Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 01-3210-GTV
November 12, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Charles R. Greer brings the instant action claiming that while he was incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas, a correctional officer impounded all of Plaintiff's property, which included twelve inches of legal materials, and failed to return the legal materials to him. Plaintiff filed a claim for the alleged value of the lost property with the prison. The prison offered Plaintiff a settlement, and Plaintiff declined to accept it. Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 2671-2680. The action is before the court on several motions: Defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment (Doc. 26); Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 37); Plaintiff's motion for reimbursement of costs (Doc. 55); and Plaintiff's motion for a psychiatric, psychological, and physical examination (Doc. 62).
The United States moves to dismiss plaintiffs complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The United States claims that this court lacks jurisdiction because the government has sovereign immunity. The court agrees, and grants the motion to dismiss. The other motions are necessarily denied as moot.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment Plaintiff's Claim for the Loss of his Legal Materials
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States is generally protected from lawsuits unless it waives immunity. Nat'l Commodity Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 1989). "A party suing the United States, its agencies or officers, must allege both a basis for the court's jurisdiction and a specific statute containing a waiver of the government's immunity from suit." Thomas v. Pierce, 662 F. Supp. 519, 523 (D. Kan. 1987) (citations omitted). The FTCA acts as a waiver of sovereign immunity, permitting an action:
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). In permitting such an action, the FTCA confers subject matter jurisdiction on federal courts to hear certain tort claims against the United States. Bradley v. United States, 951 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the FTCA also has several exceptions which limit the waiver of sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a)-(n). When the exceptions apply, a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim against the United States. Hobdy v. United States, 762 F. Supp. 1459, 1461 (D. Kan. 1991). At issue in the instant case is the exception set out in § 2680(c), excepting "[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c). The United States claims that the alleged loss of Plaintiff's legal materials falls within this exception. The court agrees.
For the exception of § 2680(c) to apply in this case, two elements must be met: (1) the claim must "aris[e] in respect of . . . the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property"; and (2) the detention must be by a "law enforcement officer." Several courts, including both the Tenth Circuit and this court, have held that the misplacement of a prisoner's belongings after an inventory or confiscation arises in respect of the detention of goods. E.g., Walkner v. United States, No. 01-3225, 2002 WL 1773307, at *12 (10th Cir. Aug. 2, 2002) (holding that loss of prisoner's confiscated paintings arose in respect of detention of goods or merchandise); Hatten v. White, 275 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that § 2680 applied when prison officials detained prisoner's property and mailed it out of the prison); Parmelee v. Carlson, No. 95-1901, 1996 WL 64701, at *1 (8th Cir. Feb. 15, 1996) (holding that loss of inventoried prisoners property arose in respect of detention of goods or merchandise); Luster v. United States, No. 01-3242-KHV, 2002 WL 418010, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 6, 2002); Wilson v. United States, No. 99-3347-GTV, 2001 WL 761204, at *1 (D. Kan. June 26, 2001), aff'd, No. 01-3224, 2002 WL 12260 (10th Cir. Jan. 4, 2002); Johnson v. United States, No. 98-3092-KHV, 2000 WL 968795, at *3 (D. Kan. June 27, 2000); Dennison v. United States, No. 98-3243-KHV, 2000 WL 206317, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 14, 2000). In the instant case, prison officials impounded legal materials from plaintiff, a prisoner. The impoundment qualifies as a "detention," and the loss of Plaintiff's materials arose out of such detention.
Citing an unpublished case from the District of Minnesota, Plaintiff argues that the detention must have been "of a kind envisioned by the statute." Hernandez v. United States, No. 5-94-145, 1995 WL 692982, at *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 1995). He argues that the detention in the instant case was not "of a kind envisioned by the statute" because it was an unlawful detention according to Plaintiff, prison officials detained his property after it should have been returned, thereby keeping it unlawfully. The court disagrees. Regardless of whether prison officials continued detaining Plaintiff's property after it should have been returned, the detention still falls under the purview of § 2680(c).
Plaintiff next claims that any "detention" was not a detention of "goods" because "legal materials" are documents, which are specifically excepted from the Black's Law Dictionary definition of "goods." Plaintiff cites the following language in Black's Law Dictionary to support his position:
Goods. A term of variable content and meaning. It may include every species of personal property or it may be given a very restricted meaning. . . . As used with reference to secured transactions, goods include all things which are movable at the time the security interest attaches or which are fixtures, but does not include documents, instruments, . . . [or] chattel paper.
Black's Law Dictionary 694 (6th ed. 1991). The problem with Plaintiff's argument is he ignores the qualifier on the sentence stating that documents are not goods. The qualifier "[a]s used with reference to secured transactions" indicates that the sentence is only referring to secured transactions. This case does not involve a secured transaction. The court determines that Plaintiff's legal materials fall within the definition of "goods."
Plaintiff does not dispute that the detention in this case was by a law enforcement officer. Several courts, including this court, have held that prison officials are law enforcement officers under § 2680(c). E.g., Johnson, 2000 WL 968795, at *3 ("[I]t appears that every court to address the issue has held that prison officials are considered `other law enforcement officer[s]' under § 2680(c)."); Dennison, 2000 WL 206317, at *3 (same). This court in Dennison noted that "[t]hese decisions are consistent with the broad scope of the term `law enforcement officer' adopted by the Tenth Circuit . . . ." 2000 WL 206317, at *3 (citing several cases). Accordingly, the court concludes that the prison officials who allegedly lost or misplaced plaintiffs legal materials are law enforcement officers under § 2680(c).
In sum, the United States has not waived sovereign immunity in this case. The facts of this case fall within exception (c) of 28 U.S.C. § 2680, thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
Plaintiff's Claim for Emotional Distress
Plaintiff also seeks $5,000 in compensatory damages for the emotional distress he suffered as a result of preparing his case or, in the alternative, $5,000 in punitive damages. The court dismisses both of these claims.
Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his claim for emotional distress. As a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit under the FTCA, a prisoner must first file an administrative claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 892 F.2d 1457, 1463 (10th Cir. 1989). The court realizes that it earlier found Plaintiff had exhausted (Doc. 6), but upon further examination of the record, now determines that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to this claim. The court concludes that this claim should be dismissed without prejudice, based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust. Plaintiff is also advised that "[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see also Searles v. VanBebber, 251 F.3d 869, 876-77 (10th Cir. 2001).
The court also dismisses Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 prohibits punitive damages for claims brought under the FTCA. The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any claim by Plaintiff for punitive damages and dismisses the claim on such basis.
Plaintiff's Motions
Because the court grants Defendant's motion, all of Plaintiff's motions must be denied. The court denies Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 37) as moot. Because Plaintiff is not the prevailing party in the case, the court denies Plaintiff's motion for reimbursement of costs (Doc. 55). Finally, Plaintiff asks for a psychiatric, psychological, and physical examination only if the court holds a hearing or trial in this case. No hearing or trial will be held, so Plaintiff's motion (Doc. 62) is denied as moot.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment (Doc. 26) is granted. Plaintiffs claims for the value of his lost legal materials and for punitive damages are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs claim for emotional distress is dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motions for partial summary judgment (Doc. 37), for reimbursement of costs (Doc. 55), and for a psychiatric, psychological, and physical examination (Doc. 62) are denied as moot.
The case is closed.
Copies of this order shall be mailed to counsel of record and pro se Plaintiff.