: "It shall be the duty of the Committee of Censors to apply for the disbarment of any lawyer who has been convicted of crime and the conviction sustained."
The petition for the rule sets forth that the said Griffin, then a United States Commissioner of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, was indicted, with others, for conspiracy to defraud the United States in the issuance of passports. He pleaded not guilty and was tried by a jury which rendered a verdict of guilty; that on January 24, 1949 a sentence of imprisonment for a year and six months was imposed and on February 9, 1950, the mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, affirming the judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was filed and thereafter on March 11, 1950 the District Court denied Griffin's petition for reconsideration of the sentence of imprisonment.
In his Answer the respondent sets forth that the by-laws of the Bar Association do not provide for necessary disbarment but for discipline, as the circumstances may warrant; that the facts of the case do not warrant his disbarment and an opportunity to present the facts to the Court should be afforded him which, as he was then confined to prison, he was unable to do; he therefore requested that a hearing upon the Petition and Answer be postponed until he was able to appear personally and call witnesses in his behalf. This indulgence was granted and since his release from the Federal Prison two hearings have been had and his case has been fully presented by himself and his counsel.
It is argued in his behalf that he was improperly convicted; that the government witnesses were unworthy of credence; that certain irregular actions which he admits performing were at most venial offenses; that the Court can only disbar for moral turpitude; that the offenses do not amount to moral turpitude and that in order to determine this question it is our duty to review the record in the District Court, and in this connection we are referred to a case in another state, Matter of Kaufmann, 245 N.Y. 423, as persuasive.
As to this it is sufficient to say that the law of New York is unlike that of Pennsylvania, and the conditions which made it a duty of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York to inquire into proceedings in the Federal Court are not present here. We need not decide whether we are concluded by the verdict of the jury as in order that the fullest consideration may be given to the respondent's contentions, we have perused the voluminous testimony taken at the trial, together with the remarks of the Trial Judge, and find nothing therein that is helpful to the respondent.
Briefly the record shows that certain Chinamen (who were indicted with Griffin and his co-defendant Belcher, a Deputy Clerk in the District Court) desired to obtain passports for Chinamen who wanted to travel outside of the United States and wished to re-enter the country later. Applications for passports were made in their behalf which were filed with Belcher, whose duty it was to accept properly verified applications and forward them to the State Department in Washington. Each application filed was supported by two affidavits; one, purporting to be made by the applicant, set forth that he was born in San Francisco, California, prior to the earthquake and fire, in which the record of his birth was said to have been destroyed. The second affidavit, in lieu of the missing birth certificate, set forth that the application was, to the affiant's personal knowledge, born in San Francisco. These affidavits, to which Griffin affixed his jurat were obtained from him by one or another of the Chinese defendants, one of whom testified that he paid Griffin various sums of money ranging from $50. to $200. for the affidavits. In certain cases the Chinese did not appear at all before Griffin and sometimes he executed the affidavits in blank; gave them to the go-between who subsequently had signatures affixed thereto, presented them to the Deputy Clerk who accepted an honorarium for forwarding them to Washington.
One affidavit purporting to have been prepared by Griffin's employe, one Leah Bowman, on May 20, 1942, went from Griffin through Belcher to Washington and was sent back because it was not signed by anybody. A corrected affidavit was then prepared in Griffin's office as if executed by Leah Bowman. She denied that she ever signed it and stated that she was not even in Griffin's employment on May 20, 1942, when she was represented as preparing the original affidavit. It was further shown that at the time she was a patient in St. Luke's Hospital, Philadelphia. At his trial Griffin did not deny these transactions but attempted to explain them on the ground of inadvertence, haste, pressure of business and the like. He did, however, deny accepting the bribes.
The exculpation attempted before us is first: That the acts done by him were not done in his capacity as an attorney but as a United States Commissioner and therefore such acts should not be considered in a petition charging that he had been guilty of non-professional conduct and should be disbarred from further practice. This we dismiss without discussion. Next we do not think that respondent's attacks on the credibility of the government's witnesses deserve consideration by us. Their evidence was heard by a jury that accepted it and rejected the respondent's denials.
With regard to the question of moral turpitude, no doubt there are improper acts performed by attorneys, for which the law requires disbarment, that may not come within a strict definition of moral turpitude which is defined as baseness or depravity. But here we doubt that we are much concerned with nice distinctions or definitions and in any case we think the respondent's actions do amount to baseness and depravity. Both a sworn officer of the Court and a government official he took part, with others, in a series of transactions designed to defraud the Government by securing passports for persons who were not entitled to receive them and for his complaisance accepted bribes in substantial amounts. These transactions succeeded one another at frequent intervals for nearly two years, and, as the Trial Judge observed, are inconsistent with any possible inference except that of guilt.
If we understand the respondent's position he appears to think it a comparatively venial offense for anyone, who has taken an oath that qualifies him to administer oaths, to certify that someone has personally appeared before him and sworn to the truth of certain averments when that person has not appeared and so sworn; and it is asserted that notaries and commissioners often take a third person's word as to the signature on an affidavit. We do not think the fact, if it be one, that other officials violate their oaths of office will serve to excuse the respondent for indulging in such a practice.
The fact is undeniable that the respondent was a participant in a scheme to defraud the Government he was sworn to defend; a scheme that could not have succeeded without him. He denies guilty knowledge but apart from the findings of the jury, the inferences to be drawn from the circumstances are all against him.
The number of New York Chinamen all under the misfortune of losing their birth certificates in the San Francisco fire who preferred to undergo the trouble and expense of a journey to Philadelphia and return rather than make application in the District Court for the Southern District of New York where equal facilities for obtaining passports exist, might well excite suspicion in the most unwary mind, but the respondent not only made no inquiry but certified falsely in a number of cases that the affiants whom he never saw and of whom he knew nothing had appeared before him and complied with the requirements of the law. Haste, inadvertence or pressure of other business cannot be held to excuse or even palliate such a gross dereliction of duty.
The respondent has been convicted of a crime and the basis of his conviction was his unethical and dishonest practice of participating in a fraudulent scheme. He cannot even plead in extenuation sudden and overpowering temptation to relieve a pressing emergency, for the preparation of the plan involved some thought and time, and its execution was repeated over and over again for a period of nearly two years.
We have no jurisdiction to retry the issue of the respondent's guilt. That has been finally determined by the proper tribunals and we are solely concerned to ascertain whether his character conforms to the required standards. It appears to us that he has throughout displayed such a lack of moral perception as to demonstrate his unfitness for the practice of law and it is our duty to announce that under the evidence presented to us, he should be disbarred.
Respondent appealed.
John M. Smith, Jr., for appellant.
Ralph S. Croskey, with him John Martin Doyle, for appellee.
The decree of the court below is affirmed on the opinion of Judges PARRY and MAWHINNEY.
It was suggested during the course of the argument that the degree of appellant's moral turpitude disclosed in the record of the disbarment proceedings did not justify his disbarment, but, at most, his suspension for a limited period of time. This suggestion would, more properly, be for the consideration of the court if an application for reinstatement be filed at some future time.