Opinion
FSTCV136019725S
11-20-2015
Anne Grey v. Greenwich Hills Association, Inc. et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
David R. Tobin, Judge Trial Referee.
In her third amended complaint dated June 5, 2014 (#135.00), the plaintiff, Anne Grey, asserts various causes of action against the defendants, Greenwich Hills Association, Inc. (Greenwich Hills), a homeowners' association for a condominium development in Greenwich, and the Property Group of Connecticut, Inc. (Property Group), the managing agent formerly retained by Greenwich Hills. In her third amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that she is the owner of unit 44 in the development, and that after purchasing the unit, she desired to expand and improve a patio outside her unit, which was described in the condominium documents as a " limited common area reserved for the exclusive use of unit 44." She further alleges that she submitted preliminary plans for her proposed expansion of the patio to the Property Group in early 2011, which, in turn provided the plans to the board of directors of Greenwich Hills (board of directors).
The plaintiff claims that the board of directors approved her proposal in June 2011 and that in February 2013, the plaintiff's contractor submitted a revised set of plans to the Property Group. Work on the project began in April 2013 and proceeded to the extent that the old patio had been removed when the board of directors of Greenwich Hills ordered that work on the project be stopped because of " several issues." In response to a demand from the board of directors, on April 23, 2013, the plaintiff entered into a contract with the Property Group to oversee the masonry work being done on the expanded patio.
Thereafter, the plaintiff submitted additional revisions to her plans, which the board of directors ultimately rejected. The board's disapproval and its failure to reverse its position led to the filing of the original complaint claiming relief in the form of a declaratory judgment and an injunction preventing the board from interfering with her revised plans for the patio.
Subsequently, the plaintiff moved to have the Property Group brought in as an additional defendant. The third amended complaint asserts the following counts against the Property Group: second count--declaratory judgment that the Property Group had consented to the plaintiff's patio project; fourth count--injunctive relief preventing the Property Group from taking any action, including the imposition of fines, against the plaintiff on the ground that her patio is in violation; sixth count--claim that by reason of promissory estoppel, the Property Group cannot withhold its approval of the plaintiff's patio project; and the ninth count--breach of the contract between the plaintiff and the Property Group.
Presently before the court is the Property Group's motion to strike dated September 9, 2014 (#141.00), which seeks to strike all of the aforementioned counts of the third revised complaint against the Property Group. A memorandum of law supporting the motion to strike was filed simultaneously with the motion (#142.00). The plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to strike on November 10, 2014. (#152.00.) The court heard the parties' arguments at short calendar on October 19, 2015. At that time, the plaintiff agreed to withdraw the second and fourth counts of her complaint because, in her view, those counts were no longer relevant once the Property Group ceased serving as managing agent for Greenwich Hills. Consequently, the motion to strike those counts and the corresponding prayers for relief became moot, therefore the court need only address the Property Group's motion to strike the sixth and ninth counts.
DISCUSSION
" The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any [pleading] . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). " [I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by [an opposing party's] motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006).
In its motion to strike, the Property Group claims that sixth count fails to allege the necessary elements of a claim of promissory estoppel. The Property Group further claims that the ninth count fails to alleges the necessary elements for a claim of breach of contract. The plaintiff counters that she has sufficiently pleaded claims upon which relief can be granted. The court will address each count in turn.
SIXTH COUNT--PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
In its memorandum of law filed in support of its motion to strike, the Property Group claims that the plaintiff has not alleged that the Property Group made any promises that would induce the plaintiff to reasonably rely upon such statements or actions to her detriment. Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, " [a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. A fundamental element of promissory estoppel, therefore, is the existence of a clear and definite promise which a promisor could reasonably have expected to induce reliance." (Citation omitted.) Stewart v. Cendant Mobility Services Corp., 267 Conn. 96, 104, 837 A.2d 736 (2003). " Although the promise must be clear and definite, it need not be the equivalent of an offer to enter into a contract because [t]he prerequisite for . . . application [of the doctrine of promissory estoppel] is a promise and not a bargain and not an offer." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Id., 105.
The Property Group points out that this court (Adams, J.T.R.) denied a motion to strike count three of the first amended complaint, which alleged that Greenwich Hills had implicitly promised that if the plaintiff performed the construction according to the approved plans, the defendant would not fine the plaintiff. (#113.87.) The Property Group claims that the court's ruling, in some fashion, establishes that the board of directors had the exclusive power to approve the plaintiff's plans and that the Property Group cannot be held liable.
In paragraph 60 of the sixth count of the complaint, the plaintiff does indeed allege that she received approval of her patio project from Greenwich Hills, and relied on that approval in expending sums to complete the project. There is no mention of the Property Group in that paragraph. However, in paragraph 61 (also included in the sixth count), the plaintiff alleges that she " relied upon the monitoring of the patio project by Property Group and relied upon that monitoring to expend considerable sums to complete the project and to pay for the monitor." In paragraph 62 she alleges that the Property Group, while monitoring the project, never objected in any way to the patio project and " [d]espite the promise to ensure compliance, the Property Group never made any statement that the Project failed to comply in any way." Taken together, the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the Property Group made clear and definite promises that the plaintiff reasonably relied upon and that the Property Group should have reasonably expected would induce the plaintiff's reliance.
The court finds that the allegations of the sixth count sufficiently allege a cause of action against the Property Group based on promissory estoppel. The motion to strike that count is accordingly denied.
NINTH COUNT--BREACH OF CONTRACT
The elements of a breach of contract action are " the formation of an agreement, performance by one party, breach of the agreement by the other party and damages." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosato v. Mascardo, 82 Conn.App. 396, 844 A.2d 893 (2004).
In its memorandum filed in support of its motion to strike, the Property Group claims that the plaintiff has failed to allege the necessary elements of a cause of action for breach of contract. Specifically, the Property Group argues that the plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that the Property Group breached the contract yet because the patio has not been found in violation by Greenwich Hills and, therefore, the cause of action is not ripe for adjudication.
" As we have recognized, justiciability comprises several related doctrines, namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and the political question doctrine, that implicate a court's subject matter jurisdiction and its competency to adjudicate a particular matter." (Footnote omitted.) Office of Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, 271 Conn. 540, 569, 858 A.2d 709 (2004). In Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 952 A.2d 1 (2008), a creditor sued a debtor's attorney asserting claims of fraud, tortious interference with contract, and conspiracy. After a jury found in favor of the creditor, the attorney appealed claiming that the claims against him were not ripe for adjudication because a trustee representing the debtor's bankrupt estate had not yet completed his efforts to recover assets which the debtor had transferred prior to the bankruptcy and, therefore, the amount of damages could not yet be determined. The court held that " in determining whether a case is ripe, a trial court must be satisfied that the case before it does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire." Id., 86-87. " Pursuant to Connecticut's ripeness jurisprudence, as long as it is clear that a plaintiff has suffered an injury sufficient to give rise to the cause of action alleged, a lack of certainty as to the precise scope of damages will not prevent the claim from being justiciable." Id., 87-88.
In the present case, the plaintiff alleged that she entered into a monitoring contract with the Property Group that stated that the Property Group wound ensure that the patio was built according to the approved plans, and that the monitoring contract was breached when the plaintiff was notified that a hearing would be held to discuss several construction violations. The plaintiff alleged damages through the cost of contracting with the Property Group and a $25 per day fine that is currently accruing for the alleged construction violations. The Property Group points out that the plaintiff's claim is based on the possibility that Greenwich Hills will prevail in its defense of the plaintiff's claims and that, as a consequence, the plaintiff will suffer damages for which the Property Group is responsible because of its failure to properly perform its duties under the monitoring agreement. In other words, the Property Group argues that there will only be a breach of contract if the plaintiff's patio is found to be in violation. Apparently, the Property Group believes that the law requires the plaintiff to await the outcome of its suit against Greenwich Hills before it maintains a breach of contract action against the Property Group. The court disagrees.
In this case, the plaintiff clearly suffered an injury when, despite the Property Group's monitoring of her patio project, the board found that the project was in violation of the approvals which it had previously granted. There is no risk that the Property Group will have a judgment against it for damages in excess of those actually sustained by the plaintiff. Since the issues involving all parties will be tried together, the Property Group will have ample opportunity to demonstrate either that it did not breach the monitoring agreement or that any damages the plaintiff may have suffered were not the result of the Property Group's breach.
The plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to support her claim for breach of contract. The court finds the motion to strike the ninth count is without merit and the motion is, accordingly, denied.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the Property Group's motion to strike counts six and nine are denied.