Summary
In Grieve, the prosecutor also referenced the trial judge's instruction on the defendant's right to remain silent, in direct response to a juror's statement that he would “probably have to hear from the defense” about what occurred.
Summary of this case from Smith v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrs.Opinion
No. 98-1081
Opinion filed April 7, 1999 JANUARY TERM 1999
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Richard D. Eade, Judge; L.T. Case No. 95-22451 CF10A.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Joseph R. Chloupek, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and James J. Carney, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
We affirm appellant's conviction for manslaughter. This case is distinguishable from Varona v. State, 674 So.2d 823 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In this case, at the beginning of the voir dire, the trial judge correctly and extensively stated the law regarding a defendant's right to remain silent at trial. Appellant did not object to any part of the court's explanation. As the supreme court indicated in Andrews v. State, 443 So.2d 78, 84 (Fla. 1983), the trial judge's recitation of correct instructions on a defendant's right to remain silent at trial, such as those contained at Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 1.01, is not error, even when given over the objection of a defendant. See Rosa v. State, 696 So.2d 1299, 1301 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). The prosecutor's reference to the right to remain silent during voir dire was in response to a potential juror's statement that he would "probably have to hear from the defense and see if it was an accident case or how the shooting occurred." In response to this assertion, the prosecutor referred to the trial judge's earlier remarks without misstating the law. UnlikeVarona, this is not a case where the prosecutor first broached the issue of the defendant's right to remain silent during voir dire, in a way that tended to devalue the right by "innuendo or faint praise." 674 So.2d at 825.
AFFIRMED.
DELL, SHAHOOD and GROSS, JJ., concur.